Carl Friedrich Goerdeler

Infobox Person
name = Carl Friedrich Goerdeler


caption =
birth_date = Birth date|1884|07|31
birth_place = Schneidemühl, Germany (modern Piła, Poland)
death_date = Death date|1945|2|2
death_place = Berlin
party=DNVP
spouse = Anneliese Ulrich
children = 5
religion=Lutheran
other_names =
known_for = One of the leaders of the conservative "widerstand" movement in Nazi Germany
occupation = Politician
nationality = German

Carl Friedrich Goerdeler (July 31, 1884 – February 2, 1945) was a conservative German politician and opponent of the Nazi regime.

Biography

Early career

Goerdeler was born to a family of Prussian civil servants in Schneidemühl, Germany (modern Piła, Poland) in the Prussian Province of Posen. He studied economics and law."Encyclopaedia Britannica" Volume 10 Garrison-Halibut, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, page 521–522] Starting in 1911, Goerdeler worked as a civil servant for the municipal government of Solingen. That same year, Goerdeler married Anneliese Ulrich, by whom he had five children. During World War I, Goerdeler served as an junior officer on the Eastern Front, rising to the rank of Captain. From February 1918, Captain Goerdeler worked as part of the German military government in Minsk. After the end of war in November 1918, Goerdeler served on the headquarters of the XVII Army Corps based in Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland). In June 1919, Goerdeler submitted a memo to his superior, General Otto von Below, calling for the destruction of Poland as the only way of preventing territorial losses on Germany's eastern borders. After his discharge from the German Army, Goerdeler joined the conservative German National People's Party (DNVP). Like most of the political class of Germany at that time, Goerdeler strongly rejected the Versailles Treaty, which stipulated that Germany cede territories to the restored Polish state. In 1919, before the exact course of the Polish-German border was determined, he suggested restoring West Prussia to Germany.

In 1922, Goerdeler became as the second mayor ("Bürgermeister") in Königsberg (modern Kaliningrad, Russia) in East Prussia before being elected mayor of Leipzig on May 22, 1930. He served as "Reich" Price Commissioner in 1931-1932 under his friend Heinrich Brüning and again in 1934-35. During the Weimar Republic, Goerdeler was widely considered to be a hard-working and outstanding municipal politician. [Rothfels, page 84.] On December 8, 1931, Brüning appointed Goerdeler "Reich" Price Commissioner, and entrusted him with the task of overseeing his deflationary policies.Tooze, page 22.] The sternness which Goerdeler administered his task as Price Commissioner made a well known figure in Germany.

After the downfall of the Brüning government in 1932, Goerdeler was considered to be a potential Chancellor and was sounded out by General Kurt von Schleicher, who ultimately choose Franz von Papen instead.Wheeler-Bennett, page 246.] Following the fall of his government on May 30, 1932, Brüning himself recommened to President Paul von Hindenburg that Goerdeler succeed him. Later in 1932, Goerdeler was offered a position in Papen's cabinet, which he refused. [Rothfels, page 55.] Goerdeler opposed the Nazi racial ideology. He left the DNVP in 1931 when this party began to cooperate with the Nazi Party.

Opposition to the Nazi Party

After 1933, Goerdeler was one of very few politicians opposing the ruling Nazis. On April 1, 1933, the day of the national boycott declared against all Jewish businesses in the "Reich", Goerdeler appeared in full uniform of the "Oberbürgermeister" of Leipzig to order the SA to cease and desist their efforts to enforce the boycott, and ordered the Leipzig police to free several Jews taken hostage by the SA.Hoffmann, Peter "The German Resistance and the Holocaust" pages 105-126 from "Confront!" edited by J.J. Michalczyk, Peter Lang Publishers, 2004, page 112] Several times, he attempted to help Leipzig Jewish businessmen threatened with the "Aryanization" economic policies of the Nazi regime.

In general, during the early years of the Third Reich, Goerdeler was an ally of the Nazi regime. Goerdeler considered Hitler to be an "enlightened dictator", whom provided he received the proper advice would be a force for the good [Müller, Klaus-Jürgen "The Structure and Nature of the National Conservative Opposition in Germany up to 1940" pages 133-178 from "Aspects of the Third Reich" edited by H.W. Koch, Macmillan: London, United Kingdom page 148] . As such, Goerdeler had sent Hitler long memos containing his advice on economic policy, and in the second half of 1935 wrote up a new draft law on the powers and responsibilities of municipal governments,Müller page 148.] . Despite his early sympathy for the regime and considerable pressures from the National Socialists, Goerdeler always refused to join the NSDAP,Müller page 148.] . By the mid-1930s, Goerdeler grew increasingly disillusioned with the Nazis as it become more and more apparent that Hitler had no interest in reading any of Goerdeler's memoes, but instead was carrying out economic and financial polices that Goerdeler regarded as highly irresponsible,Müller page 148.] . In addition, the fact that the Nazis in the Leipzig municipal government massively increased the debts owning to Leipzig was a major source of worry for Goerdeler,Müller page 148.] .

