- American airborne landings in Normandy
:"This article summarizes airborne operations by the United States during the
Normandy Landings. For British airborne operations, see Operation Tonga."Infobox Military Conflict|
Operation Overlord, Battle of Normandy
Operation Neptuneshowing final airborne routes
date=6 June to 13 July 1944
Cotentin Peninsula, Normandy, France
Matthew B. Ridgway Maxwell D. Taylor
Erich Marcks Wilhelm Falley
3,900 glider troops
5,700 USAAF aircrew
17,300 (OKW Reserve) [ [http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/index.html] compilation]
4,490 missing - Airborne losses only
casualties2=(whole campaign, not just against airborne units)
21,300 killed, wounded, and missing [ [http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/index.html] compilation]
The American airborne landings in Normandy were the first United States combat operations of Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy by the Western Allies on June 6, 1944. 13,100 paratroopers of the U.S. 82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne Divisions made night parachute drops early on
D-Day, June 6, followed by 3,937 glider troops flown in by day. cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://www.6juin1944.com/assaut/aeropus/en_page.php?page=statistics| title = Statistical Tables| format = | work = | publisher = D-Day: Etats des Lieux| accessdate = 24 June| accessyear = 2007 Includes pathfinders. All statistics, except where otherwise noted, are derived from this source, which referenced Warren.] As the opening maneuver of Operation Neptune(the assault operation for Overlord) the American airborne divisions were delivered to the continent in two parachute and six glider missions.
Both divisions were part of the U.S. VII Corps and provided it support in its mission of capturing
Cherbourgas soon as possible to provide the Allies with a port of supply. The specific missions of the airborne divisions were to block approaches into the vicinity of the amphibious landing at Utah Beach, to capture causewayexits off the beaches, and to establish crossings over the Douve Riverat Carentan to assist the U.S. V Corpsin merging the two American beachheads.
The assault did not succeed in blocking the approaches to Utah for three days. Numerous factors played a part, most of which dealt with excessive scattering of the drops. Despite this, German forces were unable to exploit the chaos. Many German units made a tenacious defense of their strongpoints, but all were systematically defeated within a week.
Except where footnoted, information in this article is from the USAF official history: Warren, "Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater"
Plans and revisions
Plans for the invasion of France went through several preliminary phases during 1943, during which the
Combined Chiefs of Staffallocated 13½ U.S. troop carrier groups to an undefined airborne assault. The actual size, objectives, and details of the plan were not drawn up until after Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhowerbecame Supreme Allied Commanderin January 1944. In mid-February Eisenhower received word from Headquarters U.S. Army Air Forcesthat the TO&Eof the C-47 Skytraingroups would be increased from 52 to 64 aircraft (plus 9 spares) by April 1 to meet his requirements. At the same time the U.S. First Armycommander, Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, won approval of a plan to land two airborne divisions on the Cotentin Peninsula, one to seize the beach causeways and block the eastern half at Carentanfrom German reinforcements, the other to block the western corridor at La Haye-du-Puitsin a second lift. The exposed and perilous nature of the La Haye de Puits mission was assigned to the combat veteran 82nd Airborne Division, while the causeway mission was given to the untested 101st, which received a new commander in March, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.
Bradley insisted that 75% of the airborne assault be delivered by gliders for concentration of forces. Because it would be unsupported by naval and corps artillery, the commander of the 82nd Airborne, Maj. Gen.
Matthew B. Ridgway, also wanted a glider assault to deliver his organic artillery. The use of gliders was planned until April 18, when tests under realistic conditions resulted in excessive accidents and destruction of many gliders. On April 28 the plan was changed; the entire assault force would be inserted at night in one lift by parachute drop, with gliders providing reinforcement during the day.
The Germans, who had neglected to fortify Normandy, began constructing defenses and obstacles against airborne assault in the Cotentin, including specifically the planned drop zones of the 82nd. At first no change in plans were made, but when significant German forces were moved into the Cotentin in mid-May, the drop zones of the 82nd were moved, even though detailed plans had been formulated and training had proceeded based on them.
Just ten days before D-Day, a compromise was reached. Because of the heavier German presence, First Army wanted the 82nd landed close to the 101st for mutual support if needed. VII Corps, however, wanted the drops made west of the Merderet to seize a bridgehead. On May 27 the drop zones were relocated ten miles (16 km) east of Le Haye-du-Puits along both sides of the Merderet. The 101st Airborne's 501st PIR, which had originally been given the task of capturing
Sainte-Mère-Église, was shifted to protect the Carentan flank, and the capture of Sainte-Mère-Église was assigned to the 505th PIR of the 82nd.
For the troop carriers, experiences in the invasion of Sicily dictated a route that avoided Allied naval forces and German anti-aircraft defenses along the eastern shore of the Cotentin. On April 12 a route was approved that would depart England at
Portland Bill, fly at low altitude southwest over water, then turn 90 degrees to the southeast and come in "by the back door" over the western coast. At the initial point the 82nd would continue straight to La Haye-du-Puits, and the 101st would make a small left turn and fly to Utah Beach. The plan called for a right turn after drops and a return on the reciprocal route.
However the change in drop zones on May 27 and the increased size of German defenses made the risk to the planes from ground fire much greater, and the routes were modified so that the 101st would fly a more southerly ingress route along the Douve River (which would also provide a better visual landmark at night for the inexperienced troop carrier pilots). Over the reluctance of the naval commanders, exit routes from the drop zones were changed to fly over Utah Beach, then northward in a ten-mile (16 km) wide "safety corridor", then northwest above
Cherbourg. As late as May 31 routes for the glider missions were changed to avoid overflying the peninsula in daylight.
