Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
Flag of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Flag of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Founded 1960
Service branches Army, Air Force, Navy
Headquarters Colonel Tshatshi Military Camp, Kinshasa
Commander-in-Chief President Joseph Kabila
(personally holds the rank of Major General)
Minister of Defence, Disarmament, and Veterans Charles Mwando
Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Didier Etumba Longila
Military age 18–45
Active personnel Around 130,000
Budget US$93.5 million (2004)
Percent of GDP 2.5% (2006)
Domestic suppliers None

The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (French: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)) is the state military organisation responsible for defending the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The FARDC is being rebuilt as part of the peace process which followed the end of the Second Congo War in July 2003.

The majority of FARDC members are land forces, but it also has a small air force and an even smaller navy. Together the three services may number around 130,000 personnel.[1] In addition, there is a presidential force called the Republican Guard, but it and the National Congolese Police (PNC) are not part of the Armed Forces.

The government in the capital city Kinshasa, the United Nations, the European Union, and bilateral partners which include Angola, South Africa, and Belgium are attempting to create a viable force with the ability to provide the DRC with stability and security. However, this process is being hampered by corruption,[2] inadequate donor coordination, and competition between donors.[3] The various military units now grouped under the FARDC banner are some of the most unstable in Africa after years of war and underfunding.

To assist the new government, since February 2000 the United Nations has had the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), which currently has a strength of over 16,000 peacekeepers in the country. Its principal tasks are to provide security in key areas, such as the Sud-Kivu and Nord-Kivu in the east, and to assist the government in reconstruction. Foreign rebel groups are also in the Congo, as they have been for most of the last half-century. The most important is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), against which Laurent Nkunda's troops were fighting, but other smaller groups such as the anti-Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army are also present.[4]

The legal standing of the FARDC was laid down in the Transitional Constitution, articles 118 and 188. This was then superseded by provisions in the 2006 Constitution, articles 187 to 192. Law 04/023 of 12 November 2004 establishes the General Organisation of Defence and the Armed Forces.[5] As of mid 2010, the Congolese Parliament is debating a new defence law, provisionally designated Organic Law 130.



The first organized Congolese troops, known as the Force Publique (FP), were created in 1888 by King Léopold II of Belgium in what was then known as the Congo Free State. It was first conceived in 1885 by King Léopold who held the Congo Free State as his private property, ordered his Secretary of the Interior to create military and police forces for the state. In 1908, under international pressure Léopold ceded administration of the colony to the government of Belgium as the Belgian Congo. The FP was renamed as the Force Nationale, and remained under the command of a Belgian officer corps through the independence of the colony in 1960. The FP saw combat in Cameroun, and successfully invaded and conquered areas of German East Africa, notably present day Rwanda, during World War I. Elements of the FP were also used to form Belgian colonial units that fought in the East African Campaign during World War II.

At independence in 1960, the army suffered from a dramatic deficit of trained leaders, particularly in the officer corps. This was because the FP had always only been officered by Belgian or other expatriate whites. The Belgian Government made no effort to train Congolese commissioned officers until the very end of the Colonial period and there were only about 20 African cadets in training on the eve of Independence. Ill-advised actions by Belgian officers led to an enlisted ranks' rebellion five days after independence in 1960, which helped spark the Congo Crisis. The new Congolese government sided with the enlisted soldiers, and the Belgian commander of the FP, Janssens, was dismissed. Victor Lundula was appointed commander-in-chief of the ANC, and Joseph-Desire Mobutu as chief of staff. Both were former FP sergeants. The soldiers were invited to appoint black officers, and 'command of the army passed securely into the hands of former sergeants,' as the soldiers in general chose the most-educated and highest-ranked Congolese army soldiers as their new officers.[6] Most of the Belgian officers were retained as advisors to the new Congolese hierarchy, and calm returned to the two main garrisons at Leopoldville and Thysville.[7] The military elements of the FP were renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), or Congolese National Army.

During the crucial period of July–August 1960, Mobutu Sese Seko built up "his" national army by channeling foreign aid to units loyal to him, by exiling unreliable units to remote areas, and by absorbing or dispersing rival armies. He tied individual officers to him by controlling their promotion and the flow of money for payrolls. Despite this, by September 1960, following the four-way division of the country, there were four separate armed forces: Mobotu's ANC itself, numbering about 12,000, the South Kasai Constabulary loyal to Albert Kalonji (3,000 or less), the State of Katanga gendarmerie which were part of Moise Tshombe's regime (totalling about 10,000), and the Kisanagani dissident ANC loyal to Antoine Gizenga (numbering about 8,000).[8]

After five years of turbulence, in 1965 Mobutu used his position as ANC Chief of Staff to seize power in the Congo. As a general rule, since that time, the armed forces have not intervened in politics as a body, rather being tossed and turned as ambitious men have shaken the country. In reality, the larger problem has been the misuse and sometimes abuse of the military and police by political and ethnic leaders.[9]

On 16 May 1968 a parachute brigade of two regiments (each of three battalions) was formed which eventually was to grow in size to a full division.[10]

Zaire 1971–1997

The country was renamed Zaire in 1971 and the army was consequently designated the Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ). In 1971 the army's force consisted of the 1st Groupement at Kananga, with one guard battalion, two infantry battalions, and a gendarmerie battalion attached, and the 2nd Groupement (Kinshasa), the 3rd Groupement (Kisangani), the 4th Groupement (Lubumbashi), the 5th Groupement (Bukavu), the 6th Groupement (Mbandaka), and the 7th Groupement (Boma). Each was about the size of a brigade, and commanded by 'aging generals who have had no military training, and often not much positive experience, since they were NCOs in the Belgian Force Publique.'[11] BY the late 1970s the number of groupements reached nine, one per administrative region.[12] The parachute division operated semi-independently from the rest of the army.

A large number of countries supported the FAZ in the early 1970s. Three hundred Belgian personnel were serving as staff officers and advisors throughout the Ministry of Defence, Italians were supporting the Air Force, Americans were assisting with transport and communications, Israelis with airborne forces training, and there were British advisors with the engineers.[13]

During 1975–1976, Mobutu directed the FAZ to intervene in the Angolan Civil War assisting the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA)'s fight against the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). This policy backfired when the MPLA won in Angola, and then, acting ostensibly at least as the Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (Front for the National Liberation of the Congo), occupied Zaire's Katanga Province, then known as Shaba, in March, 1977, facing little resistance from the FAZ. This invasion is sometimes known as Shaba I. Mobutu had to request assistance, which was provided by Morocco in the form of regular troops who routed the MPLA and their Cuban advisors out of Katanga. The humiliation of this episode led to civil unrest in Zaire in early 1978, which the FAZ had to put down.[14]

The poor performance of Zaire's military during Shaba I gave evidence of chronic weaknesses (which extend to this day).[15] One problem was that some of the Zairian soldiers in the area had not received pay for extended periods. Senior officers often kept the money intended for the soldiers, typifying a generally disreputable and inept senior leadership in the FAZ. As a result, many soldiers simply deserted rather than fight. Others stayed with their units but were ineffective.