In 1933, a "Reich" law forbade doctors who were members of the KPD or who were "non-Aryans' from participating in public health insurance, exempting only those who were World War I veterans, or children or parents of veterans. A second degree of 1934 banned all physicians from participating in public health insurance who had one or more Jewish grandparents regardless of their religion, or if they were married to a "non-Aryan".Hoffmann, page 113.] However, these laws did not affect those physicians who received their approbation under the Weimar Republic. On April 9, 1935, the Deputy Maylor of Leipzig, the National Socialist Rudolf Haake in defiance of the existing laws banned all Jewish doctors from participating in public health insurance, and advised all municipal employees from consulting Jewish doctors. In response, the "Landesverband Mitteldeutschland des Centralvereins deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens e.V" (Saxon Association of the Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith) complained to Goerdeler about Haake's actions, and asked him to enforce the existing anti-Semitic laws, which at least allowed some Jewish doctors to practice. On April 11, 1935 Goerdeler ordered the end of Haake's boycott, and provided a list of "non-Aryan" physicians permitted to operate under the existing laws, and those who were excluded.Hoffmann, pages 113-114.] Critics of Goerdeler such as Daniel Goldhagen have asserted that because Goerdeler published a list of "non-Aryan" physicians to be excluded from practicing under public insurance that this proved that Goerdeler was an anti-Semitic; by contrast, Goerdeler's defenders like Peter Hoffmann have argued that Goerdeler's insistence on enforcing the laws served to protect those Jewish physicians entitled to practice.Hoffmann, pages 112-115.]

In November 1934, Goerdeler was again appointed "Reich" Price Commissioner, and ordered to combat inflation.Tooze, page 108.] Gestapo reports from the 1934 record that the German public greeted the news of Goerdeler's reappointment as Price Commissioner as a postive development.Tooze, page 704.] The appointment of Goerdeler was Hitler's response to the increasing problem of inflation [Kershaw, Ian "Hitler Hubris", New York: Norton, 1998, 1999 page 578.] . Despite the great fanfare which greeted Goerdeler's appointment, he was given little real powerKershaw, page 578] . In 1934, Goerdeler was strongly opposed to the idea of devaluing the "Reichmark", and had supported Hitler and Dr. Schacht against the advocates of devaluation.Tooze, page 217.] During his second term as Price Commissioner in 1934-35, Goerdeler often came into conflict with the Economics Minister and "Reichsbank" president Dr. Hjalmar Schacht over his inflationary policies. [Rothfels, page 55.] In Goerdeler's opinion, these posed a grave danger to the German economy, and finally prompted his resignation in 1935 as Price Commissioner.As Price Commissioner, Goerdeler became increasingly troubled by Nazi economic policies, as while as being digusted by rampant corruption within the Nazi Party. In October 1935, Goerdeler sent Hitler in which he urged that the priorities for the use of German foreign exchange should be shifted from buying raw materials that Germany lacked for rearmament, and instead be used to buy food that Germany was short of like fatsKershaw, page 579] . In his report, Goerdeler wrote that the foremost goal of German economic policy should be: "the satisfactory provisioning of the population with fats, even in relation to armaments, as having political priority"Kershaw, page 579] . In the same report, Goerdeler argued that the root of German economic problems was rearmament, and advocated as the solution reducing military spending, increasing German exports, and returning to a free market economyKershaw, page 579] . Goerdeler wanted that to continue the present course of increasing statism in the economy and the current levels of high military spending would result in the total collapse of the economy with an extremely drastic drop in living standardsKershaw, page 579] . After Hitler ignored Goerdeler's report, Goerdeler asked Hitler to dissolve the Reich Commisariat for Price Surveillance since there was nothing for that office to doKershaw, page 579] .