IX Troop Carrier Command(TCC) was formed in October 1943 to carry out the airborne assault mission in the invasion. Gen. Paul Williams, who had commanded the troop carrier operations in Sicily and Italy, took command in February 1944. The TCC command and staff officers were an excellent mix of combat veterans from those earlier assaults, and a few key officers were held over for continuity.
The groups assigned to IX TCC were a mixture of experience. Four had seen significant combat in the
Twelfth Air Force. Four had no combat experience but had trained together for more than a year in the United States. Four others had been in existence less than nine months and arrived in the UK one month after training began. The thirteenth had experience only as a transport group and the last had been recently formed.
Joint training with airborne troops and an emphasis on night formation flying began at the start of March. The veteran 52nd Troop Carrier Wing (TCW), wedded to the 82nd Airborne, progressed rapidly and by the end of April had completed several successful night drops. The 53rd TCW, working with the 101st, also progressed well (although one practice mission on April 4 in poor visibility resulted in a badly scattered drop) but two of its groups concentrated on glider missions. By the end of April joint training with both airborne divisions ceased when Taylor and Ridgway deemed that their units had jumped enough. The 50th TCW did not begin training until April 3 and progressed more slowly, then was hampered when the troops ceased jumping.
A divisional night jump exercise for the 101st Airborne scheduled for May 7, Exercise Eagle, was postponed to May 11-May 12 and became a dress rehearsal for both divisions. The 52nd TCW, carrying only two token paratroopers on each C-47, performed satisfactorily although the two lead planes of the 316th Troop Carrier Group (TCG) collided in mid-air, killing 14 including the group commander, Col. Burton R. Fleet. The 53rd TCW was judged "uniformly successful" in its drops. The lesser-trained 50th TCW, however, got lost in haze when its pathfinders failed to turn on their navigation beacons. It continued training till the end of the month with simulated drops in which pathfinders guided them to drop zones. The 315th and 442d Groups, which had never dropped troops until May and were judged the command's "weak sisters", continued to train almost nightly, dropping paratroopers who had not completed their quota of jumps. Three proficiency tests at the end of the month, making simulated drops, were rated as fully qualified. The inspectors, however, made their judgments without factoring that most of the successful missions had been flown in clear weather.
By the end of May 1944, the IX Troop Carrier Command had available 1,207 C-47 Skytrain troop carrier airplanes and was one-third overstrength, creating a strong reserve. Three quarters of the planes were less than one year old on D-Day, and all were in excellent condition. Engine problems during training had resulted in a high number of aborted sorties, but all had been replaced to eliminate the problem. All matériel requested by commanders in IX TCC, including armor plating, had been received with the exception of
self-sealing fuel tanks, which Chief of the Army Air Forces Gen. Henry H. Arnoldhad personally rejected because of limited supplies.
Crew availability exceeded numbers of aircraft, but 40% were recent-arriving crews or individual replacements who had not been present for much of the night formation training. As a result, 20% of the 924 crews committed to the parachute mission on D-Day had minimum night training and fully three-fourths of all crews had never been under fire. Over 2,100
CG-4 Wacogliders had been sent to the UK, and after attrition during training operations, 1,118 were available for operations, along with 301 Airspeed Horsagliders received from the British. Trained crews sufficient to pilot 951 gliders were available, and at least five of the troop carrier groups intensively trained for glider missions.
Because of the requirement for absolute
radio silenceand a study that warned that the thousands of Allied aircraft flying on D-Day would break down the existing system, plans were formulated on May 17 to mark aircraft including gliders with black-and-white stripes to facilitate aircraft recognition. Air Chief MarshalSir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, approved the use of the recognition markings on May 17.
For the troop carrier aircraft this was in the form of three white and two black stripes, each two feet (60 cm) wide, around the
fuselagebehind the exit doors and from front to back on the outer wings. A test exercise was flown by selected aircraft over the invasion fleet on June 1, but to maintain security, orders to paint stripes were not issued until June 3.
U.S. VII Corps
**82nd Airborne Division
101st Airborne Division
IX Troop Carrier Command
**50th Troop Carrier Wing
**52nd Troop Carrier Wing
**53rd Troop Carrier Wing
German Seventh Army
**91st Air Landing Division
**243rd Infantry Division
**709th Infantry Division
**6th Parachute Regiment
Concept and training
To assist the pilots of the troop carrier groups in locating the six
drop zones and two landing zones in the darkness, each division formed a company of scouts referred to as "pathfinders". A school to train these troops and the air crews in the use of navigation aids was established by IX Troop Carrier Command in February 1944 at RAF North Withamin Lincolnshire, and 24 crews of the first 8 groups were detached to this school for the initial training class.
The school had 52 C-47 aircraft assigned to it, 11 of which had SCR-717-C search
radarsets installed. On D-Day these aircraft were used as a provisional group to carry the pathfinder force into Normandy. The SCR-717, nicknamed the "belly button radar" by air crews because it protruded from the lower fuselage, [Martin Wolfe, "Green Light! A Troop Carrier Squadron's War from Normandy to the Rhine" (1993). Center for Air Force History. ISBN 0812281438, 136.] was installed in 50 C-47s. It provided a crude radar map of terrain for navigation and also triggered the "BUPS" (Beacon, Ultra Portable S-band) radar marker carried by some pathfinders. With only 6 BUPS units available in Europe, and two of those on boats marking the route, the system was only used experimentally. The SCR-717 was in such limited supply that no more than two were available to any serial.
