Sweden and the Winter War


Sweden and the Winter War

The Winter War was fought in the four months following the Soviet Union's invasion of Finland on November 30, 1939. This took place three months after the German invasion of Poland that triggered the start of World War II. Sweden did not become actively involved in the conflict, but did indirectly support Finland.

Message from the King

In the "Statsrådsdiktamen" on 19 February 1940, Sweden's king Gustav V publicly rejected pleas from Finland's government for military intervention in the Winter War to help defend Finland against the Soviet invasion. This statement from the king was aimed at pressuring Finland to accept harsh Soviet peace conditions and to quiet a strong Swedish activist public opinion advocating participation in the war. The statement had this effect, but was also to produce substantial bitterness in Finland.

During the war, Sweden's government rejected a total of three formal pleas from Finland's government to engage militarily in Finland's defense against the Soviet Union. Detailed plans for Swedish deployment along Finland's border had been made ten years before, and they were regularly updated in secret contacts between the General Staffs of the two countries. However, no formal alliance had been concluded, and a proposed official recognition of cooperative defense of the de-militarized Åland Islands had been rebuffed by Sweden's parliament in June 1939.

Background to Swedish policy

According to the dominant view in Sweden's foreign ministry, Finland's foreign policy had, since her independence and 1918 civil war, been "unsteady and adventurous". In addition, Finland's domestic politics were viewed with great suspicion by Swedish Social Democrats. After the Socialists' defeat in the civil war, anti-parliamentarism and Anti-Socialist policies dominated Swedish impressions of Finland. Cooperation with Finland had in the 1920s and 1930s primarily been advocated by fringe right-wing politicians and military officers. Both to the right and to the left, a closer cooperation with Finland was seen as a means to counter the hegemonic position of the Social Democrats in Sweden.

After the Abyssinia crisis, both Finland and Sweden were forced to adjust their foreign policies, as the League of Nations seemed to offer only a hollow protection against foreign aggression. In the Baltic region both the reborn Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were seen as likely aggressors, eager to regain territories lost as a result of World War I, and likely to want to expand their influence further, if possible. Finland re-oriented her foreign policy towards Scandinavia and a neutralist policy of the Swedish type. The detailed plans for military cooperation were supplemented by intensified contacts between diplomats and politicians. Social Democrats under Väinö Tanner were rehabilitated and included in the cabinet. Finland's embassy in Stockholm was deemed the most important, and Paasikivi became ambassador there.

Even though central politicians and officials had been converted and convinced of the necessity for a closer Swedish–Finnish cooperation, parliamentarians and prominent individuals did not change their anti-Swedish or anti-Finnish attitudes as easily. Impressions made (in both countries) in connection with Finland's independence, civil war, the Åland crisis, language strife, and the Lapua Movement all stuck. These impressions, in turn, were compounded by a tendency in Sweden to emphasize the danger of Nazi expansionism and to view the Soviet Union with a great deal of good will: in Finland, however, the converse view was dominant.

Litvinov's demise as Soviet Foreign Minister in March 1939 signaled an increasing tension and danger for Finland and the Baltic countries, and indirectly for Sweden. Litvinov was known as being friendly towards the West, whereas the new minister, Molotov, had made a more aggressive impression. Litvinov's half promises to accept and support joint Finnish–Swedish provisions for the defense of Åland against the potential German threat were not upheld by his successor. As a consequence, Soviet-leaning ministers in Sweden, such as Ernst Wigforss and Östen Undén, proposed Sweden's withdrawal from these plans. Parliament agreed, being eager to continue Sweden's successful policy, since 1812, of non-confrontation towards Russia.

The political response to the Soviet invasion

In the face of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the following Soviet aggressions against Poland and the Baltic countries, Finland's situation seemed increasingly dangerous. On October 4, Finland's government asked if Sweden was prepared to contribute to Åland's defense with military means. The following day, Molotov invited a Finnish delegation to Moscow, with Sweden's parliament being informed the day after. On October 12, it turned out that the political support was deemed insufficient in Sweden for a military engagement on Åland: the Conservative party was in favor, the Social Democrats were split, and a majority of the Agrarians and all the Liberals were opposed. The opposition to Swedish military assistance on Åland was strengthened by the fear that intervention would become extended to Mainland Finland, which few parliamentarians would support.

