Powell v. McCormack

SCOTUSCase
Litigants=Powell v. McCormack
ArgueDate=April 21
ArgueYear=1969
DecideDate=June 16
DecideYear=1969
FullName=Powell, et al. v. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives, et al.
USVol=395
USPage=486
Citation=89 S. Ct. 1944; 23 L. Ed. 2d 491; 1969 U.S. LEXIS 3103
Prior=Cert. to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Subsequent=
Holding=Congress may not in anyway alter the qualifications of its members from the exclusive list given in the Constitution (age, length of citizenship, and inhabitant of state where elected). Therefore, "excluding" a Congressman by a two-thirds majority vote is not allowed although the Constitution allows expulsion by a two-thirds vote.
SCOTUS=1967-1969
Majority=Warren
JoinMajority=Black, Brennan, Douglas, Harlan, Marshall, and White
Concurrence=Douglas
JoinConcurrence=
Concurrence2=
JoinConcurrence2=
Concurrence/Dissent=
JoinConcurrence/Dissent=
Dissent=Stewart
JoinDissent=
Dissent2=
JoinDissent2=
LawsApplied=

"Powell v. McCormack", ussc|395|486|1969 was a United States Supreme Court case decided in 1969 . It answered the question of whether Congress can exclude a person who has met the requirements written in the text of the U.S. Constitution and who has been elected to Congress, from serving in Congress.

Background of the case

Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., a senior member of the U.S. House of Representatives, was embroiled in scandals (allegedly refusing to pay a judgment ordered by a court in New York, misappropriating Congressional travel funds, and illegally paying his wife a Congressional staff salary for work she had not done).

In January of 1967, when the 90th Congress convened, Speaker of the House John William McCormack asked Representative Powell to abstain from taking the oath of office. Then, the House passed H.Res.1, which stripped Powell of his chairmanship, excluded him from taking his seat, and created a Select Committee to investigate Powell’s misdeeds. After the Select Committee conducted its investigation and hearings, in March 1967, the House passed H.Res.278 by a vote of 307 to 116, which again excluded Powell from Congress and also censured him, fined him $40,000, took away his seniority, and declared his seat vacant.

Powell, along with thirteen of his constituents, responded by filing suit in Federal District Court. He named Speaker of the House John William McCormack and five other members as defendants. He also named the Clerk of the House, the Sergeant at Arms, and even the Doorkeeper. Most of these parties were named in an effort to get injunctions barring the enforcement of H.Res.278:

:* To prevent the Speaker from refusing to administer the oath of office:* To prevent the Clerk from "refusing to perform the duties due a Representative":* To prevent the Sergeant at Arms from withholding Powell’s salary:* To prevent the Doorkeeper from barring Powell from Congressional chambers

The suit claimed that excluding Powell amounted to an expulsion but that an expulsion would not have garnered the necessary two-thirds vote.

The suit was dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An appeals court overturned their ruling, stating that the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction but dismissed the case nonetheless for a lack of justiciability.

While the suit was making its way through the court system, Powell was re-elected and ultimately re-seated in the 91st Session of Congress, which passed H.Res.2 that only fined him $25,000. Because he was seated when the case came to court, the defendants argued that the case was moot.

Constitutional issues of the case

*Congressional power to develop qualifications other than those specified (Art. I, § 2, cl. 1-2)
*Congressional power to exclude rather than impeach or expel (Art. I, § 2, cl. 5; Art. I, § 5, cl. 2)
*Judicial review versus Congressional power to be the judge of its qualifications (Art. I, § 5, cl. 1) Supreme Court Jurisdiction and Justiciability (Art. III)
*Rights of the electorate to elect their Representative

Court's decision

Warren's majority opinion

The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice Warren, and signed by Black, Brennan, Douglas, Harlan, Marshall, and White

The opinion stated that the case was justiciable; that it did not constitute a political question that pit one branch of government against another. Rather, it required "no more than an interpretation of the Constitution."

The opinion stated furthermore that Congress being the sole judge of its members’ qualifications (Art. I, § 5, cl. 1) and the Speech and Debate Clause (Art. I, § 6) do not preclude judicial review of Constitutional issues ("raised in this case" e.g., in this particular case; but not necessarily in all cases touching upon the subject of speech & debate, or Congresses' judging the qualifications of its members) because "no branch is supreme" and it is the duty of the court to ensure that all branches conform to the Constitution.