During the months following the Shaba invasion, Mobutu sought solutions to the military problems that had contributed to the army's dismal performance. He implemented sweeping reforms of the command structure, including wholesale firings of high-ranking officers. He merged the military general staff with his own presidential staff and appointed himself chief of staff again, in addition to the positions of minister of defence and supreme commander that he already held. He also redeployed his forces throughout the country instead of keeping them close to Kinshasa, as had previously been the case. The Kamanyola Division,[16] at the time considered the army's best formation, and considered the president's own, was assigned permanently to Shaba. In addition to these changes, the army's strength was reduced by 25 percent. Also, Zaire's allies provided a large influx of military equipment, and Belgian, French, and American advisers assisted in rebuilding and retraining the force.

Despite these improvements, a second invasion by the former Katangan gendarmerie, known as Shaba II in May–June 1978, was only dispersed with the despatch of the French 2e régiment étranger de parachutistes and a battalion of the Belgian Paracommando Regiment. Kamanyola Division units collapsed almost immediately. French units fought the Battle of Kolwezi to recapture the town from the FLNC. The U.S. provided logistical assistance.[17]

The army's structure changed during Mobotu's long rule, but as of July 1975, according to the IISS Military Balance, the FAZ was made up of 14 infantry battalions, seven "Guard" battalions, and seven other infantry battalions variously designated as "parachute" (or possibly "commando"; probably the units of the new parachute brigade originally formed in 1968). There were also an armored car regiment and a mechanized infantry battalion. Organisationally, the army was made up of seven brigade groups and one parachute division.[18] In addition to these units, a tank battalion was reported to have formed by 1979.[19]

Further details of FAZ operations in the 1980s and onwards can be found in John W. Turner's book A Continent Ablaze.[20]

Ground Forces Order of Battle, 1988 - Source CIA[21]
Formation Location Size Notes
Special Presidential Division Kinshasa 5,200 Five battalions, 'appears combat ready'
Kamanyola Division Shaba 4,100 14th Bde only combat ready formation
31st Parachute Brigade Kinshasa/Kamina 3,800 'High state of combat readiness'
32nd Parachute Brigade Kinshasa 1,000 Still forming, to be deployed to Kitona
1st Armored Brigade Mbanza-Ngungu 1,300 Only 30 of apx 100 tanks operational
41st Commando Brigade Kisangani 1,200 Three battalions deployed along Eastern borders
13th Infantry Brigade Kalemie 1,500 'One of the most neglected units in the Zairean ground forces.'
21st Infantry Brigade Around Lubumbashi 1,700 'Modest combat capability'
22nd Light Infantry Brigade Kamina base 2,500 'Role undefined'

The authors of the Library of Congress Country Study on Zaire commented in 1992-93 that: "The maintenance status of equipment in the inventory has traditionally varied, depending on a unit's priority and the presence or absence of foreign advisers and technicians. A considerable portion of military equipment is not operational, primarily as a result of shortages of spare parts, poor maintenance, and theft. For example, the tanks of the 1st Armored Brigade often have a nonoperational rate approaching 70 to 80 percent. After a visit by a Chinese technical team in 1985, most of the tanks operated, but such an improved status generally has not lasted long beyond the departure of the visiting team. Several factors complicate maintenance in Zairian units. Maintenance personnel often lack the training necessary to maintain modern military equipment. Moreover, the wide variety of military equipment and the staggering array of spare parts necessary to maintain it not only clog the logistic network but also are expensive.

The most important factor that negatively affects maintenance is the low and irregular pay that soldiers receive, resulting in the theft and sale of spare parts and even basic equipment to supplement their meager salaries. When not stealing spare parts and equipment, maintenance personnel often spend the better part of their duty day looking for other ways to profit. American maintenance teams working in Zaire found that providing a free lunch to the work force was a good, sometimes the only, technique to motivate personnel to work at least half of the duty day.

The army's logistics corps is to provide logistic support and conduct direct, indirect, and depot-level maintenance for the FAZ. But because of Zaire's lack of emphasis on maintenance and logistics, a lack of funding, and inadequate training, the corps is understaffed, underequipped, and generally unable to accomplish its mission. It is organized into three battalions assigned to Mbandaka, Kisangani, and Kamina, but only the battalion at Kamina is adequately staffed; the others are little more than skeleton" units.

The poor state of discipline of the Congolese forces became apparent again in 1990. Foreign military assistance to Zaire ceased following the end of the Cold War and Mobutu deliberately allowed the military's condition to deteriorate so that it did not threaten his hold on power.[22] Protesting low wages and lack of pay, paratroopers began looting Kinshasa in September 1991 and were only stopped after intervention by French ('Operation Baumier') and Belgian ('Operation Blue Beam')[23] forces.

Map of the DR of Congo

In 1993, according to the Library of Congress Country Studies,[15] the 25,000-member FAZ ground forces consisted of one infantry division (with three infantry brigades); one airborne brigade (with three parachute battalions and one support battalion); one special forces (commando/counterinsurgency) brigade; the Special Presidential Division; one independent armored brigade; and two independent infantry brigades (each with three infantry battalions, one support battalion). These units were deployed throughout the country, with the main concentrations in Shaba Region (approximately half the force). The Kamanyola Division, consisting of three infantry brigades operated generally in western Shaba Region; the 21st Infantry Brigade was located in Lubumbashi; the 13th Infantry Brigade was deployed throughout eastern Shaba; and at least one battalion of the 31st Airborne Brigade stayed at Kamina. The other main concentration of forces was in and around Kinshasa: the 31st Airborne Brigade was deployed at Ndjili Airport on the outskirts of the capital; the Special Presidential Division (DSP) resided adjacent to the presidential compound; and the 1st Armored Brigade was at Mbanza-Ngungu (in Bas-Congo, approximately 120 kilometers southwest of Kinshasa). Finally the 41st Commando Brigade was at Kisangani.

This superficially impressive list of units overstates the actual capability of the armed forces at the time. Apart from privileged formations such as the Presidential Division and the 31st Airborne Brigade, most units were poorly trained, divided and so badly paid that they regularly resorted to looting. What operational abilities the armed forces had were gradually destroyed by politicisation of the forces, tribalisation, and division of the forces, included purges of suspectedly disloyal group, intended to allow Mobutu to divide and rule.[24] All this occurred against the background of increasing deterioration of state structures under the kleptocratic Mobutu regime.

Mobutu's overthrow and after

Much of the origins of the recent conflict in what is now the DRC stems from the turmoil following the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, which then led to the Great Lakes refugee crisis. Within the largest refugee camps, beginning in Goma in Nord-Kivu, were Rwandan Hutu fighters, which were eventually organised into the Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Rwanda, who launched repeated attacks into Rwanda. Rwanda eventually backed Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his quickly organised Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo in invading Zaire, aiming to stop the attacks on Rwanda in the process of toppling Mobutu's government. When the militias rebelled, backed by Rwanda, the FAZ, weakened as is noted above, proved incapable of mastering the situation and preventing the overthrow of Mobutu in 1997.[25] Recent reports from South Africa show that Mobutu turned down two offers of help - from EO of South Africa and Military Professional Resources Incorporated - for lack of funds in the crucial last days of battle.[citation needed]