Despite his earlier differences with Dr. Schacht, Goerdeler together with Schacht were the leaders of the "free-market" faction in the German government who during the economic crisis of 1936 urged Hitler to reduce military spending, turn away from autarkic and protectionist policies, and reduce etatism in the economy.Kershaw, Ian "Hitler Nemesis", New York: Norton 2000 pages 18-20.] Supporting the "free-market" faction were some of Germany's leading business executives, most notably Hermann Duecher of AEG, Robert Bosch of Robert Bosch GmbH, and Albert Voegeler of Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG. Goerdeler and Schacht were opposed by another faction centered around Hermann Göring calling for the opposite. Despite his disagreements with Göring over the best economic course to follow, in the summer of 1936, Göring commissioned a report from Goerdeler as a leading economic expert about whatever Germany should devalue the "Reichmark" or not.Tooze, page 215.] Goerdeler began his report by rejecting the policies of Dr. Schacht's New Plan of 1934 as untenable. Goerdeler argued that the tolerance of other Western nations, especially the United States for German state's subsiding the dumping of exports was wearing thin, and would soon result in harsh new tariffs being applied against German goods. Goerdeler argued that the only way of the economic crisis which gripped the German economy in 1936 was the devaluation of the "Reichmark", and abandoning all of the restrictions governing foreign exchange in Germany. Goerdeler argued that for devaluation of the "Reichmark" to be successful would require co-ordination with other nations, especially the United States, the United Kingdom and France, who otherwise might be tempted to engage in competitive devaluations of the dollar, the pound and the franc respectively. To secure their co-operation, Goerdeler argued for rapprochement with the Western powers. In his memo for Göring, Goerdeler wrote of the "grandiose possibility" that a German reengagement with the world economy, and the end of protectionism and autarkism would lead to a new age of economic co-operation among the world's largest economies.Tooze, page 216.] To this end, Goerdeler argued in exchange for Anglo-French-American economic co-operation and support, Germany should at a minimum cease its unilateral economic policies, and sharply cut military spending. In addition, Goerdeler felt that the price of Western economic support would a moderation of the Nazi regime's policies in regards to the "Jewish question, freemasonry question, question of the rule of law, Church question". Goerdeler wrote that "I can well imagine that we will have to bring certain issues...into a greater degree of alignment with the imponderable attitudes of other peoples, not in substance, but in the manner of dealing with them". The historian Adam Tooze has argued that Goerdeler was following his own agenda in seeking to moderate the regime's domestic policies in his memo, and that it is highly unlikely that outside powers would have require the concessions on anti-Semitic and other domestic policies that Goerdeler advocated as the price of Western economic support (through Tooze does feel that Goerdeler was correct in arguing that the West would have made cutbacks in military spending a precondition of economic support). Goerdeler argued his policies of economic liberalization and devaluation would in the short run cause 2 million-2.5 million unemployed in Germany, but argued that in the long-run, the increase in exports would make the German economy stronger. In public, Göring called Goerdeler's memo "completely unusable."Tooze, page 219.] Göring's copy of Goerdeler's memo is covered with handwritten personal comments by Göring on the side such as "What cheek!", "Nonsense!", and "Oho!" When Göring forwarded a copy of Goerdeler's memo to Hitler, his coverng letter stated: "This may be quite important, my Führer, for your memorandum, since it reveals the complete confusion and incomprehension of our bourgeois businessmen, Limitation of armaments, defeatism, incomprehension of the foreign policy situation alternate. His [Goerdeler's] recommendations are adequate for a mayor, but not for the state leadership." Goerdeler's advice was rejected by Hitler in his "Four-Year Memorandum" of August 1936, and instead in the fall of 1936, the Nazi regime launched the Four Year Plan as the way out of the 1936 economic crisis.

In the spring of 1936, Goerdeler came into increasing conflict with Haake over the question of demolition of a monument to the German-Jewish composer Felix Mendelssohn.Hoffmann, pages 113-114.] After much arguement, Goerdeler agreeded to have the statue moved from its location in front of the Gewandhaus concert hall to a less high profile position. In the fall of 1936, Goerdeler left for a trip to Finland promoted by the German Chamber of Commerce.Hoffmann, page 114.] Before leaving, Goerdeler met with Adolf Hitler and the Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, and received their promise that nothing would happen to the statue during his trip. During his trip, the statue was demoblished on Haake's orders. Upon his return, Haake stated that the matter of the statue was "only the outward occasion of the conflict" and declared that "Dr. Goerdeler's attitude in the Jewish Question had been revealed particularly clearly in the matter of the Mendelssohn-Bartholdy statue". Goerdeler tried to have the statue rebuilt. After failing that, he declined to accept his reelection as mayor of Leipzig and resigned from office on March 31, 1937.

After his resignation as "Oberbürgermeister" of Leipzig, Goerdeler was offered the position of heading the Finance department at the firm of Krupp AG, which was at the time Germany's largest corporation.Wheeler-Bennett, page 386] However, Hitler forbade Goerdeler to take up this appointment, and ordered Krupp to withdraw the offer. Goerdeler instead became the Director of the overseas sales department at the firm of Robert Bosch GmbH. Shortly after his resignation, Goerdeler became involved in anti-Nazi plots. As a conservative and self-proclaimed follower of the Bismarckian tradition, Goerdeler was opposed to what he considered the extreme radicalism of the Nazis, and was fearful of what the results of Hitler foreign policy might be. Despite his anti-Nazi plotting, Goerdeler continued to submit memoranda to Hitler and the other Nazi leaders out of the hope that he might somehow convince them to change course,Müller page 113.] . The case of Goerdeler has been used by the historian Hans Mommsen to support his view of “resistance as a process” with Goerdeler going from an ally of the regime to becoming increasing disillusioned by Nazi economic policies in the mid-1930s, and finally committed to the regime’s overthrow by 1937M [ Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London: Arnold Press, 2000 page 196] .