The 300 men of the pathfinder companies were organized into teams of 14-18 paratroops each, part of whom would deploy "Eureka" transponding radar beacons and set out
holophanemarking lights while the remainder acted as security. The paratroops trained at the school for two months with the troop carrier crews, but although every C-47 in IX TCC had a Rebecca interrogator installed, to keep from jamming the system with hundreds of signals, only flight leads were authorized to use it in the vicinity of the drop zones.
Each drop zone (DZ) had a serial of three C-47 aircraft assigned to locate the DZ and drop pathfinder teams, who would mark it. The serials in each wave were to arrive at six minute intervals. The pathfinder serials were organized in two waves, with those of the 101st Airborne arriving a half hour before the first scheduled assault drop. These would be the first U.S. and possibly the first Allied troops to land in the invasion. The three pathfinder serials of the 82nd Airborne were to begin their drops as the final wave of 101st Airborne paratroopers landed, thirty minutes ahead of the first 82nd Airborne drops.
Efforts of the early wave of pathfinder teams to mark the drop zones were partially ineffective. The first serial, assigned to DZ A, missed its zone and set up a mile away near St. Germain-de-Varreville. The team was unable to get either its amber halophane lights or its Eureka beacon working until the drop was well in progress. Although the second pathfinder serial had a plane ditch in the ocean en route, the remainder dropped two teams near DZ C, but most of their marker lights were lost in the ditched airplane. They managed to set up a Eureka beacon just before the assault force arrived but were forced to use a handheld signal light which was not seen by some pilots. The planes assigned to DZ D along the Douve River failed to see their final turning point and flew well past the zone. Returning from an unfamiliar direction, they dropped ten minutes late and one mile (1.5 km) off target. The drop zone was chosen after the 501st PIR's change of mission and was in an area identified by the Germans as a likely landing area. Consequently so many Germans were present that the pathfinders could not set out their lights and were forced to rely solely on Eureka, which was a poor guide at short range.
The pathfinders of the 82nd Airborne had similar results. The first serial, bound for DZ O near Sainte-Mère-Église, flew too far north but corrected its error and dropped near its DZ. It made the most effective use of the Eureka beacons and holophane marking lights of any pathfinder team. The planes bound for DZ N south of Sainte-Mère-Église flew their mission accurately and visually identified the zone but still dropped the teams a mile southeast. They landed among troop areas of the German 91st Division and were unable to reach the DZ. The teams assigned to mark DZ T northwest of Sainte-Mère-Église were the only ones dropped with accuracy, and while they deployed both Eureka and BUPS, they were unable to show lights because of the close proximity of German troops.
The pathfinder teams assigned to Drop Zones C (101st) and N (82nd) each carried two BUPS beacons. The units for DZ N were intended to guide in the parachute resupply drop scheduled for late on D-Day, but the pair of DZ C were to provide a central orientation point for all the SCR-717 radars to get bearings. However the units were damaged in the drop and provided no assistance.
The assault "lift" (one operation employing all available aircraft) was divided into two missions, "Albany" and "Boston", each with three regiment-sized landings on a drop zone. The drop zones of the 101st were east and south of Sainte-Mère-Église and lettered A, C, and D from north to south (Drop Zone B had been that of the 501st PIR before the changes of May 27). Those of the 82nd were west (T and O, from west to east) and southwest (Drop Zone N).
Each parachute infantry regiment (PIR) was transported by three or four "serials", formations containing 36, 45, or 54 C-47s. The planes, individually designated within a serial by "chalk numbers" (literally numbers chalked on the airplanes to aid paratroopers in boarding the correct airplane), were organized into flights in trail, in a close pattern called "vee's of vee's" (3 planes in triangular vee's arranged in a larger vee of 9 planes). The serials were scheduled over the drop zones at 6-minute intervals. The paratroopers were organized into "sticks", a plane load of troops numbering 15-18 men.
To achieve surprise, the parachute drops were routed to approach Normandy at low altitude from the west. The serials took off beginning at 22:30 on June 5, assembled into formations, and flew south to the departure point, code-named "Flatbush". There they descended and flew southwest over the
English Channelat 500 feet (150 m) MSL to remain below German radar coverage. Each flight within a serial was 1,000 feet (300 m) behind the flight ahead. The flights encountered winds that pushed them five minutes ahead of schedule, but the affect was uniform over the entire invasion force and had negligible effect on the timetables. Once over water, all lights except formation lights were turned off, and these were reduced to their lowest practical intensity.
Twenty-four minutes (57 miles or 92 km) out over the channel, the troop carrier stream reached a stationary marker boat code-named "Hoboken" and carrying a Eureka beacon, where they made a sharp left turn to the southeast and flew between the
Channel Islandsof Guernseyand Alderney. Weather over the channel was clear; all serials flew their routes precisely and in tight formation as they approached their initial points on the Cotentin coast, where they turned for their respective drop zones. The initial point for the 101st at Portbail, code-named "Muleshoe", was approximately ten miles (16 km) south of that of the 82d, "Peoria", near Flamanville.