When Kabila took power in 1997, the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo and so the name of the national army changed once again. Command over the armed forces in the first few months of Kabila's rule was vague. Gerard Prunier writes that 'there was no minister of defence, no known chief of staff, and no ranks; all officers were Cuban-style 'commanders' called 'Ignace,' 'Bosco,' Jonathan,' or 'James,' who occupied connecting suites at the Intercontinental Hotel and had presidential list cell-phone numbers. None spoke French or Lingala, but all spoke Kinyarwanda, Swahili, and, quite often, English.' On being asked by a Belgian journalist what was the actual army command structure apart from himself, Kabila answered 'We are not going to expose ourselves and risk being destroyed by showing ourselves openly... . We are careful so that the true masters of the army are not known. It is strategic. Please, let us drop the matter.'[26] Kabila's new Forces Armees Congolaises, as he renamed the state armed forces after his assumption of power, were riven with internal tensions. The new FAC had Banyamulenge fighters from South Kivu, kadogo child soldiers from various eastern tribes, [the mostly] Lunda Katangese Tigers of the former FNLC, and former FAZ personnel.[27] Mixing these disparate and formerly warring elements together led to mutuny. On February 23, 1998, a mostly Banyamulenge unit mutiniued at Bukavu after its officers tried to disperse the soldiers into different units spread all around the Congo.[28] By mid 1998, formations on the outbreak of the Second Congo War included the 50th Brigade, headquartered at Camp Kokolo in Kinshasa,[29] and the 10th Brigade — one of the best and largest units in the army — stationed in Goma, as well as the 12th Brigade in Bukavu. The declaration of the 10th Brigade's commander on 2 August 1998 that he no longer recognised Kabila as the state's president was one of the factors in the beginning of the Second Congo War.[30]

The FARDC performed poorly throughout the Second Congo War and "demonstrated little skill or recognisable military doctrine".[31] At the outbreak of the war in 1998 the Army was ineffective and the DRC Government was forced to rely on assistance from Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe. As well as providing expeditionary forces, these countries unsuccessfully attempted to retrain the DRC Army. North Korea and Tanzania also provided assistance with training. During the first year of the war the Allied forces defeated the Rwandan force which had landed in Bas-Congo and the rebel forces south-west of Kinshasa and eventually halted the rebel and Rwandan offensive in the east of the DRC. These successes contributed to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which was signed in July 1999.[32] Following the Lusaka Agreement, in mid-August 1999 President Kabila issued a decree dividing the country into eight military regions. The first military region, Congolese state television reported, would consist of the two Kivu provinces, Orientale would form the second region, and Maniema and Kasai Oriental provinces the third. Katanga and Equateur would fall under the fourth and fifth regions, respectively, while Kasai Occidental and Bandundu would form the sixth region. Kinshasa and Bas-Congo would form the seventh and eighth regions, respectively.[33] In November 1999 the Government attempted to form a 20,000-strong paramilitary force designated the People's Defence Forces. This force was intended to support the FARDC and national police but never became effective.[34]


The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was not successful in ending the war, and fighting resumed in September 1999. The FARDC's performance continued to be poor and both the major offensives the Government launched in 2000 ended in costly defeats.[35] President Kabila's mismanagement was an important factor behind the FARDC's poor performance, with soldiers frequently going unpaid and unfed while the Government purchased advanced weaponry which could not be operated or maintained. The defeats in 2000 are believed to have been the cause of President Kabila's assassination in January 2001.[34] Following the assassination Joseph Kabila assumed the presidency and was eventually successful in negotiating an end to the war in 2003.

Much of the east of the country remains insecure, however. In the far northeast this is due primarily to the Ituri conflict. In the area around Lake Kivu, primarily in North Kivu, fighting continues among the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and between the government FARDC and Laurent Nkunda's troops, with all groups greatly exacerbating the issues of internal refugees in the area of Goma, the consequent food shortages, and loss of infrastructure from the years of conflict.[36] In 2009, several United Nations officials stated that the army is a major problem, largely due to corruption that results in food and pay meant for soldiers being diverted and a military structure top-heavy with colonels, many of whom are former warlords.[37] In a 2009 report itemizing FARDC abuses, Human Rights Watch urged the UN to stop supporting government offensives against eastern rebels until the abuses ceased.[38]

Current organisation

Gén. Kisempia Sungilanga, former Chief of Staff of the FARDC, in December 2006.

The President, Major General Joseph Kabila is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Chikez Diemu, Minister of Defence, Disarmament, and Veterans (Ancien Combattants), with the French acronym MDNDAC, succeeded the former Defence Minister Adolphe Onusumba Yemba (of RCD-G) in February 2007. Charles Mwando succeeded Diemu in 2008.

The Colonel Tshatshi Military Camp in the Kinshasa suburb of Ngaliema hosts the defence department and the Chiefs of Staff central command headquarters of the FARDC. There are no local defence industries.[39]

Below the Chief of Staff, the current organisation of the FARDC is not fully clear. There is known to be a Military Intelligence branch - Service du Renseignement militaire, SRM, the former DEMIAP. The FARDC is known to be broken up into the Land Forces (Forces Terrestres), Navy and Air Force. The Land Forces are distributed around ten military regions, up from the previous eight, following the ten provinces of the country. There is also a training command, the Groupement des Écoles Supérieurs Militaires (GESM) or Group of Higher Military Schools, which as of January 2010 was under the command of Major General Marcellin Lukama.[40] The Navy and Air Forces are composed of various groupments (see below). There is also a central logistics base.

A decision on which factions were to name which military regional commanders was announced in August 2003 as the first move in military reform, superimposed on top of the various groups of fighters, government and former rebels.[41] Three military regional commanders were nominated by the former Kinshasa government, two commanders each by the RCD-Goma and the MLC, and one region commander each by the RCD-K/ML and RCD-N. Another report however says that the military region commanders were only nominated in January 2004, and that the troop deployment on the ground did not change substantially until the year afterward.

It should be made clear also that Joseph Kabila does not trust the military; the Republican Guard is the only component he trusts. Major General John Numbi, former Air Force chief, now inspector general of police, ran a parallel chain of command in the east to direct the 2009 Eastern Congo offensive, Operation Umoja Wetu; the regular chain of command was by-passed. Previously Numbi negotiated the agreement to carry out the mixage process with Laurent Nkunda.[42]

Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff

The available information on the following officers is incomplete and sometimes contradictory. There may be confusion between the post of army chief of staff and armed forces chief of staff in the following list.