Using the "cover" of his job as chief of overseas sales at Robert Bosch, between 1937-1938, Goerdeler often travelled abroad, mostly to France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Balkans, the Middle East and Canada to warn anyone who would listen about what he considered to be the aggressive and dangerous foreign policy of Nazi Germany. [Rothfels, page 85.] Through opposed to what he considered to be the reckless foreign policy of Nazi Germany, Goerdeler often demanded in his meetings with his foreign friends that the Great Powers back the bestowal of the Sudetenland, the Polish Corridor, the Memelland (modern Klaipėda, Lithuania), and the Free City of Danzig together with the return of the former German colonies in Africa to Germany. At the same time, Goerdeler became a member of General Ludwig Beck's private intelligence network. [Müller, Klaus-Jürgen "The Structure and Nature of the National Conservative Opposition in Germany up to 1940" pages 133-178 from "Aspects of the Third Reich" edited by H.W. Koch, Macmillan: London, United Kingdom page 152] Goerdeler's reports were received not only by General Beck, but by General Werner von Fritsch,Müller page 152.] . The German historian Klaus-Jürgen Müller observed that Goerdeler in his contacts abroad tended to falsely portray himself as resprenting a more organized movement then was in fact the case,Müller pages 152-153.] . Goerdeler always told his foreign contacts that he was the secret spokesman of the well-organzied "German Opposition",Müller pages 167-168.] .In addition, Goerdeler attempted to use his reports to try to influence the Army leadership into considering a anti-Nazi "putsch"] ,Müller page 153.] . In June 1937, Goerdeler told Sir Robert Vansittart that he would like to see the Nazi regime replaced by a military dicatorship that would seek British friendship, in exchange for which Goerdeler wanted British support for annexing parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia. [Weinberg, Gerhard] "The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II", Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980 page 43] In October 1937 during a visit to the United States, Goerdeler stayed with the British historian Sir John Wheeler-Bennett at the latter's estate in Virginia, and informed him of his desire to restore the monarchy in Germany. During hte same trip, Goerdeler drafted his "Political Testament" attacking Nazi economic policies, and criticized the regime for its anti-Christian policies, widespread corruption, and lawlessness. [Rothfels, page 85.] In this period, Goerdeler met with Winston Churchill and Robert Vansittart several times. [Rothfels, page 126.]

During the crisis caused by the court-martial of General Werner von Fritsch, Goerdeler became closely associated with such several loose groupings of German rightists in the Civil Service and the military who for various reasons were unhappy with aspects of the Third Reich. [Wheeler-Bennett, page 374.] Goerdeler attempted to use the Fritsch crisis to try to turn the Army leadership against the Nazi regime,Müller page 154.] . His efforts were in vain,Müller page 154.] . iIn April 1938, Goerdeler visited London, where he advised the British government both to resist the Nazi claim to the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia, while at the same time declaring he wanted to see the area transfered to Germany as soon as possible.Weinberg, page 351.] As Gerhard Weinberg observed, Goerdeler's statements left the British somewhat confused. In the spring of 1938, Goerdeler in association with Hans von Dohnanyi, Colonel Hans Oster, and Johannes Popitz became involved in planning a "putsch" against the Nazi regime should the regime launch "Fall Grün", the codename for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. [Wheeler-Bennett, page 396.] In June 1938, General Beck often consulted with Goerdeler over the question of whatever or not he should resign as Chief of the General Staff as a way of stopping "Fall Grün". [Wheeler-Bennett, pages 399-400.]

Vansittart introduced Goerdeler to one of his spies, the British industrialist A.P. Young, who was a close business partner of several German corporation, and as such, often visited Germany. Starting in August 1938, Goerdeler started to leak information to London informing the British that Hitler intended to launch "Fall Grün" in September 1938.Weinberg, page 394.] In August 1938, Goerdeler met with Young in the village of Rauschen Dune in East Prussia.Hoffmann, page 115.] During his meeting with Young, Goerdeler asked that Young convey a message to the British government that London should apply diplomatic and economic pressure on Germany to cease the persecution of the Jews. Through those British politicians and civil servants who met with Goerdeler were impressed with his candor and earnestness, it was judged too risky by the Chamberlain government in 1938 to stake all upon the Goerdeler's projected "putsch", especially given that the chances for sucess were variable at best, and the discovery of British backing for an unsuccessful "putsch" was likely to cause the war the Chamberlain government was working to avert in 1938. [Wheeler-Bennett, pages 414-415.] Moreover, as one British civil servant wrote on August 22, 1938: "We have had similar visits from other emissaries of the "Reichsheer", such as Dr. Goerdeler, but those for whom these emissaries claim to speak have never given us any reasons to suppose that they would be able or willing to take action such as would lead to the overthrow of the regime. The events of June 1934 and February 1938 do not lead one to attach much hope to energetic action by the Army against the regime."Weinberg, page 396.] In the tense atmosphere of September 1938 with the crisis in Central Europe looking likely to explode into war at any moment, Goerdeler was waiting anxiously for the "putsch" to overthrow the Nazi regime, and his taking over the reigns of the German state as the new Chancellor. [Wheeler-Bennett, page 420.] On September 29, 1938 Goerdeler informed the British through one of Vansittart's contacts, Colonel Graham Christie that the mobilization of the Royal Navy was turning German public opinion against the regime.Weinberg, page 457.]