Despite precise execution over the channel, numerous factors encountered over the Cotentin Peninsula disrupted the accuracy of the drops, many encountered in rapid succession or simultaneously. These included:
*C-47 configuration, including severe overloading, use of drag-inducing parapacks, and shifting centers of gravity,
*a lack of navigators on 60% of aircraft, forcing navigation by pilots when formations broke up,
*radio silence that prevented warnings when adverse weather was encountered,
*a solid cloud bank at penetration altitude (1500 feet or 450 m MSL), obscuring the entire western half of the 22-mile (35 km) wide peninsula, thinning to broken clouds over the eastern half,
ground fogover many drop zones,
*German antiaircraft fire ("
*limitations of the
Rebecca/Eureka transponding radarsystem used to guide serials to their drop zones,
*emergency usage of Rebecca by numerous lost aircraft,
*unmarked or poorly marked drop zones,
*drop runs by some C-47s that were above or below the designated 700 foot (200 m) drop altitude, or in excess of the 110 mph (180 km/h) drop speed, and
*second or third passes over an area searching for drop zones.
Of the 20 serials making up the two missions, 9 plunged into the cloud bank and were badly dispersed. Of the 6 serials which achieved concentrated drops, none flew through the clouds. However the primary factor limiting success of the paratroop units, because it magnified all the errors resulting from the above factors, was the decision to make a massive parachute drop at night, a concept that was not again used in three subsequent large-scale airborne operations. This was further illustrated when the same troop carrier groups flew a second lift later that day with precision and success under heavy fire. [Wolfe, "Green Light!", 122.]
First wave: mission Albany
Paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division "Screaming Eagles" jumped first on June 6, between 00:48 and 01:40
British Double Summer Time. 6,928 troops were carried aboard 432 C-47s of mission "Albany" organized into 10 serials. The first flights, inbound to DZ A, were not surprised by the bad weather, but navigating errors and a lack of Eureka signal caused the 2nd Battalion 502nd PIR to come down on the wrong drop zone. Most of the remainder of the 502nd jumped in a disorganized pattern around the impromptu drop zone set up by the pathfinders near the beach. Two battalion commanders took charge of small groups and accomplished all of their D-Day missions. The division's parachute artillery experienced one of the worst drops of the operation, losing all but one howitzer and most of its troops as casualties.
The three serials carrying the 506th PIR were badly dispersed by the clouds, then subjected to intense antiaircraft fire. Even so, 2/3 of the 1st Battalion was dropped accurately on DZ C. The 2nd Battalion, much of which had dropped too far west, fought its way to the Houdienville causeway by mid-afternoon but found that the 4th Division had already seized the exit. The 3rd Battalion of the 501st PIR, also assigned to DZ C, was more scattered, but took over the mission of securing the exits. A small unit reached the Pouppeville exit at 0600 and fought a six-hour battle to secure it, shortly before 4th Division troops arrived to link up.
The 501st PIR's serial also encountered severe
flakbut still made an accurate jump on Drop Zone D. Part of the DZ was covered by pre-registered German fires that inflicted heavy casualties before many troops could get out of their chutes. Among the killed were two of the three battalion commanders and one of their executive officers. A group of 150 troops captured the main objective, the la Barquette lock, by 04:00. A staff officer put together a platoonand achieved another objective by seizing two foot bridges near la Porte at 04:30. The 2nd Battalion landed almost intact on DZ D but in a day-long battle failed to take Saint-Côme-du-Montand destroy the highway bridges over the Douve.
The glider battalions of the 101st's
327th Glider Infantry Regimentwere delivered by sea and landed across Utah Beach with the 4th Infantry Division. On D-Day its third battalion, the 1st Battalion 401st GIR, landed just after noon and bivouacked near the beach. By the evening of June 7 the other two battalions were assembled near Sainte Marie du Mont.
econd wave: mission Boston
The 82nd Airborne's drop, mission "Boston", began at 01:51. It was also a lift of 10 serials organized in three waves, totalling 6,420 paratroopers carried by 369 C-47s. The C-47s carrying the 505th did not experience the difficulties that had plagued the 101st's drops. Pathfinders on DZ O turned on their Eureka beacons as the first 82nd serial crossed the initial point and lighted holophane markers on all three battalion assembly areas. As a result the 505th enjoyed the most accurate of the D-Day drops, half the regiment dropping on or within a mile of its DZ, and 75% within two miles (3 km).
The other regiments were more significantly dispersed. The 508th experienced the worst drop of any of the PIRs, with only 25% jumping within a mile of the DZ. Half the regiment dropped east of the Merderet, where it was useless to its original mission. [Warren, "Airborne Operations", 54.] The 507th PIR's pathfinders landed on DZ T, but because of Germans nearby, marker lights could not be turned on. Approximately half landed nearby in grassy swampland along the river. Estimates of drowning casualties vary from "a few" [Warren, "Airborne Operations", 55.] to "scores" [Wolfe, "Green Light!, 119.] (against an overall D-Day loss in the division of 156
killed in action), but much equipment was lost and the troops had difficulty assembling.
Timely assembly enabled the 505th to accomplish two of its missions on schedule. The 3rd Battalion captured
Sainte-Mère-Égliseby 0430 without firing a shot. The 2nd Battalion established a blocking position on the northern approaches to Sainte-Mère-Église with a single platoon while the rest reinforced the 3rd Battalion when it was counterattacked at mid-morning. The 1st Battalion did not achieve its objectives of capturing bridges over the Merderet at la Fière and Chef-du-Pont, despite the assistance of several hundred troops from the 507th and 508th PIRs.
None of the 82nd's objectives of clearing areas west of the Merderet and destroying bridges over the Douve were achieved on D-Day. However one makeshift battalion of the 508th PIR seized a small hill near the Merderet and disrupted German counterattacks on Chef-du-Pont for three days, effectively accomplishing its mission. Two company-sized pockets of the 507th held out behind the German center of resistance at Amfreville until relieved by the seizure of the causeway on June 9.