  • 1960 - c.1961?: Major General Victor Lundula (promoted in one leap from sergeant-major to major general on the formation of ANC)[43] After the severe riots that followed in the Congo now, Lundula sought to intervene in several incidents, personally rescued some Europeans from harm and averted trouble wherever possible. In September 1960, when President Kasavubu deposed Lumumba as prime minister, Lundula was jailed for two months. At the end of November 1960 he was released and escaped to Stanleyville in the Eastern Province, and became Antoine Gizenga's military chief.
  • Early 1960s (1964–1965): Major then Lieutenant General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu[44]
  • 1964-1965: Major General Léonard Mulumba, Chief of Staff since October 1964, until named Prime Minister after coup of November 25, 1965. Removed from premiership October 26, 1966, following pressure from army high command. Mobutu became head of government as well as head of state. Born Kasai 1930, Joined Force publique 1949, Sergeant Major by 1960, quickly became an officer. 1962 assigned to command the 3rd Groupement at Kisangani. 'Gained international fame for.. defence of Bukavu and for conducting one of the most decisive battles of the 1964 north-east revolution. When Kisangani was recaptured from rebel forces in 1964 he was named military governor of the entire northeastern region.' 'General Mulamba has always enjoyed great popularity with the troops. He is known for his straightforward approach to problems. He has a sizeable farm outside Kinshasa to which, he has said, he would like to retire some day.'[45]
  • November 1965[46] to at least 1972:[47] General Louis Bobozo, Commandant en chef de l’Armée nationale congolaise. Bobozo was a Major General in 1965 and appears to have been a full General by 1972.
  • 1966: Lieutenant Colonel Ferdinand Malila, Army Chief of Staff[48][49]
  • c.1972-1977 : Brigadier General Bumba Moaso, former commander of the Airborne Division (DITRAC: Division de Troupes Aeromobiles Reinforcee de Choc). From Equateur; Crawford and Young describe him as 'illiterate, but a forceful personality.'[50] One of a number of military leaders who entered the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) Political Bureau in 1975, when the MPR was merged with the state, and in 1975 became one of the eight permanent members of the Political Bureau.
  • Sept 1978 - 1981 Général de corps d'armée Babia Zangi Malobia. Former Director-General of the Defence Ministry, and graduate of the Belgian defence academy.[50]
  • 1981-1987: unknown
  • Oct 1987-1989: Admiral fr:Lomponda Wa Botembe
  • 1989-91: General d'Armee Mazembe ba Embanga
  • 1991–1993 : General Mahele Lioko Bokoungo, Chief of Staff of the Forces Armées Zaïroises[51]
  • 1993–1996 : General Eluki Monga Aundu (February 1993 – 20 November 1996)
  • 1996–1997 : General Marc Mahélé Lièko Bokungu (assassinated 16 May 1997)
  • 1997–1998 : James Kabarebe, Chef d'état-major des FAC, until July 1998.
  • 16 July 1998 – 15 August 1998: Célestin Kifwa[52]
  • August 1998 – 1999:?[53]
  • 1999–?: General Sylvestre Lwetcha, reappointed March 2001[54]
  • ?-2004 : Admiral Baudouin Liwanga Mata Nyamuniobo
  • 21 June 2004[55]–2007 : Lieutenant Général Kisempia Sungilanga Lombe, Chef d’état-major des forces armées[56]
  • June 2007 : Lieutenant General Dieudonné Kayembe Mbandakulu, former DEMIAP director
  • November 2008: General Didier Etumba[57]

Command structure as of January 2005

Virtually all officers have now changed positions, but this list gives an outline of the present structure.[58] Despite the planned subdivision of the country into more numerous provinces, the actual splitting of the former provinces has not taken place.

  • FARDC chief of staff: Major General Sungilanga Kisempia (PPRD)
  • FARDC land forces chief of staff: General Sylvain Buki (RCD-G)[59]
  • FARDC navy chief of staff: General Major Dieudonne Amuli Bahigwa (MLC) (Commander of the Kimia II operation in 2009)[60]
  • FARDC air force chief of staff: Brigadier General Bitanihirwa Kamara (MLC)
  • 1st Military Region/Bandundu: Brigadier General Moustapha Mukiza (MLC)
  • 2nd Military Region/Bas-Congo: Unknown. General Jean Mankoma 2009.
  • 3rd Military Region/Equateur: Brigadier-General Mulubi Bin Muhemedi (PPRD)
  • 4th Military Region/Kasai-Occidental: Brigadier-General Sindani Kasereka (RCD-K/ML)
  • 5th Military Region/Kasai Oriental: General Rwabisira Obeid (RCD)
  • 6th Military Region/Katanga: Brigadier-General Nzambe Alengbia (MLC) - 62nd, 63rd, and 67th Brigades in Katanga have committed numerous acts of sexual violence against women.[61]
  • 7th Military Region/Maniema: Brigadier-General Widi Mbulu Divioka (RCD-N)
  • 8th Military Region/North Kivu: General Gabriel Amisi Kumba (RCD). General Amisi, aka 'Tango Fort' now appears to be Chief of Staff of the Land Forces. Brig. Gen. Vainqueur Mayala was Commander 8th MR in September 2008[62]
  • 9th Military Region/Province Orientale: Major-General Bulenda Padiri (Mayi-Mayi)
  • 10th Military Region/South Kivu: Major Mbuja Mabe (PPRD). General Pacifique Masunzu as of 2010. Region included 112th Brigade on Minembwe plateuxes. This grouping was “an almost exclusively Banyamulenge brigade under the direct command of the 10th Military Region, [which] consider[ed] General Masunzu as its leader.” [63]

Land forces

Congolese soldier near the Rwandan border, 2001.

The land forces are made up of about 14 integrated brigades, of fighters from all the former warring factions which have gone through an brassage integration process (see next paragraph), and a not-publicly known number of non-integrated brigades which remain solely made up from single factions (the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)'s Armee National Congolaise, the ex-government former Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the ex-RCD KML, the ex-Movement for the Liberation of Congo, the armed groups of the Ituri conflict (the Mouvement des Révolutionnaires Congolais (MRC), Forces de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri (FRPI) and the Front Nationaliste Intégrationniste (FNI)) and the Mai-Mai).

It appears that about the same time that Presidential Decree 03/042 of 18 December 2003 established the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion (CONADER), '..all ex-combatants were officially declared as FARDC soldiers and the then FARDC brigades [were to] rest deployed until the order to leave for brassage.[64]

The reform plan adopted in 2005 envisaged the formation of eighteen integrated brigades through the brassage process as its first of three stages.[65] The process consists firstly of regroupment, where fighters are disarmed. Then they are sent to orientation centres, run by CONADER, where fighters take the choice of either returning to civilian society or remaining in the armed forces. Combatants who choose demobilisation receive an initial cash payment of US $110. Those who choose to stay within the FARDC are then transferred to one of six integration centres for a 45-day training course, which aims to build integrated formations out of factional fighters previously heavily divided along ethnic, political and regional lines. The centres are spread out around the country at Kitona, Kamina, Kisangani, Rumangabo and Nyaleke (within the Virunga National Park) in Nord-Kivu, and Luberizi (on the border with Burundi) in South Kivu. The process has suffered severe difficulties due to construction delays, administration errors, and the amount of travel former combatants have to do, as the three stages' centres are widely separated. Following the first 18 integrated brigades, the second goal is the formation of a ready reaction force of two to three brigades, and finally, by 2010 when MONUC is anticipated to have withdrawn, the creation of a Main Defence Force of three divisions.

In February 2008, the current reform plan was described as:[66]

“The short term, 2008-2010, will see the setting in place of a Rapid Reaction Force; the medium term, 2008 -2015, with a Covering Force; and finally the long term, 2015-2020, with a Principal Defence Force.” He added that the reform plan rests on a programme of synergy based on the four pillars of dissuasion, production, reconstruction and excellence. “The Rapid Reaction Force is expected to focus on dissuasion, through a Rapid Reaction Force of 12 battalions, capable of aiding MONUC to secure the east of the country and to realise constitutional missions,” Defence Minister Chikez Diemu said.