In 1938, Goerdeler was deeply disappointed with the Munich Agreement, which in his view, though it turned over the Sudetenland to Germany, was undesirable in that it removed what Goerdeler considered to be best chance of a "putsch" against the Nazi regime. After the Munich Agreement, Goerdeler wrote to one of his American friends:

"...The German people did not want war; the Army would have done anything to avoid it;...the world had been warned and informed in good time. If the warning had been heeded and acted upon Germany would by now be free of its dictator and turning against Mussolini. Within a few weeks we could have began to build lasting world peace on the basis of justice, reason and decency. A purified Germany with a government of decent people would have been ready to solve the Spanish problem without delay in company with Britain and France, to remove Mussolini and with the United States to create peace in the Far East. The way would have been open for sound co-operation in economic and social fields, for the creation of peaceful relations between Capital, Labour and the State, for the raising of ethical concepts and for a fresh attempt to raise the general standard of living..." [Rothfels, Hans "The German Opposition To Hitler" London: Oswald Wolff, 1961 pages 60-61.]

In the same letter, Goerdeler wrote "You can hardly conceive the despair that both people and th Army feel about the brutal, insane and terroristic dictator and his henchmen".Wheeler-Bennett, page 426.] Wheeler-Bennett commented that Goerdeler was vastly exaggerating the extent of anti-Nazi feelings both in the German Army and with the German public.

In Novmeber 1938, Goerdeler met with Young in Switzerland, and asked if were possible for the British government to intercede on the behalf of 10, 000 Polish Jews the Germans had expelled from Germany, and which the Poles refused to accept. Goerdeler declared that the treatment of the Polish Jews stranded on the German-Polish border to be "barbaric". In December 1938-January 1939, Goerdeler had a further series of meetings with Young in Switzerland. Goerdeler informed Young that the "Kristallnacht" pogrom of November 1938 had ordered by Hitler personally, and was not a "spontaneous" demonstration as the Nazis had claimed. Goerdeler recommended that Young inform London that as soon as "the new persecution of the Jews is started, it is absolutely essential to break diplomatic relations". Goerdeler also informed Young that of his belief that Hitler was seeking world conquest, and that the Führer had "decided to destroy the Jews-Christianity-Capitalism". In December 1938, Goerdeler again visited Britain where he alienated those British civil servants he met by his extreme German nationalist language, together with demands that the British support the return of Danzing, the Polish Corridor, and the former German colonies in Africa, plus make an huge loan to a post-Nazi government.Weinberg, page 525.] In addition, the fact that Goerdeler was exaggerating the extent of anti-Nazi feeling in Germany, and his ability to organize a "putsch" was becoming increasing clear to the British.Weinberg, page 525.] In the same month, Goerdeler wrote his "World Peace Prgramme" calling an international conference of all the world's leading powers to consider disarmament, a "moral code" for relations between the states, and the stabilization of the various currencies. [Rothfels, page 126.] The end of Goerdeler's "World Peace Programme" read "Whoever abstains from co-operating wants war and is a breaker of the peace." [Rothfels, page 125.]

German Resistance

Despite what Goerdeler considered a major set-back after Munich, he continued with his efforts to bring about the downfall of the Nazi regime. Goerdeler was a resolute and unyielding optimist, which together with a deep sense of civic duty and religious convictions, led him to believe that if only he could convince enough people, he could overthrow the Nazi regime. [Rothfels, pages 61-62.] Goerdeler spent much of the winter of 1938-39 holding discussions with General Beck, the diplomat Ulrich von Hassell, and Erwin Planck about how best to overthrow the Nazi regime,Müller page 172.] . At the same time, Hitler grew increasingly annoyed with Goerdeler's memos urging him to excise caution [Roberston, E.M. "Hitler Planning for War and the Response of the Great Powers (1938-early 1939" pages 196-234 from "Aspects of the Third Reich" edited by H.W. Koch, Macmillan: London, United Kingdom,page 204.] . Goerdeler together with Dr. Schacht, General Beck, Hassell, and the economist Rudolf Brinkmann were described by Hitler as "the overbred intellectual circles" whom were trying to block him from fulifilling his mission by their appeals to caution, and but for the fact that he needed their skills "otherwise, perhaps we could someday exterminate them or do something of this kind to them",Roberston page 204.] . During the winter of 1938-39, Goerdeler sent reports to the British stating that Hitler was pressuring Italy into attacking France, was planning to launch a surprise air offensive against Britain intended to achieve a "knock-out blow" by razing British cities to the ground sometime in the second half of February 1939, and was considering an invasion of Switzerland and the Low Countries as prelude to attacking France and Britain,Roberston page 231.] . Unknown to Goerdeler, he was transmitting false information provided by the Abwehr chief Admiral Wilhelm Canaris who was hoping that these reports might lead to a change in British foreign policy,Roberston page 231.] . In this, Admiral Canaries achieved his purpose as Goerdeler's misinformation resulted in public declarations by the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in February 1939 that any German attack upon France, Switzerland, and the Low Countries would be automatically considered the "casus belli" for an Anglo-German war.