D-Day glider landings
Two pre-dawn glider landings, missions "Chicago" (101st) and "Detroit" (82nd), each by 52 CG-4 Waco gliders, landed anti-tank guns and support troops for each division. The missions took off while the parachute landings were in progress and followed them by two hours, landing at about 0400, 2 hours before dawn. Chicago was an unqualified success, with 92% landing within two miles of target. Detroit was disrupted by the same cloud bank that had bedeviled the paratroops and only 62% landed within two miles. Even so, both missions provided heavy weapons that were immediately placed into service. Only eight passengers were killed in the two missions, but one of those was the assistant division commander of the 101st Airborne, Brig. Gen.
Don Pratt. Five gliders in the 82nd's serial, cut loose in the cloud bank, remaining missing after a month.
Evening reinforcement missions
On the evening of D-Day two additional glider operations, mission "Keokuck" and mission "Elmira", brought in additional support on 208 gliders. Operating on British Double Summer Time, both arrived and landed before dark. Both missions were heavily escorted by
P-38, P-47, and P-51 fighters.
Keokuck was a reinforcement mission for the 101st Airborne consisting of a single serial of 32 tugs and gliders that took off beginning at 18:30. It arrived at 20:53, seven minutes early, coming in over Utah Beach to limit exposure to ground fire, into a landing zone clearly marked with yellow panels and green smoke. German forces around Turqueville and Saint Côme-du-Mont, 2 miles on either side of Landing Zone E, held their fire until the gliders were coming down, and while they inflicted some casualties, were too distant to cause much harm. Although only 5 landed on the LZ itself and most were released early, the Horsa gliders landed without serious damage. Two landed within German lines. The mission is significant as the first Allied daylight glider operation, but was not significant to the success of the 101st Airborne. [ Warren, "Airborne Operations", 66.]
Elmira was essential to the 82nd Airborne, however, delivering two battalions of glider artillery and 24 howitzers to support the 507th and 508th PIRs west of the Merderet. It consisted of four serials, the first pair to arrive ten minutes after Keokuck, the second pair two hours later at sunset. The first gliders, unaware that the LZ had been moved to Drop Zone O, came under heavy ground fire from German troops who occupied part of Landing Zone W. The C-47s released their gliders for the original LZ, where most delivered their loads intact despite heavy damage.
The second wave of mission Elmira arrived at 22:55, and because no other pathfinder aids were operating, they headed for the Eureka beacon on LZ O. That wave too came under severe ground fire as it passed directly over German positions. One serial released early and came down near the German lines, but the second came down on Landing Zone O. Nearly all of both battalions joined the 82nd Airborne by morning, and 15 guns were in operation on June 8. [Warren, "Airborne Operations", 68-69.]
Follow-up landing and supply operations
325th Glider Infantry Regiment
Two additional glider missions ("Galveston" and "Hackensack") were made just after daybreak on June 7, delivering the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment to the 82nd Airborne. The hazards and results of mission Elmira resulted in a route change over the Douve River valley that avoided the heavy ground fire of the evening before, and changed the landing zone to LZ E, that of the 101st Airborne Division. The first mission, Galveston, consisted of two serials carrying the 325th's 1st Battalion and the remainder of the artillery. Consisting of 100 glider-tug combinations, it carried nearly a thousand men, 20 guns, and 40 vehicles and released at 06:55. Small arms fire harried the first serial but did not seriously endanger it. Low releases resulted in a number of accidents and 100 injuries in the 325th (17 fatal). The second serial hit LZ W with accuracy and few injuries.
Mission Hackensack, bringing in the remainder of the 325th, released at 08:51. The first serial, carrying all of the 2nd Battalion and most of the 2nd Battalion 401st GIR (the 325th's "third battalion"), landed by squadrons in four different fields on each side of LZ W, one of which came down through intense fire. 15 troops were killed and 60 wounded, either by ground fire or by accidents caused by ground fire. The last glider serial of 50 Wacos, hauling service troops, 81-mm mortars, and one company of the 401st, made a perfect group release and landed at LZ W with high accuracy and virtually no casualties. By 1015, all three battalions had assembled and reported in. With 90% of its men present, the 325th GIR became the division reserve at Chef-du-Pont.
Two supply parachute drops, mission "Freeport" for the 82nd and mission "Memphis" intended for the 101st, were dropped on June 7. All of these operations came in over Utah Beach but were nonetheless disrupted by small arms fire when they overflew German positions, and virtually none of the 101st's supplies reached the division. Fourteen of the 270 C-47s on the supply drops were lost compared to only 7 of the 511 glider tugs shot down.
In the week following, six resupply missions were flown on call by the 441st and 436th Troop carrier Groups, with 10 C-47's making parachute drop and 24 towing gliders. This brought the final total of IX Troop Carrier Command sorties during Operation Neptune to 2,166, with 533 of those being glider sorties.