Amid the other difficulties in building new armed forces for the DRC, in early 2007 the integration and training process was distorted as the DRC government under Kabila attempted to use it to gain more control over the dissident general Laurent Nkunda. A hastily-negotiated verbal agreement in Rwanda saw three government FAC brigades integrated with Nkunda's former ANC 81st and 83rd Brigades in what was called mixage. Mixage brought multiple factions into composite brigades, but without the 45-day retraining provided by brassage, and it seems that actually, the process was limited to exchanging battalions between the FAC and Nkunda brigades in North Kivu, without further integration. Due to Nkunda's troops having greater cohesion, Nkunda effectively gained control of all five brigades - not what the DRC central government had been hoping![67] However after Nkunda used the mixage brigades to fight the FDLR, strains arose between the FARDC and Nkunda-loyalist troops within the brigades and they fell apart in the last days of August 2007. The International Crisis Group says that 'by 30 August [2007] Nkunda's troops had left the mixed brigades and controlled a large part of the Masisi and Rutshuru territories' (of North Kivu).[68]

Both formally integrated brigades and the non-integrated units continue to conduct arbitrary arrests, rapes, robbery, and other crimes[69] and these human rights violations are "regularly" committed by both officers and members of the rank and file. Members of the Army also often strike deals to gain access to resources with the militias they are meant to be fighting.[70]

The various brigades and other formations and units number at least 100,000 troops.[71] The status of these brigades has been described as "pretty chaotic."[72] A 2007 disarmament and repatriation study said "army units that have not yet gone through the process of brassage are usually much smaller than what they ought to be. Some non-integrated brigades have only 500 men (and are thus nothing more than a small battalion) whereas some battalions may not even have the size of a normal company (over a 100 men)."[73]

Known integrated brigades in 2007

Like the Force Publique in the Congo Free State, FARDC brigades have been deploying to their areas of operation with their families in tow.

  • 1st Brigade (integrated), human rights reports in April and August 2007 place the Brigade in the Mahagi territory, Ituri area, Orientale.[74] At Bavi, 30 km south of Bunia, between August and November 2006 forty civilians were slaughtered and buried in three different graves by soldiers of the 1st integrated Brigade.
  • 2nd Brigade (integrated), Butembo, North Kivu, 28 July 2007[75]
  • 3rd Brigade (integrated), Bukavu area, late March 2007[76] (now 101st Brigade)
  • 4th Brigade (integrated), elements reported at Lopa, Ituri area, 24–25 July 2007[77]
  • 5th Brigade (integrated), previously stationed in North Kivu[78] but now at Kananga, Kasai-Occidental
  • 6th Brigade (integrated), Jiba, Ituri area, Orientale, May 2007[79] Ordered to leave Ituri for North Kivu for offensive against Laurent Nkunda, June 2007.[80]
  • 7th Brigade (integrated), finished forming Kitona March 2006.[81] Stationed in Kinshasa August 2006.[82] Elements of this brigade at Bolobo, Bandundu province, May 2007.[83]
  • 8th Brigade (integrated), elements at Luberizi & Luvungi, in South Kivu[84]
  • 9th Brigade (integrated), North Kivu
  • 10th Brigade (integrated), Gemena, Equateur
  • 12th Brigade (integrated), HQ at Baraka, DRC, South Kivu[85]
  • 13th Brigade (integrated), Marabo, North Kivu, mid June 2007.[86] Second battalion of this brigade in process of formation near Bunia mid August 2007.[87]
  • 14th Brigade (integrated), Kalima, South Kivu, May 2007, now numbered 105th Brigade.[88] Africa Confidential reported in January 2008 that the brigade was a part of a 25,000 strong government attack on 4,000 of Laurent Nkunda's soldiers in December 2007, but was beaten back, with the loss of its 'entire arms and equipment.'[89] Human Rights Watch's 'Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone: Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo,' July 2009, is a detailed study of this brigade's history and crimes.[90]
  • 15th Brigade (integrated) (waiting for deployment as of 30 May 2007, with 2,837 men assigned.[91] Ordered to leave Kisangani for North Kivu for offensive against Laurent Nkunda, June, and then routed by Nkunda troops in the Sake area, early September 2007.[80]
  • 16th and 17th Brigades (integrated)(beginning 'brassage' integration process as of May 30, 2007, both over 4,000 strong at the beginning of the process)[92] 17th Bde was later referred to in the Oxfam report ‘Waking the Devil,’ as well as later being in the Luhago/Kabona localities of Kabare territoire.[93]
  • 18th Brigade[94]
Congolese soldiers being trained by American contractors wait for instructions during training at Camp Base, Kisangani, 5 May 2010
  • 103rd Brigade (integrated)—previously designated 11th Brigade. Elements reported at Walungu, 110 km SW of Bukavu, South Kivu in the course of rape allegation 27 March 2007.[95]

A number of outside donor countries are also carrying out separate training programmes for various parts of the Forces du Terrestres (Land Forces). The People's Republic of China is training Congolese troops at Kamina in Katanga,[96] and the Belgian government is training at least one 'rapid reaction' battalion. When Kabila visited U.S. President George W. Bush in Washington D.C., he also asked the U.S. Government to train a battalion, and as a result, a private contractor, Protection Strategies Incorporated, started training a FARDC battalion at Camp Base, Kisangani, in February 2010.[97] The company is being supervised by Special Operations Command-Africa Command. The various international training programmes are not well integrated.


Attempting to list the equipment available to the DRC's land forces is difficult; most figures are unreliable estimates based on known items delivered in the past. The IISS's Military Balance 2007 and's Concise World Armies 2005 give only slightly differing figures however (the figures below are from the IISS Military Balance 2007). Much of the Army's equipment is non-operational due to insufficient maintenance—in 2002 only 20 percent of the Army's armoured vehicles were estimated as being serviceable.[98]

In addition to these 2007 figures, In March 2010, it was reported that the DRC's land forces had ordered USD $80 million worth of military equipment from Ukraine which included 20 T-72 main battle tanks, 100 trucks and various small arms.[99] 20 x T-72 have been reported by World Defence Almanac. Tanks have been used in the Kivus in the 2005-9 period.

Republican Guard

In addition to the other land forces, President Joseph Kabila also has a Republican Guard presidential force, formerly known as the Special Presidential Security Group (GSSP). FARDC military officials state that the Garde Républicaine is not the responsibility of FARDC, but the Head of State.[100] Apart from Article 140 of the Law on the Army and Defence, no legal stipulation on the DRC's Armed Forces makes provision for the GR as a distinct unit within the national army. In February 2005, President Joseph Kabila passed a decree which appointed the GR's commanding officer and 'repealed any previous provisions contrary' to that decree. The GR is more than 10,000 strong (the ICG said 10,000–15,000 in January 2007), and has better working conditions and is paid regularly, but still commits rapes and robberies nearby their bases.