In the second half of March 1939, Goerdeler together with Dr. Schacht and Hans Bernd Gisevius visited Ouchy, Switzerland to meet with a senior French intelligence agent representing the Premier Édouard DaladierWheeler-Bennett, page 436.] Goerdeler told the "Deuxième Bureau" agent that the under the strain of massive military spending had left the German economy on the verge of collapse, that Hitler was determined to use the Danzig issue as a excuse to invade Poland, which in itself was only a prelude for a German seizure of all of Eastern Europe, that a forceful Anglo-French diplomatic stand could deter Hitler, and that if Hitler were deterred long enough, then the economic collapse of Germany would cause the downfall of his regime.Wheeler-Bennett, pages 436-437.] On May 6, 1939 Goerdeler leaked information to the British foreign office stating that the German and Soviet governments were secretly beginning a rapprochement with the aim of dividing Eastern Europe between them.Weinberg, page 574.]

In May 1939, Goerdeler visited London to repeat the same message to the British government.Wheeler-Bennett, pages 441-442.] During his London trip, Goerdeler told the British that the state of the German economy was so deplorable that even if war come, then it could only have the effect of accelerating the German economic collapse, and that Germany simply lacked the economic staying power for a extended war.Wheeler-Bennett, page 442.] During the same visit to London in May 1939, Goerdeler claimed that the German Army leadership was willing to overthrow the regime, that he himself favored launching a "putsch" immediatly, but that "the leaders of the whole movement...still considered it too early",Müller page 176.] . The historian Klaus-Jürgen Müller commented that Goerdeler in making these claims was either lying to the British or else was serioulsy deluded,Müller page 174.] . Goerdeler's assessment of the German diplomatic-military-economic situation had considerable influence on decision-makers in the British and French governments in 1939, whom based on Goerdeler's reports believed that a firm Anglo-French diplomatic stand for Poland might bring about the fall of Hitler without a war, or failing that at least ensure that the Allies faced war on relatively auspicious economic terms.Wheeler-Bennett, pages 441-442.] During the summer of 1939, Goerdeler contacted General Walter von Brauchitsch, and advised him if Germany attacked Poland, the result would not be the limited war that Hitler it would be, but rather a world war pitting Germany against Britain and France,Müller page 174.] . Goerdeler advised Brauchitsch that the only way to save German from such a war would be a putsch to depose Hitler,Müller page 174.] . Braunchitsch was not interested in Goerdeler's opinions,Müller page 174.] . On August 25, 1939 in reaction to his discovery that the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had not ended as intended led to an Anglo-French abandonment of Poland, Hitler ordered the temporary postponement of "Fall Weiß", which had due to begin that day.Wheeler-Bennett, pages 450-451] Goerdeler was convinced that the postponement was a fatal blow to Hitler's prestige, and on August 26, 1939 went to a trip to Sweden that because of the international situation he had been considering canceling.Wheeler-Bennett, page 451] On August 27, 1939 Goerdeler told the British diplomat Gladwyn Jebb to continue to make a firm diplomatic stand for Poland as the best way of bringing down the Nazi regimeWeinberg, page 643.]

In 1939-40, Goerdeler assembled conservative politicians, diplomats and generals, most notably Ulrich von Hassell, General Ludwig Beck, and Johannes Popitz, in opposition to Adolf Hitler. In October 1939, Goerdeler drafted peace terms that a post-Nazi government would seek with Great Britain and France.Wheeler-Bennett, page 485] Under Goerdeler's terms, Germany would retain all the areas of Poland that had been part of Germany prior to 1918, Austria, and the Sudetenland with independence being restored to Poland and Czechoslovakia with general disarmament, the restoration of global free trade and the ending of protectionism as the other major goals for the new regime. On November 3, 1939, Goerdeler paid another visit to Sweden, where he met with the senior Marcus Wallenberg, Gustav Cassell, and Dr. Sven Hedin.Wheeler-Bennett, page 470] Hedin worte in his diary that "he [Goerdeler] believed in Göring and thought that a speedy peace was the only thing to save Germany, but that peace was unthinkable so long as Hitler remained at the head of affairs".Wheeler-Bennett, page 470] At the same time, Goerdeler was deeply involved in the planning of a abortive putsch intended to be launched on November 5, 1939, and as such was in very high spirits prior to that day.Wheeler-Bennett, page 470] Hassell wrote in his diary that with worry that "He [Goerdeler] often reminds me of Kapp." (Wolfgang Kapp, the nominal leader of the Kapp Putsch was notorious for his irresponsibility)Wheeler-Bennett, page 470]

