- Space Shuttle Challenger launch decision
The Space Shuttle Challenger launch decision was the decision-making process that led to the launch of the
Space Shuttle"Challenger" on January 28, 1986despite inclement weather conditions and the warnings of many engineers working both for NASAand for NASA contractors Morton Thiokoland Rockwell International. The Shuttle was destroyed as a consequence of the failure of one of the O-ringjoints in its right solid rocket booster(SRB). After the loss of "Challenger", the engineering decisions, organizational problems and inadequate safety culture that led to its launch were criticized by the Rogers Commissionand by the U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology, as well as by independent commentators such as Edward Tufte.
As originally designed by Thiokol, the O-ring joints in the Shuttle's SRBs were supposed to close more tightly due to forces generated at ignition. However, a
1977test showed that when pressurized water was used to simulate the effects of booster combustion, the metal parts bent "away" from each other, opening a gap through which gases could leak. This phenomenon, known as "joint rotation," caused a momentary drop in air pressure. This made it possible for combustion gases to erode the O-rings. In the event of widespread erosion, an actual flame path could develop, causing the joint to burst—which would have destroyed the booster and the shuttle. [McConnell, Malcolm. "Challenger: A Major Malfunction," page 118.]
Engineers at the
Marshall Space Flight Centerwrote to the manager of the Solid Rocket Booster project, George Hardy, on several occasions suggesting that Thiokol's field joint design was unacceptable. For example, one engineer suggested that joint rotation would render the secondary O-ring useless. However, Hardy did not forward these memos to Thiokol, and the field joints were accepted for flight in 1980.cite web |author=Rogers Commission report |title=Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle "Challenger" Accident, Volume 1, chapter 6 |year=1986 |url=http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch6.htm]
Evidence of serious O-ring erosion was present as early as the second space shuttle mission,
STS-2, which was flown by "Columbia." However, contrary to NASA regulations, the Marshall Center did not report this problem to senior management at NASA, but opted to keep the problem within their reporting channels with Thiokol. Even after the O-rings were redesignated as "Criticality 1"—meaning that their failure would result in the destruction of the Orbiter—no one at Marshall suggested that the shuttles be grounded until the flaw could be fixed.
1985, Marshall and Thiokol realized that they had a potentially catastrophic problem on their hands. They began the process of redesigning the joint with three inches (76 mm) of additional steel around the tang. This tang would grip the inner face of the joint and prevent it from rotating. However, they did not call for a halt to shuttle flights until the joints could be redesigned. Rather, they treated the problem as an acceptable flight risk. For example, Lawrence Mulloy, Marshall's manager for the SRB project since 1982, issued and waived launch constraints for six consecutive flights. Thiokol even went as far as to persuade NASA to declare the O-ring problem "closed". Donald Kutyna, a member of the Rogers Commission, later likened this situation to an airline permitting one of its planes to continue to fly despite evidence that one of its wings was about to fall off.
*cite web | last = Boisjoly | first = Roger | authorlink = Roger Boisjoly| title = Ethical Decisions - Morton Thiokol and the Space Shuttle "Challenger" Disaster: Telecon Meeting| publisher = onlineethics.org | url = http://www.onlineethics.org/essays/shuttle/telecon.htm| accessdate = 2006-11-20
*McConnell, Malcolm. (1987) "Challenger: A Major Malfunction." Garden City, NY: Doubleday. ISBN 0-385-23877-0.
*cite web| author=Rogers Commission report| title=Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle "Challenger" Accident| year=1986| url=http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/genindex.htm
*Tufte, Edward. (1997) "Visual Explanations", ISBN 0-9613921-2-6.
*cite web| last=U.S House Committee on Science and Technology | title = Investigation of the Challenger Accident; Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives. | publisher = US Government Printing Office| date =
October 29 1986.| url = http://www.gpoaccess.gov/challenger/64_420.pdf | format = PDF
*Vaughan, Diane. (1996) "The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA". Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-85176-1.
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