In an effort to extend his personal control across the country, Joseph Kabila has deployed the GR at key airports, ostensibly in preparation for an impending presidential visit.[101] At the end of 2005, there were Guards deployed in Mbandaka, Kindu, Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Kolwezi, staying many months after the President had left. They are still deployed at Kisangani's Bangoka airport, where they appear to answer to no local commander and have caused trouble with MONUC troops there.[100]

The GR is also supposed to undergo the integration process, but as of January 2007, only one battalion had been announced as been integrated. Formed at a brassage centre in the Kinshasa suburb of Kibomango, the battalion included 800 men, half from the former GSSP and half from the MLC and RCD Goma.[102]

Other forces active in the country

Locations of MONUC units as at December 2009

There are currently large numbers of United Nations troops stationed in the DRC. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) As of 31 August 2011 (2011 -08-31) had a strength of over 19,000 peacekeepers (including 16,998 military personnel) and has a mission of assisting Congolese authorities maintain security.[103] The UN and foreign military aid missions, the most prominent being EUSEC RD Congo,[104] are attempting to assist the Congolese in rebuilding the armed forces, with major efforts being made in trying to assure regular payment of salaries to armed forces personnel and also in military justice. Among EUSEC DR Congo's projects was the 'Modernisation de l’Administration des Forces Armées de la RDC' (Modernisation of the Administration of the FARDC) underway in December 2008, under which, amongst other projects, information technology training was being delivered.[105] It appears that in December 2009, SG/HR Javier Solana of the EU issued a formal invitation for the United States government to offer a contribution to EUSEC RD Congo.[106] Retired Canadian Lieutenant General Marc Caron also served for a time as Security Sector Reform advisor to the head of MONUC.

Groups of anti-Rwandan government rebels like the FDLR, and other foreign fighters remain inside the DRC.[4] The FDLR which is the greatest concern, was some 6,000 strong, as of July 2007. By late 2010 the FDLR's strength however was estimated at 2,500.[107] The other groups are smaller: the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army, the Ugandan rebel group the Allied Democratic Forces in the remote area of Mt Rwenzori, and the Burundian Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu—Forces Nationales de Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL).

Finally there is a government paramilitary force, created in 1997 under President Laurent Kabila. The National Service is tasked with providing the army with food and with training the youth in a range of reconstruction and developmental activities.[108] There is not much further information available, and no internet-accessible source details the relationship of the National Service to other armed forces bodies; it is not listed in the constitution. President Kabila, in one of the few comments available, says National Service will provide a gainful activity for street children. Obligatory civil service administered through the armed forces was also proposed under the Mobutu regime during the 'radicalisation' programme of December 1974-January 1975; the FAZ was opposed to the measure and the plan 'took several months to die.'[109]

Air Force

All military aircraft in the DRC are operated by the Air Force. Jane's World Air Forces states that the Air Force has an estimated strength of 1,800 personnel and is organised into two Air Groups. These Groups command five wings and nine squadrons, of which not all are operational. 1 Air Group is located at Kinshasa and consists of Liaison Wing, Training Wing and Logistical Wing and has a strength of five squadrons. 2 Tactical Air Group is located at Kaminia and consists of Pursuit and Attack Wing and Tactical Transport Wing and has a strength of four squadrons. Foreign private military companies have reportedly been contracted to provide the DRC's aerial reconnaissance capability using small propeller aircraft fitted with sophisticated equipment. Jane's states that National Air Force of Angola fighter aircraft would be made available to defend Kinshasa if it came under attack.[110]

Like the other services, the Congolese Air Force is not capable of carrying out its responsibilities. Few of the Air Force's aircraft are currently flyable or capable of being restored to service and it is unclear whether the Air Force is capable of maintaining even unsophisticated aircraft. Moreover, Jane's states that the Air Force's Ecole de Pilotage is 'in near total disarray' though Belgium has offered to restart the Air Force's pilot training program.[111]


The 2002 edition of Jane's Sentinel described the Navy as being "in a state of near total disarray" and stated that it did not conduct any training or have operating procedures.[112] The Navy shares the same discipline problems as the other services. It was initially placed under command of the MLC when the transition began: the current situation is uncertain.

The 2007 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships states that the Navy is organised into four commands, based at Matadi, near the coast; the capital Kinshasa, further up the Congo river; Kalemie, on Lake Tanganyika; and Goma, on Lake Kivu.[113]

The IISS, in its 2007 edition of the Military Balance, confirms the bases listed in Jane's and adds a fifth base at Boma, a coastal city near Matadi.

Various sources also refer to numbered Naval Regions. Operations of the 1st Naval Region have been reported in Kalemie,[114] the 4th near the northern city of Mbandaka,[115] and the 5th at Goma.[116]

The IISS lists the Navy at 1,000 personnel and a total of eight patrol craft, of which only one is operational, a Shanghai II Type 062 class gunboat designated "102". There are five other 062s as well as two Swiftships which are not currently operational, though some may be restored to service in the future. According to Jane's, the Navy also operates barges and small craft armed with machine guns.[117]

Before the downfall of Mobutu, a small navy operated on the Congo river. One of its installations was at the village of N'dangi near the presidential residence in Gbadolite. The port at N'dangi was the base for several patrol boats, helicopters and the presidential yacht.[118]