In early April 1940, Goerdeler met secretly with General Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, and asked him to consider a "putsch" while the Phony War was still on, while the British and French were still open to a negotiated peace.Wheeler-Bennett, page 493.] Halder refused Goerdeler's request. During the winter of 1940-41, Goerdeler spent much of his time discussing with Popitz, Beck and Hassell which of the Hohenzollerns would occupy the throne of Germany after the overthrow of the Nazis.Wheeler-Bennett, pages 502-503.] Goerdeler supported the claim of Prince Oskar of Prussia.Wheeler-Bennett, pages 502.] They developed a future constitution for Germany and even a list of potential ministers. Goerdeler's proposed constitution called for a strong executive branch, a high degree of decentralisation, a "Reichstag" partially elected on the British style-"First-past-the-post" system instead of election by party lists, and partially elected by members of local councils, and a "Reichsrat" comprised of representatives nominated by Christian Churches, trade unions, universities, and business groups. [Rothfels, page 102.] To assist with the drafting of the future constitution, Goerdeler enlisted the help, through his friend Dietrich Bonhoeffer, of the so-called "Freiburger Kreis" (Freiburg Circle), a anti-Nazi discussion group of professors at Freiburg University founded in 1938 which included Adolf Lampe, Erich Wolf, Walter Eucken, Constantin von Dietze, and Gerhard Ritter. [Rothfels, page 99.] Had the July 20 Plot succeeded, Goerdeler would have served as Chancellor in the new government that would have been formed after Hitler's assassination and the overthrow of the Nazi regime. In August 1941, Goerdeler was most disappointed with the Atlantic Charter feeling that the demands contained in Clause 8 calling the disarmament of Germany would make both the task of recruiting the German Army to overthrowing the regime more difficult, and were unacceptable since Goerdeler believed in maintaining a strong military. [Wheeler-Bennett, page 519]

In 1941, under the impact of the news of the deportations of German Jews to the Nazi killing fields and death camps in Eastern Europe, Goerdeler submitted a memo to the German government calling for all Jews who had been German citizens or were descended from Jews who been German citizens from 1871 onwards to be Germans, and those Jews who were descended from Jews who not lived within the borders of Germany prior to 1871 to be considered citizens of Jewish state whose creation would occur later. Some controversy has been attracted by this memo. Goerdeler's critics are offended by his suggestion that German Jews whose ancestors had not lived within the borders of the German Empire before July 1 1871 should not be considered German citizens, whereas Goerdeler's defenders such as the historian Peter Hoffmann have argued that Goerdeler was trying to present the Nazi regime with an alternative to genocide. In January 1942, Goerdeler submitted another memo to the German government protesting at the deportation of Leipzig Jews. After the Battle of Stalingrad, the pace of Goerdeler's conspiracial activities gathered more speed. During the spring of 1943, Goerdeler grew increasing impatient with the military end of the conspiracy, complaining that those officers involved in the plot were better at finding excuses for inaction then reasons for action. [Wheeler-Bennett, page 567] In a letter to General Friedrich Olbricht of May 17, 1943, Goerdeler wrote:

MY DEAR GENERAL

I have again and again considered the view that we must wait for the psychologically right moment.If by this we mean the moment at which events cause us to take action, then it will coincide with the beginnings of the collapse; action would then be too late to be exploited politically. In the meantime irreplacable cultural monuments and the most important industrial centers would be heaps of ruins and the responsibility for precious lives would fall on the military leaders. Therefore we must not wait for the 'psycholgicaly right' moment to come, "we must bring it about" [emphasis in the original] . For we are certainly agreed that leadership without far-sighted correct action is impossible.

For the sake of the future of our fatherland I would not like to see the intelligentsia which has grown up throughout the centuries excluded from this leadership; for the same reason the experienced leaders among our soldiers should not be excluded either.

Stalingrad and Tunis are defeats unparalleled in German history since Jena and Auerstädt. In both cases the German people were told that for decisive reasons armies had to be sacrificed. We know how false this is; for soldiers and politicians can only describe such sacrifices as necessary when they are justified by successes in other fields which outweight the sacrifice. The truth is that our leadership is incapable and unscrupulous; if it had been true leadership both tragic sacrifices would have been avoided and a favourable military and political situation would have been established.

The number of civilians, men, women and children of all nations and of Russian prisoners of war ordered to be put to death before and during this war exceeds one million. The manner of their deaths is monstrous and is far removed from chivarly, humanity, and even from the most primitive ideas of decency among savage tribes. But the German people are falsely led to believe that it is Russian Bolshevists who are constantly committing monstrous crimes against innocent victims.

The list of such things can be extended at will. I chose these two examples, because they are obvious examples of the poisoning of people's minds, and taken in conjunction with a corruption never before known in German history and the supression of law, they offer every opportunity of "creating" [emphasis in the original] the 'psychologically right' moment. The vast majority of the German people, almost the whole working class, knows to-day that this war cannot be brought to a successful conclusion.

In face of this the patience of the people is inexplicable. But this perversity is based only on the fact that terror fosters secrecy, lies, and crime. It will disappear as soon as the people realize that terror is being attacked, corruption removed and that sincerity and truth are taking the place of secrecy and falsehood. At that time every German will pull himself together again, both the decent and corrupt, each will reject and condemn the action which he tolerated yesterday or to which he took no exception, because it was secret, because the decent German will again see decency and the others will be faced with responsibility.