Ground combat involving U.S. airborne forces
"This section summarizes all ground combat in Normandy by the U.S. airborne divisions. The U.S. Army does not designate the point in time in which the airborne assault ended and the divisions then fought a conventional infantry campaign."After 24 hours, only 2,500 of the 6,000 men in 101st were under the control of division headquarters. The 82nd had consolidated its forces on Sainte-Mère-Église, but significant pockets of troops were isolated west of the Merderet, some of which had to hold out for several days. The dispersal of the American airborne troops, and the nature of the hedgerow terrain, had the effect of confusing the Germans and fragmenting their response. In addition, the Germans' defensive flooding, in the early stages, also helped to protect the Americans' southern flank. The 4th Infantry Division had landed and moved off Utah Beach, with the 8th Infantry surrounding a German battalion on the high ground south of Sainte-Mère-Église, and the 12th and 22nd Infantry moving into line northeast of the town. The biggest anxiety for the airborne commanders was in linking up with the widely scattered forces west of the Merderet.
Many continued to roam and fight behind enemy lines for up to 5 days. Most consolidated into small groups, rallied by NCOs and officers up to and including battalion commanders, and many were hodgepodges of troopers from different units. The Air Force Historical Study on the operation notes that several hundred paratroopers scattered without organization far from the drop zones were "quickly mopped up", despite their valor and inherent toughness, by small German units that possessed unit cohesion. Particularly in the areas of the 507th and 508th PIRs, these isolated groupings, while fighting for their own survival, played an important role in the overall clearance of organized German resistance.
On June 6, the German 6th Parachute Regiment (FJR6) advanced two battalions, I./FJR6 to Sainte-Marie-du-Mont and II./FJR6 to Sainte-Mère-Église, but faced with the overwhelming numbers of the two U.S. divisions, withdrew. I./FJR6 attempted to force its way through U.S. forces half its size along the Douve River but was cut off and captured almost to the man. Nearby, the 506th PIR conducted a reconnaissance-in-force with two understrength battalions to capture Saint-Côme-du-Mont but although supported by several tanks, was stopped near
Angoville-au-Plain. In the 82nd Airborne's area, a battalion of the 1058th Grenadier Regiment supported by tanks and other armored vehicles counterattacked Sainte-Mère-Église the same morning but were stopped by a reinforced company of M4 Shermantanks from the 4th Division. The German armor retreated and the infantry was routed with heavy casualties by a coordinated attack of the 2nd Battalion 505th and the 2nd Battalion 8th Infantry.
101st units maneuvered on June 8 to envelop Saint-Côme-du-Mont, pushing back FJR6, and consolidated its lines on June 9. VII Corps gave the division the task of taking Carentan. The 502nd experienced heavy combat on the causeway on June 10. The next day it attacked the town, supported by the 327th GIR attacking from the east. The 506th PIR passed through the exhausted 502nd and attacked into Carentan on June 12, defeating the rear guard left by the German withdrawal. On June 13 German counterattacks using assault guns, tanks, and infantry of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division's 37th SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment and III./FJR6 attacked the 101st southwest of Carentan. The Germans pushed back the left of the U.S. line in a morning-long battle until Combat Command A of the 2nd Armored Division was sent forward to repel the attack. The 101st was then assigned to the newly-arrived
U.S. VIII Corpson June 15 in a defensive role before returning to England for rehabilitation.
The 82nd airborne still had not gained control of the bridge across the Merderet by June 9. Its 325th GIR, supported by several tanks, forced a crossing under fire to link up with pockets of the 507th PIR, then extended its line west of the Merderet to Chef-du-Pont. The 505th PIR captured
MontebourgStation northwest of Sainte-Mere-Èglise on June 10, supporting an attack by the 4th Division. The 508th PIR attacked across the Douve Riverat Beuzeville-la-Bastille on June 12 and captured Baupte the next day. On June 14 units of the 101st Airborne linked up with the 508th PIR at Baupte.
The 325th and 505th passed through the 90th Division, which had taken Pont l'Abbé (originally an 82nd objective), and drove west on the left flank of VII Corps to capture
Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomteon June 16. On June 19 the division was assigned to VIII Corps, and the 507th established a bridgehead over the Douve south of Pont l'Abbé. The 82nd Airborne continued its march towards La Haye-du-Puits, and made its final attack against Hill 122 ( Mont Castre) on July 3 in a driving rainstorm. It was "pinched out" of line by the advance of the 90th Infantry Division the next day and went into reserve to prepare to return to England. cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-A-StLo/USA-A-StLo-1.html| title = St-Lô The July Offensive| format = | work = | publisher = HyperWar Foundation| accessdate = 4 July| accessyear = 2007]
Aircraft losses and casualties
Forty-two C-47s were destroyed in two days of operations, although in most cases the crews survived and were returned to Allied control. Twenty-one of the losses were on D-Day during the parachute assault, 7 while towing gliders, and the remaining 14 during parachute resupply missions. Of the 517 gliders, 222 were
Airspeed Horsagliders, most of which were destroyed in landing accidents or by German fire after landing. Although a majority of the 295 Waco gliders were repairable for use in future operations, the combat situation in the beachhead did not permit the introduction of troop carrier service units, and 97% of all gliders used in the operation were abandoned in the field. [Warren, "Airborne Operations", 53.]
D-Day casualties for the airborne divisions were calculated in August 1944 as 1,240 for the 101st Airborne Division and 1,259 for the 82nd Airborne. Of those, the 101st suffered 182 killed, 338 wounded, and 501 missing. For the 82nd, the total was 156 killed, 904 wounded, and 756 missing. cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-4/7-4_8.htm#278| title = Cross Channel Attack| format = | work = | publisher = US Army Center for Military History| accessdate = 26 June| accessyear = 2007, Note 34 for 101st, note 55 for 82nd.]