References and notes

  1. ^ Number derived from 80,000 estimate for non-integrated land forces (The Economist, note 55, July 2007) plus 2007 IISS estimates: 46,000 for integrated brigades and 5,000 for Air and Naval forces together.
  2. ^ Ian Johnston (ed.), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, Center for International Cooperation - Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder/London, p.62
  3. ^ A. AUGÉ and P. KLAOUSEN, eds, Réformer les armées africaines. En quête d’une nouvelle stratégie Paris: Karthala, 2010. ISBN 978-2-8111-0340-8, p.120-122
  4. ^ a b International Crisis Group, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report No.128, 5 July 2007
  5. ^ In French, 'Loi No 04/023 du 12 novembre 2004 portant Organisation Generale de defence et des forces armees.'
  6. ^ Jean-Claude Williame in Kitchen, ed, Footnotes to the Congo Story, Walker & Co., New York, 1967, p.166-7
  7. ^ Ludo de Witte, The assassination of Lumumba, p.7
  8. ^ Gordon McDonald et al, U.S. Army Area Handbook for the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) [issued by the Foreign Area Studies Division of American University], June 1962, p.620
  9. ^ Institute for Security Studies workshop, [1]
  10. ^ British Military Attache Kinshasa, Report for the Period Ending 30 June 1970, FCO 31/577, accessed at Public Records Office, Kew
  11. ^ Colonel S.C. Davis, British Military Attache Kinshasa, May 1972, DA/KIN/76, FCO 31/1170
  12. ^ Crawford and Young, 1985, p.266
  13. ^ See Colonel S.C. Davis, British Military Attache Kinshasa, May 1972, DA/KIN/76, FCO 31/1170, via The National Archives, and J. M. Lee and Institute for Strategic Studies, African armies and civil order, Studies in international security, 13 (New York: Published for the Institute for Strategic Studies [by] Praeger, 1969), 85.
  14. ^ John Keegan, World Armies, New York: Facts on File, 1979, pp. 822–823.
  15. ^ a b Ed. by Sandra W. Meditz and Tim Merrill, Country Study for Zaire, 1993, Library of Congress
  16. ^ The Division was formed in 1974 and trained by North Korea. It was named after a June 1964 incident in the eastern town of Kamanyola. In 1993 it consisted of the 11th Infantry Brigade, the 12th Infantry Brigade, and the 14th Infantry Brigade. See Michela Wrong, The Emperor Mobutu, Transition—Issues 81 & 82 (Volume 9, Number 1 and 2), 2000, pp. 92–112
  17. ^ Ed. by Sandra W. Meditz and Tim Merrill, Shaba II, Country Study for Zaire 1993, Library of Congress
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  19. ^ John Keegan, World Armies, New York: Facts on File, 1979, p. 823.
  20. ^ John W. Turner, 'A Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present,' Arms and Armour Press, London, 1998, ISBN 1-85409-128-X, 221-225
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  23. ^ Tom Cooper & Pit Weinert, Zaire/DR Congo since 1980, 2 September 2003, Air Combat Information Group, accessed August 2007
  24. ^ Jacques Ebenga & Thierry N’Landu The Congolese National Army: In search of an identity, Evolutions and Revolutions, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2005, p.66–70, 73–74
  25. ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 289. A good military description of the 1996-97 war was written by William Thom: (1999) Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence, Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. XIX No. 2, Fall 1999
  26. ^ Gerard Prunier, From Genocide to Continental War: The "Congolese" Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa, C. Hurst & Co, 2009, ISBN 978-1-85065-523-7, p.150, and Colette Braeckman interview with Kabila in Le Soir, October 31 - November 2, 1997, at Prunier p.150.
  27. ^ Prunier, 2009, p.176
  28. ^ Prunier, 2009, p.176. Prunier says 'on the causes of the mutiny, see Memorandum de la Communaute Banyamulenge a Son Excellence le President de la Republique Democratique du Congo, eut egard a la situation securitaire qui prevaut au Sud Kivu, Bukavu, February 24, 1998. Prunier footnote p.416
  29. ^ Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo Casualties of War: Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms, Vol. 11, No. 1 (A), February 1999
  30. ^ Herbert Weiss, War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Political Evolution in Rwanda and Burundi, 1998-1999, Nordic Africa Institute, 2000, p.13. See web reference at [2]. See also OCHA/IRIN 20 August 1998
  31. ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 284.
  32. ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Pages 284–285.
  33. ^ "IRIN-CEA Update No. 737 for 17 August (19990817)". IRIN. Tuesday 17 August 1999. Retrieved 17 November 2009. 
  34. ^ a b Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 289.
  35. ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Pages 286–287.
  36. ^ Integrated Regional Information Networks (2008-01). "DR Congo Rising food prices". Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell) 44 (11): 17623C–17624A. 
  37. ^ Hochschild, Adam (August 13, 2009). "Rape of the Congo". New York Review of Books Volume 56, Number 13. Retrieved 30 July 2009. 
  38. ^ "You Will Be Punished". Human Rights Watch. 13 December 2009. Retrieved 14 December 2009. 
  39. ^ Jane's Sentinel security assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 314.
  40. ^$File/CICR%20bulletin.pdf. This command was formed in accordance with DÉCRET 106/2002 portant création d’un groupement des écoles supérieures militaires des Forces armées congolaises. (Présidence de la République), and is a reformation of a grouping with the same name eactive in the 1980s and potentially before. Claude Lambert, 'L'Ecole de Formation d'Officiers 1969-1990,' Militaria Belge 2007-08, Societe Royale des Amies du Musee de l'Armee, Brussels, 2008, pp.267 onwards
  41. ^ "New military command for DR Congo". BBC News. Wednesday 20 August 2003. Retrieved 17 November 2009. 
  42. ^ See for example CNDP,
  43. ^ Library of Congress Country Study:Zaire. Washington DC. October 1993. Retrieved April 2008. 
  44. ^ 'Promu, le 7 janvier 1960, au grade de Général Major, Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Nationale, il s'attelle à la modernisation et à l'équipement des forces armées. Le 3 novembre 1965, il est nommé au grade de Lieutenant-général de l'Armée Nationale Congolaise.', accessed 18 November 2009.
  45. ^ Sydney Taylor, The New Africans, 1967, p.102
  46. ^ Le Potential, 24 novembre 1965 : le communiqué du coup d'Etat du Lieutenant-général Mobutu. Bobozo was made C-in-C under Mobutu when Mobutu seized power, and it was stated initially that he would act as C-in-C 'while Mobutu was acting as President of the Republic.'
  47. ^ Colonel S.C. Davis, British Military Attache Kinshasa, Report on the Zairean Armed Forces for the Period Apr 1971 – Apr 1972, DA/KIN/76, 5 May 1972, FCO 31/1170, accessed at Public Records Office, Kew
  48. ^ Miami News, June 18, 1966
  49. ^ Sydney Taylor (ed), The New Africans: A Guide to the Contemporary History of Emergent Africa and its Leaders, Paul Hamlin, London/Reuters, 1967, p.95, 102. No ISBN visible.
  50. ^ a b M. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, 1985, ISBN 0-299-10110-X, p.265
  51. ^ Canadian Government Immigration Review Board, Issue Paper: Zaire: The Balance of Power in the Regions, April 1997
  52. ^, Congo developments XXIV Chronicle: June 1 – August 26, 1998
  53. ^ Joseph Kabila was made Chef de Etat-Major Adjoint in 1998 and then Chef de Etat-Major des Forces Terrestres in 2000. Was given rank of Major General, but has no military training apart from a course in China.
  54. ^ Gerard Prunier, 'From Genocide to Continental War: the 'Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa,' Hurst & Co., London, 2009, ISBN 978-1-85065-523-7, p.263 (see also p.230; there is also a confusing reference to General Lwetcha being made FAC chief of staff in September 1999).
  55. ^
  56. ^ [3] République Démocratique du Congo : L’armée doit arrêter l’utilisation d’enfants soldats, Bruxelles, 19 avril 2007, Human Rights Watch
  57. ^ Xinhua, [4]. See also U.S. State Department cable on his appointment:
  58. ^ Source is the Institute for Security Studies, at Democratic Republic of Congo Security Information (updated: 12 January 2005)
  59. ^ Still in post January 2006. Le Potential (Kinshasa), Le chef d’état-major de la Force terrestre en visite éclair au centre de brassage de Rumangabo, 7 January 2006
  60. ^ Twenty-eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2009/335), 30 June 2009, paragraph 3
  61. ^ Legal Submission from Human Rights Watch to Dr. Adolphe Onusumba, Minister of Defense, July 21, 2006, (accessed June 8, 2009), via HRW 'Soldiers who Rape, Commanders who Condone.'
  62. ^
  63. ^ As of ICG, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report No. 128, 5 July 2007, p.13-14.
  64. ^ Garrett, Nicholas; Sergiou, Sylvia; Koen Vlassenroot (2008). "Negotiated peace for extortion: the case of Walikale territory in eastern DR Congo". Journal of Eastern African Studies (Taylor and Francis) 3 (1): 9. ISSN 1753-1063. 
  65. ^ This paragraph is drawn completely from the International Crisis Group's, Security Sector Reform in the Congo report of February 2006, p.17–18
  66. ^, accessed 1 November 2008
  67. ^ Henri Boshoff, The DDR Process in the DRC: a never-ending story, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2 July 2007
  68. ^ International Crisis Group, Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Africa Report No.133, 31 October 2007, p.13
  69. ^ Amnesty International, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army], 25 January 2007, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007
  70. ^ Autesserre, Séverine (2008). "The Trouble With Congo". Foreign Affairs (New York: Council on Foreign Relations) 87 (3): 104–105. 
  71. ^ " FARDC troops estimated at 100,000, says EUSEC ::: 20/03/2006". Retrieved 2008-09-29. 
  72. ^ "Only just staying in one piece". The Economist. 2007-07-28. p. 42. Retrieved 2007-08-04. 
  73. ^ Hans Romkena De Vennhoop Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the DRC, Multi Country Demobilization and Recovery Program, April 2007, p.32
  74. ^ MONUC Human Rights report April 2007, paragraph 31 and MONUC via Le Potential Violation des droits de l’homme en RDC: état des lieux de la Monuc, 10 August 2007
  75. ^ MONUC via Reliefweb, RD Congo : Rapport mensuel des droits de l'homme - juillet 2007, paragraph 14
  76. ^ MONUC Human Rights Report via Le Potentiel Le Potentiel, 18 April 2007
  77. ^ MONUC Human Rights Report July 2007 (French), paragraph 11
  78. ^ Charles Gba, Verbatim point de presse MONUC du mercredi 27 juin 2007
  79. ^ 'Au cours du mois d'avril 2007, des soldats FARDC de la 6ème Brigade Intégrée basée à Jiba -60 km au Nord-Est de Bunia, Ituri-, ont été responsables de 14 cas de viol et de plusieurs cas de mauvais traitements à l'égard de la population locale.' MONUC via Le Potentiel (Kinshasa), Congo-Kinshasa: Violation des droits de l'homme en RDC, 22 June 2007
  80. ^ a b International Crisis Group, Congo:Bringing Peace to North Kivu, 31 October 2007, p.12
  81. ^ (French), accessed July 2009
  82. ^ "Les Dépęches". Retrieved 2008-09-29. 
  83. ^ MONUC, Droits de l'Homme: Rapport Mensuel - Mai 2007, paragraph 22
  84. ^, Imminence d'une mutinerie à Luberizi, à l'Est de la RD.Congo, dans la Province du Sud Kivu, 23 May 2007
  85. ^ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Situation humanitaire en RDC (Sud Kivu) - Rapport hebdomadaire du 30 juin au 06 juillet 2007, 6 July 2007
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  87. ^ MONUC,
  88. ^ MONUC,, paragraph 25
  89. ^ 'Central Africa: A slow road to travel,' Africa Confidential, 11 January 2008, Vol. 49, No.1, p.9
  90. ^ Human Rights Watch (2009). Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone: Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo. New York: Human Rights Watch. ISBN 1-56432-510-5. . See also U.S. State Department, 08KINSHASA441 : The FARDC 14th Brigade: A Burden to Kabare Residents, 19 May 2008
  91. ^ MONUC via at Congo-Kinshasa: La Monuc a rendu hommages aux 85 soldats de la paix décédés en RDC depuis le début de sa mission
  92. ^ See also on 12th and 13th Battalions of 17th Brigade - Congo-Kinshasa: Second Monuc Training Session of FARDC Integrated Brigades Ends(06:Feb'08)
  93. ^ Radio Okapi May 2009, “Nindja : attaques des FDLR, 2 officiers FARDC tués et un disparu”
  94. ^ Reliefweb and MONUC
  95. ^ Le Potential, Congo-Kinshasa: Rapport de la Monuc pour avril 2007, graves violations des droits de l'homme en RDC via, 21 May 2007. There is an ambiguous reference to the 'eleventh and twelfth brigades' in the ICG's 31 October 2007 report, 'Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Appendix C, page 25, indicating that these two formations may have been principally raised from the all-Hutu Local Defence Force in North Kivu, revived by Governor Eugene Serufuli, probably during the 2000–2002 period.
  96. ^ See Africa Confidential, 'A multinational road to army reform,' 24 July 2009, p.9, Sebastien Melmot 2007 (Fr), Candide in Congo: The Expected Failure of Security Sector Reform 2009, and Congo-Kinshasa: New Multinational Initiative Launches Peace Efforts, 6 November 2009
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  100. ^ a b Amnesty International, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army, Section VII A, 25 January 2007, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007
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  102. ^ 'Sortie officielle du premier bataillon integre de la Garde Republicaine des FARDC', Xinhua News Agency, 15 September 2006, cited in Amnesty International DRC Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army, Section VII A, 25 January 2007, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007
  103. ^ "MONUSCO Facts and Figures - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". Retrieved 16 October 2011. 
  104. ^ "EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". The Council of the European Union. Retrieved 2007-08-12. . EUSEC DR Congo was initially planned in 2005-06 to include eight EU advisors assigned to posts in the DRC's integrated military structure (Structure Militaire d'Integration (?)), the army general staff, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (CONADER?), the Joint Operational Committee, and the Ministry of Defence. Sharon Wiharta, 'Peacebuilding: the new international focus on Africa,' SIPRI Yearbook 2006, Oxford University Press, p.154
  105. ^ Council of the European Union, Note Technique: Projet “Modernisation de l'Administration des FARDC” Formation en Technologies d’Information au profit des Forces Armées de la RDC, November 2008
  106. ^ U.S. Embassy Brussels, EU: Help Us Reform Congo's Army, 09BRUSSELS1606, 1 December 2009, via United States diplomatic cables leak
  107. ^ MONUSCO, Over 1800 FDLR armed rebels surrender to MONUSCO in 2010, February 3, 2011
  108. ^ Jacques Ebenga & Thierry N’Landu The Congolese National Army: In search of an identity, Evolutions and Revolutions, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2005
  109. ^ Crawford and Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairiean State, 1985, p.359-360
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  118. ^ L'Express, 22. December 2008, page 13