Publicly, Finland was supported, but Finland's Foreign Minister Elias Erkko was informed that Swedish troops were not to be expected. It remains controversial to this day whether he delivered this message to his colleagues and his president.

The message perceived by public opinion in Finland, as well as in Sweden, thus differed greatly from the Swedish government's intentions. For two months Finland literally fought for her national survival, but by the end of January 1940, the Soviet Union gave up its plans for a reconquest of the whole of Finland. It was now deemed sufficient if Finland ceded its industrial heartland, including its second largest city Viipuri (Viborg, currently Vyborg). This would mean that the Soviet Union might gain much greater territory than the Red Army had been able to seize control of by military means. Through the so-called "Statsrådsdiktamen," Sweden's king helped the public perception of Sweden's intentions converge with the government's intentions.

Swedish military's position

One of the main considerations that led the Swedish government to declare Sweden a non-belligerent state was concern that they might otherwise lose control of the internal situation in Sweden. The Soviet demands on Finland in the months prior to the outbreak of war had roused public opinion. While there had been large demonstrations in support of Finland, Russia was a traditional enemy, and fear of the Russians had been a part of the Swedish mindset since 1719, when Russian galleys burned Swedish coastal communities during the Great Northern War. Therefore, there was a strong feeling that it was better to defend Sweden on Finnish soil.

Swedish military strength was at one of its low points in 1939, a rearmament program had been decided in 1936 but it hadn't yet had any substantial effect on the armed forces. The army only had 16 tanks apart from a small number of tankettes armed with machine guns. Air defence guns where few and the air force only had 36 Gloster Gladiator fighters. Modern artillery was very limited short range guns of the great war era or older where the norm.Worst of all training had been very reduced in the 1925 decision to cut back on the armed forces, most units didn't have winter training and left army units needing to conduct rehearsal training after a mobilization.

Within the Swedish military, officers who had been volunteers in the Finnish civil war were now senior officers. Most notable among them were Axel Rappe, a member of the General Staff, and Archibald Douglas, commander of the Northern Army Corps.

The belief that Sweden was best served by a defense in Finland was enacted primarily by Douglas, whose Northern Army Corps comprised around 26,600 men who had been mobilised to guard the Swedish border with Finland in case the Russians invaded.Cite web|url=http://www.tdg.nu/swedish_armed_forces/oob_swe_1939-40.htm|title=Swedish Army Order of Battle: 1939-1940|accessdate=2007-06-02] Cite web|url=http://www.tdg.nu/swedish_armed_forces/toe_swe_inf_rgt_1937.htm|title=Swedish Army Infantry Regiment: 1937|accessdate=2007-06-02] Cite web|url=http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=65068&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=15&sid=5cbbd2beb7b9171c94d58e57a1402705|title=Axis History Forum|accessdate=2007-06-02] He reasoned that the best way he could defend Sweden was to move into Finland and meet the Russians there. When the Russians had reached a certain point inside Finland, the whole Northern Army Corps would move across the border and take up positions along the Kemi river, all without approval of the Swedish government.

The fact that the Swedish government did not get news of Douglas' plan right away makes it entirely possible that the plan could have been implemented. However, when they did find out, and the plan was scrapped, Douglas was allowed to retain command and later rose to become Chief of the Army.

The Northern Army Corps, barred from entering Finland, did not block attempts at aid however. Swedish frontal units would at times lose equipment and material that was needed on the other side of the border. The willingness to help out can be traced by officers in charge of Swedish supply units likening the Swedish Army Stores at Boden as a Finnish supply base.

It is thought that up to 10,000 Swedish volunteers traveled to Finland and fought alongside Finnish soldiers during the conflict with Russia to aid in her defense. Several books written about the Winter War include reference to the Swedish volunteers and many older Finns today still acknowledge the contributions of these few individuals.

Aftermath

The Winter War also helped reaffirm the Swedish position. Aid to Finland had been as much about aiding a neighbour as about neutralising the public opinion calling for active intervention in the war. It also helped to establish the political priorities before the events of 9th April 1940, when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway. The goal was now fixed on keeping Sweden out of the growing European conflict; if they had not gone to war to defend Finland, there was no way that they would do it for Norway.

References


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