Casualties through June 30 were reported by VII Corps as 4,670 for the 101st (546 killed, 2217 wounded, and 1,907 missing), and 4,480 for the 82nd (457 killed, 1440 wounded, and 2583 missing). cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/BOOKS/WWII/utah/utahb.htm| title = Utah to Cherbourg| format = | work = | publisher = US Army Center for Military History| accessdate = 26 June| accessyear = 2007 Appendix B.]
German casualties, [compiled at [http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/index.html German Order of Battle Normandy] ] amounted to approximately 21,300 for the campaign. The 6th Parachute Regiment reported approximately 3,000 through the end of July. Divisional totals, which include combat against all VII Corps units, not just airborne, and their reporting dates were:
*91st Luftlande Div: 2,212 (June 12), 5,000 (July 23)
*243rd Infantry Div: 8,189 (July 11)
*709th Infantry Div: 4,000 (June 16)
*17th SS-Panzergrenadier Div: 1,096 (June 30)
Troop carrier controversy
In his 1962 book, "Night Drop: The American Airborne Invasion of Normandy", Army historian
S.L.A. Marshallconcluded that the mixed performance overall of the airborne troops in Normandy resulted from poor performance by the troop carrier pilots. In coming to that conclusion he did not interview any aircrew nor qualify his opinion to that extent. Marshall's original data came from after-action interviews with paratroopers after their return to England in July 1944, which was also the basis of all U.S. Army histories on the campaign written after the war, and which he later incorporated in his own commercial book. cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://hnn.us/articles/1356.html| title = Why Does the NYT Continue to Cite Historian S.L.A. Marshall After the Paper Discredited Him in a Front-Page Story Years Ago?
format = | work = | publisher = History News Network George Mason University| accessdate = 26 June| accessyear = 2007]
Omar Bradley["A General's Life"] blamed "pilot inexperience and anxiety" as well as weather for the failures of the paratroopers. Memoirs by former 101st troopers, notably Donald Burgett("Curahee") and Laurence Critchell("Four Stars of Hell") harshly denigrated the pilots based on their own experiences, implying cowardice and incompetence (although Burgett also praised the Air Corps as "the best in the world"). Later John Keegan("Six Armies in Normandy") and Clay Blair("Ridgway's Paratroopers: The American Airborne in World War II") escalated the tone of the criticism, stating that troop carrier pilots were the least qualified in the Army Air Forces, disgruntled, and castoffs. [Wolfe, "Green Light!", 334. Blair also imputed that glider pilots were cowards in general.] Others critical included Max Hastings("Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy") and James Huston ("Out of the Blue: U.S. Army Airborne Operations in World War II"). As late as 2003 a prominent history ("Airborne: A Combat History of American Airborne Forces" by retired Lt Gen. E.M. Flanagan) repeated these and other assertions, all of it laying failures in Normandy at the feet of the pilots. cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://warchronicle.com/correcting_the_record/NEPTUNE_airborne.htm| title = An open letter to the airborne community| format = | work = | publisher = War Chonicles.com| accessdate = 26 June| accessyear = 2007]
This criticism primarily derived from anecdotal testimony in the 101st Airborne. Criticism from veterans of the 82nd Airborne was not only rare, its commanders Ridgway and Gavin both officially commended the troop carrier groups, as did Lt Col.
Benjamin Vandervoortand even one prominent 101st veteran, Captain Frank Lillyman, commander of its pathfinders. Gavin's commendation said in part:
"The accomplishments of the parachute regiments are due to the conscientious and efficient tasks of delivery performed by your pilots and crews. I am aware, as we all are, that your wing suffered losses in carrying out its missions and that a very bad fog condition was encountered inside the west coast of the peninsula Yet despite this every effort was made for an exact and precise delivery as planned. In most cases this was successful." cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://www.b-26marauderarchive.org/MS/MS1741/MS1741.htm| title = Stephen E. Ambrose World War II Sins| format = | work = | publisher = B-26 Marauder Historical Society| accessdate = 26 June| accessyear = 2007]
The troop carrier pilots in their remembrances and histories admitted to many errors in execution of the drops but denied the aspersions on their character, citing the many factors since enumerated and faulty planning assumptions. Some, such as Martin Wolfe, an enlisted radio operator with the 436th TCG, pointed out that some late drops were caused by the paratroopers, who were struggling to get their equipment out the door until their aircraft had flown by the drop zone by several miles. [Wolfe, "Green Light", 118, quoting from "Four Stars of Hell".] Others mistook drops made ahead of theirs for their own drop zones and insisted on going early. [Warren, "Airborne Operations", 41.] The TCC personnel also pointed out that anxiety at being new to combat was not confined to USAAF crews. Warren reported that official histories showed 9 paratroopers had refused to jump and at least 35 other uninjured paratroopers were returned to England aboard C-47s. [Warren, "Airborne Operations", 41, 43, 45.] General Gavin reported that many paratroopers were in a daze after the drop, huddling in ditches and hedgerows until prodded into action by veterans. [Wolfe, "Green Light!", 117.] Wolfe noted that although his group had botched the delivery of some units in the night drop, it flew a second mission on D-Day and performed flawlessly in heavy ground fire from alerted Germans.