Further reading

  • Recent German Foreign Ministry Report
  • Thierry Charlier, « Défilé militaire à Kinshasa », in Raids magazine, no 294, novembre 2010, p. 46-47 (ISSN 0769-4814)
  • K.M.F. Emizet, 'Explaining the rise and fall of military regimes: civil-military relations in the Congo,' Armed Forces and Society, Winter 2000
  • Ernest W. Lefever, Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
  • Rene Lemarchand, "Forecasting the Future of the Military in Former Belgian Africa," in Catherine M. Kelleher, ed., Political Military Systems: A Comparative Analysis (Sage Publications, Inc., Beverly Hills, California: 1974), pp. 87–104
  • Human Rights Watch, 'Soldiers who rape, commanders who condone: Sexual violence and military reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,' July 16, 2009
  • Mark Malan, 'U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement,' Refugees International, 2008
  • Gordon C. McDonald et al., Area handbook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo Kinshasa), Washington; For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1971. DA Pam 550-67.
  • Kisukula Abeli Meitho, 'La desintegration de l'armee congolaise de Mobutu a Kabila', L'Harmattan, Paris/Montreal, 2001, ISBN 2-7384-8693-2
  • Kisukula Abeli Meitho, "Les armées du Congo-Zaire, un frein au developpement"
  • Anthony Mockler, 'The New Mercenaries,' Corgi Books, 1985, ISBN 0-552-12558-X - covers mercenary units titularly part of the Armée National Congolaise in the 1960s
  • Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert, Mapping Conflict Motives in the Eastern DRC, IPIS, Antwerp, 4 March 2008
  • Mwayila Tshiyembe, 'Le défi de l'armée républicaine en République Démocratique du Congo,' Editions L'Harmattan, 2005
  • Louis-François Vanderstraeten, De la Force publique à l'Armee nationale congolaise : histoire d'une mutinerie : juillet 1960, Bruxelles : Académie Royale de Belgique ; Paris-Gembloux : Duculot, ©1985. ISBN 9782801105573

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