If we can find no other way I am ready to do everything to talk personally to Hitler. I would tell him what he must be told, namely that in the vital interests of the people, his resignation is essential. If such a personal talk can be brought about, there is no reason why it should end badly. Surprises are possible, not probable, but the risk must be taken. Only it is not unreasonable on my part to demand that action must be taken immediately.The political conditions for this exist.

I urgently entreat you, my dear General, to consider again whether the difficulties standing in the way of the technical measures cannot also be overcome. I also ask you to think over the method I have suggested and to give an opportunity on my return to discuss the situation and the posssibilites calmely.

With my best wishes

Yours sincerely

GOERDELER [Wheeler-Bennett, pages 567-569]

In a memo Goerdeler sent to the British and Amercian governments in the fall of 1943, he called for a negotiated peace between the Allies and Germany once the Nazis were overthrown. In the same memo, Goerdeler called for the "1914 frontier" to serve as the basis of Germany's borders both in Western and Eastern Europe, called for Austria and the Sudetenland remaining part of the "Reich", and for the annexation of the south Tyrol region of Italy. In the discussions within the German Opposition between the "Easterners" who favored reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union after the overthrow of Hitler and the "Westerners" who favored reaching an understanding with Great Britain and the United States, Goerdeler belonged to the "Westerners", considering Communism to be no different then National Socialism, and regarded the "Easterners" as being dangerously naive about the Soviets. [Wheeler-Bennett, page 619]

Unlike the Kreisau Circle, Goerdeler was a strong champion of laissez-faire capitalism, and was very much opposed to what Goerdeler saw as the socialism of the Kreisau Circle. [Rothfels, page 106.] This system was in Goerdeler's vision to serve as the basis of the "democracy of the Ten Commandments." [Rothfels, pages 103-104.] In March 1943, Goerdeler wrote in a letter addressed to several German Army officers appealing to them to overthrow the Nazis that the one line that should divide Germans was "...that between decent and non-decent." [Rothfels, page 86.] However, Goerdeler was heavily criticised by other members of the German resistance (for example by some members the Kreisau Circle) for objecting to killing Hitler (who Goerdeler wanted to see tried; Goerdeler had no objection to Hitler being executed after his conviction), for his sympathy for reintroducing monarchy, and for his extremely anti-communist ideology. In 1944, Goerdeler told Kunrath von Hammerstein that "In those days your father stood at the helm of world history", by which Goerdeler meant that if General Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord had carried out a "putsch" in 1933, then the present state of world troubles in 1944 might have been avoided. [Wheeler-Bennett, page 286]

A source of latter-day controversy about Goerdeler concerns his attitude towards Anti-Semitism. Some historians such as Christof Dipper and Martin Broszat have argued that Goerdeler was just as much of an anti-Semitic as the Nazis. [Dipper, Christof "Der Deutsche Widerstand und die Juden" pages 349-380 from "Geschichte und Gesellschaft", Volume 9, 1983; Broszat, Martin "Plädoyer für Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus from "Merkur", Volume 39, 1985 pages 382-383.] By contrast, the German-Canadian historian Peter Hoffmann has contended that Goerdeler was opposed to anti-Semitism in all forms.Hoffmann, page 112.]

Execution

On July 17, 1944, a warrant for Goerdeler's arrest was issued. Goerdeler managed to escape but he was apprehended on August 12 of the same year after being denounced by an innkeeper in Marienwerder (modern Kwidzyn, Poland) while visiting the grave of his parents. Under Gestapo interrogation and torture, Goerdeler claimed that the Holocaust was the major reason for his seeking to overthrow the Nazi regime.Hoffmann, page 117.] On September 9, after a trial at the "Volksgerichtshof", he was sentenced to death. He was tortured for months by the Gestapo, which hoped to find out the names of other conspirators. While Goerdeler was on death row, he wrote a letter which called the "Shoah" the very worst of Nazi crimes. He was finally executed by hanging on February 2, 1945 at Plötzensee Prison in Berlin. While awaiting his death sentence, Goerdeler wrote a farewell letter, which ended with "I ask the world to accept our martyrdom as penance for the German people." [Rothfels, page 152]

Footnotes

References

*Hoffmann, Peter "The German Resistance and the Holocaust" pages 105-126 from "Confront! Resistance in Nazi Germany" edited by John J. Michalczyk, New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 2004, ISBN 0820463175.
*Müller, Klaus-Jürgen "The Structure and Nature of the National Conservative Opposition in Germany up to 1940" pages 133-178 from "Aspects of the Third Reich" edited by H.W. Koch, Macmillan: London, United Kingdom, ISBN 0-333-35272-6.
*Ritter, Gerhard "The German Resistance : Carl Goerdeler's Struggle Against Tyranny", translated by R.T. Clark, Freeport, N.Y. : Books for Libraries Press, 1970.
*Rothfels, Hans "The German Opposition To Hitler" London: Oswald Wolff, 1961
*Tooze, Adam "The Wages of Destruction The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy", New York: Viking, 2006, ISBN 978-0-670-03826-8.
*Wheeler-Bennett, John "The Nemesis of Power", London: Macmillan, 1967.
*Weinberg, Gerhard "The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II", Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.