Despite this, controversy did not flare until the assertions reached the general public as a commercial best-seller in
Stephen Ambrose's " Band of Brothers", particularly in sincere accusations by icons such as Richard Winters. In 1995, following publication of "D-Day June 6th, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II", troop carrier historians, including veterans Lew Johnston (314th TCG), Michael Ingrisano Jr. (316th TCG), and former U.S. Marine Corpsairlift planner Randolph Hils, attempted to open a dialogue with Ambrose to correct errors they cited in "D-Day", which they then found had been repeated from the more popular and well-known "Band of Brothers". Their frustration with his failure to follow through on what they stated were promises to correct the record, particularly to the accusations of general cowardice and incompetence among the pilots, led them to detailed public rejoinders when the errors continued to be widely asserted, including in a History Channelbroadcast April 8, 2001. cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://www.amcmuseum.org/Collections/OralStories/ddayfights.htm| title = The Troop Carrier D-Day Flights| format = | work = | publisher = AMC Museum| accessdate = 26 June| accessyear = 2007 This is a 12-part work by Lew Johnston, a TC pilot with the 314th TCG.] As recently as 2004, in "MHQ: The Quarterly of Military History", the misrepresentations regarding lack of night training, pilot cowardice, and TC pilots being the dregs of the Air Corps were again repeated, with Ambrose being cited as its source. cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://www.historynet.com/air_sea/airborne_operations/3036676.html| title = 101st Airborne Division participate in Operation Overlord (sic)| format = | work = | publisher = HistoryNet.com| accessdate = 11 July| accessyear = 2007]
Order of battle for the American airborne landings in Normandy
IX Troop Carrier Command
*cite book | author=Dr. John C. Warren| title= Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater | publisher=US Air Force Historical Research Agency|location=Air University, Maxwell AFB| year=1956| id=USAF Historical Study 97
*cite book | author=Martin Wolfe| title=Green Light! A Troop Carrier Squadron's War from Normandy to the Rhine | publisher=Center for Air Force History|location=Washington| year=1993| id=ISBN 0812281438 This book may be found on-line.
*cite book | author=Gordon A. Harrison| title= [http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-4/7-4_Contents.htm "Cross-Channel Attack", Chapter VIII] | publisher=US Army Center of Military History|location=Washington| year=1951| id=CMH Pub 7-4
*cite book | author=Maj. Roland G. Ruppenthal| title= [http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/BOOKS/WWII/utah/utah2.htm "The Airborne Assault" - Utah Beach to Cherbourg] | publisher=US Army Center of Military History|location=Washington| year=1948| id=CMH Pub 100-12
* [http://www.americandday.org "American D-Day: Omaha Beach, Utah Beach & Pointe du Hoc"]
* [http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/maps/Nor_5_6_44.jpgGerman battalion dispositions in Normandy, 5 June 1944]
* [http://www.ww2-airborne.us/ US Airborne during World War II]
* [http://www.b-26marauderarchive.org/MS/MS1741/MS1741.htm Stephen E. Ambrose World War II sins] a thorough examination of the Troop carrier controversy from the TCC point of view, includes detailed explanation of troop carrier terms and procedures
* [http://warchronicle.com/correcting_the_record/NEPTUNE_airborne.htm An open letter to the airborne community] another view of the controversy from a TCC historian
* [http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/index.html German Order of Battle] , a private site well-documented from German records of OB, strength, and casualties
* [http://www.6juin1944.com/assaut/aeropus/en_9tcc.php U.S. Airborne in Cotentin Peninsula]
* [http://www.amcmuseum.org/Collections/OralStories/ddayfights.htm "The Troop Carrier D-Day Flights", Air Mobility Command Museum]
Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.
Look at other dictionaries:
Order of battle for the American airborne landings in Normandy — The Order of battle for the American airborne landings in Normandy is a list of the units immediately available for combat on the Cotentin Peninsula between June 6, 1944, and June 15, 1944, during the American airborne landings in Normandy during … Wikipedia
Normandy American Cemetery and Memorial — American Battle Monuments Commission … Wikipedia
Normandy landings — D Day redirects here. For the use of D Day as a general military term, see D Day (military term). For other uses, see D Day (disambiguation). For the video game Operation Neptune , please see Operation Neptune (video game). This article is about… … Wikipedia
Airborne forces — Airborne Military parachuting or gliding form of inserting personnel or supplies. Purpose Delivering personnel, equipment, or supplies. Origins Attributed to Italian troops on November 1927. [ Parachutist Badge awarded by the United States Army… … Wikipedia
Normandy Invasion — ▪ European United States history Introduction also called Operation Overlord during World War II, the Allied invasion of western Europe, which was launched on June 6, 1944 (the most celebrated D Day of the war), with the simultaneous landing… … Universalium
Invasion of Normandy — This article is about the first few weeks of the invasion of Normandy. The first day of the landings (D Day) is covered in more detail at Normandy landings. For earlier invasions of Normandy in other wars, see Invasions of Normandy. Invasion of… … Wikipedia
First Allied Airborne Army — Infobox Military Unit unit name=First Allied Airborne Army caption=Badge of the First Allied Airborne Army dates=2 August 1944 20 May 1945 country= allegiance=Allied branch=Air Force type=Airborne forces role= size= command structure= garrison=… … Wikipedia
1st Airborne Division (United Kingdom) — 1st Airborne Division … Wikipedia
6th Airborne Division (United Kingdom) — Infobox Military Unit unit name= 6th Airborne Division caption=The divisional shoulder flash of the airborne forces dates= World War II 3 May 1943 1 April 1948 country= Great Britain allegiance= branch= British Army type=Airborne role=Parachute… … Wikipedia
101st Airborne Division (United States) — Infobox Military Unit unit name=101st Airborne Division placeofburial= caption=101st Airborne Division shoulder sleeve insignia (the Screaming Eagle ). country=United States of America allegiance= Federal type=Division branch=Regular Army… … Wikipedia