The majority opinion held that Congress does not have the power to develop qualifications other than those specified in Art. I, § 2, cl. 1-2.

states that "Each house shall be the judge of...qualification of its own members," but then immediately states that each House has the authority to expel a member "with the Concurrence of two thirds." The Court found that it had a "textually demonstrable commitment" to interpret this clause. In the instant case the Court so did. The Court's interpretation was that the clause meant, expulsion was the only method for a House to determine the qualification(s) of its members. The Court reasoned that the Congresses' authority in this matter was post facto, i.e., after a member elect had been so created by his/her election under the laws of the state in which the congressional district resided; after his/her qualification for standing in such an election according to the qualifications specified in the U.S. Constitution; and after accepting the oath of office and enrollment into the Congress, determine the qualification(s) of its members.Fact|date=October 2007 It was unclear whether a vote of two-thirds would have been reached if the House resolution had specified expulsion (Art. I, § 2, cl. 5; Art. I, § 5, cl. 2) rather than exclusion. Thus, the Court found that Powell was wrongfully excluded from his seat.

The Court found that Congress is the whole body of initially candidate members (since under the U.S. Constitution all seats are open for elections in every election cycle) who have been elected by the laws of the several states (in and for each state’s apportioned congressional districts’), who assemble at the seat of the Federal Government on the 3rd day of January after the preceding November’s congressional elections. On that date they are sworn in (through their individual oath’s of office) and thereby they collectively become the Xth Congress (89; 95, 105, etc.).

The Court did not reach (because it determined it did not need to, in order to definitively rule in this case) the question of which Congress the Constitution was referring to; that had the power to expel one of its members. The Court determined in this case that no Congress could exclude a not-yet member (i.e., a candidate member) from being sworn and taking their seat in the House. The Court found that if the Congress went beyond a determination that a candidate member had satisfied the Constitution’s qualifications for membership (and had been duly chosen by, and through the laws of their state) it could not (under the Constitution) go further in examining and possibly rejecting a candidate member before administering the oath of office, and seating them.

The Court did not explicitly decide whether a particular Congress (i.e., 105th, 106th, or whatever), had the power to prospectively expel an individual from a future Congress without encumbering that future Congress from having, after the re-election, re-swearing and re-seating of a formerly expelled member; to expel the member all over again. Because the Court in effect did decide that the states were not prohibited from putting on their congressional district ballots; nor were the voters prohibited from electing; an individual who had been expelled from a previously existent, or an existing Congress. And that once elected, the Congress had a constitutional duty to swear and seat such an individual, if that individual had satisfied the qualifications enumerated in the Constitution, and had been chosen according to the laws of their state.

The challenge here is one diving a proper course of action between competing sovereign authorities (the Congress over its members, the people and the states over the Congress) over the choosing of members to the Congress. The Court looked at the historical precedent of the House; the history of its candidate members; and the role of the states and their voters in choosing their representatives. The Court concluded that the Constitution (which is the word and will of the people); the weight of history (the record of how the people have used their constitution); and the Federal structure of our Government (i.e., the role of the states in organizing and managing elections within their borders) to decide that the sovereign will of the people and the coordinate role of the states must be held supreme in this instance.

The people, through their constitution, affirmatively defined and bounded in their totality, the qualifications for standing in elections for membership in the Congress. The states, under the 9th and 10th amendment’s to the constitution explicitly retain unto themselves the power to make the laws for the conduct and regulation of elections for Federal offices that are apportioned to them (the states) by the U.S. constitution. Therefore, the people and the states together have the sole authority for the generation of candidate members of the U.S. Congress through the operation of the laws of the several states; and the Articles and Clauses of the U.S. constitution. Under this scheme, the Congress itself is a creation of, and subordinate to this process. And its processes and procedures for the management, administration and/or discipline of its members (members, once they are sworn) are constitutionally subordinate to the sovereignty of the people and the states respectively; over the creation of the membership of the Congress.

Douglas' concurring opinion

Justice Douglas wrote the only concurring opinion of this case. It stated that qualifications that are not part of the Constitution may not be added except through constitutional amendment. Therefore, Congress cannot exclude a member "except" through a two-thirds vote to expel.

Stewart's dissenting opinion

Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion that said that the case should not have been heard by the U.S. Supreme Court because the case was moot because Powell had already been seated in the 91st Congress by the time the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Non-voting justice

Justice Fortas was embroiled in his own scandal at the time, and did not vote on this case.

ee also

*List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 395

External links

* [http://www.enfacto.com/case/U.S./395/486/ Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)] (opinion full text).