A dogfight, or dog fight, is a form of aerial combat between fighter aircraft; in particular, combat of maneuver at short range, where each side is aware of the other's presence. Dogfighting first appeared during World War I, shortly after the invention of the airplane. Until at least 1992, it has been a component in every major war despite beliefs after World War II that increasingly greater speeds and longer range weapons would make dogfighting obsolete.[1] Modern terminology for air-to-air combat is air combat maneuvering (ACM), which refers to tactical situations requiring the use of individual basic fighter maneuvers (BFM) to attack or evade one or more opponents. This differs from aerial warfare, which deals with the strategy involved in planning and executing various missions.[2]



The term dogfight has been used for centuries to describe a melee; a fierce battle between two or more opponents. The term gained popularity during World War II, although its origin in air combat can be traced to the latter years of World War I.[3] The first written reference to the modern day usage of the word comes from Fly Papers, by A. E. Illingworth, in 1919, “The battle develops into a ‘dog-fight’, small groups of machines engaging each other in a fight to the death.”[4]


World War I

Dogfighting first emerged in World War I. Ever since "heavier than air" flight became a reality in 1903, people had been trying to figure out how to use this new technology for warfare. Aircraft were initially used as mobile observation vehicles, and early pilots gave little thought to aerial combat. Balloons had been used for this purpose since the American Civil War in 1861.[5] The new airplanes proved their worth by spotting the hidden German advance on Paris in the second month of the war.[6]

Enemy pilots at first simply exchanged waves, or shook their fists at each other. Due to weight restrictions, only small weapons could be carried on board. Intrepid pilots decided to interfere with enemy reconnaissance by improvised means, including throwing bricks, grenades and sometimes rope, which they hoped would entangle the enemy plane's propeller. This progressed to pilots firing hand-held guns at enemy planes, such as pistols and carbines. In August 1914, Staff-Captain Pyotr Nesterov, from Russia, became the first pilot to ram his plane into an enemy spotter aircraft. In October 1914, the first airplane to be shot down by a hand gun from another plane happened over Rheims, France. Once machine guns were mounted to the plane, either on a flexible mounting or higher on the wings of early biplanes, the era of air combat began.

The biggest problem was mounting a machine gun onto an aircraft so that it could be fired forward, through the propeller, and aimed by pointing the nose of the aircraft directly at the enemy. Roland Garros solved this problem by mounting steel deflector wedges to the propeller of a Morane Saulnier monoplane. He achieved three kills, but was shot down behind enemy lines, and captured before he could destroy his plane by burning it. The wreckage was brought to Anthony Fokker, a Dutch designer who built aircraft for the Germans. Fokker decided that the wedges were much too risky, and improved the design by connecting the trigger of an MG 08 Maxim machine gun to the timing of the engine.[7][8] The Germans acquired an early air superiority due to the invention of the synchronization gear in 1915, transforming air combat with the Fokker E.I, the first synchronized, forward firing fighter plane.[7][8] On the evening of July 1, 1915, the very first aerial engagement by a fighter plane armed with a synchronized, forward-firing machine gun occurred just to the east of Luneville, France. The German Fokker E.I was flown by Lieutenant Kurt Wintgens, earning the victory over a French two-seat observation monoplane. Later that same month, on July 25, 1915, British Royal Flying Corps (RFC) Major Lanoe Hawker, flying a very early production Bristol Scout C., attacked three separate aircraft during a single sortie, shooting down two with a non-synchronizable Lewis gun which was mounted next to his cockpit at an outwards angle to avoid hitting the propeller. He forced the third one down, and was awarded the Victoria Cross.[7]

Battles in the air increased as the technological advantage swung from the British to the Germans, then back again. The Feldflieger Abteilung observation units of the German air service, in 1914-15, consisted of six two-seat observation aircraft each, with each unit assigned to a particular German Army headquarters location. They had but a single Fokker Eindecker aircraft assigned to each "FFA" unit for general defensive duties, so pilots such as Max Immelmann and Oswald Boelcke began as lone hunters with each "FFA" unit, shooting unarmed spotter planes and enemy aircraft out of the sky.[8] During the first part of the war, there was no established tactical doctrine for air-to-air combat. Oswald Boelcke was the first to analyze the tactics of aerial warfare, resulting in a set of rules known as the Dicta Boelcke. Many of Boelcke's concepts, conceived in 1916, are still applicable today, including use of sun and altitude, surprise attack, and turning to meet a threat.

British Brigadier General Hugh Trenchard ordered that all reconnaissance aircraft had to be supported by at least three fighters, creating the first use of tactical formations in the air. The Germans responded by forming Jastas, large squadrons of fighters solely dedicated to destroying enemy aircraft, under the supervision of Boelcke. Pilots who shot down five or more fighters became known as aces. One of the most famous dogfights, resulting in the death of Major Hawker, is described by the Red Baron, Manfred von Richthofen,

I WAS extremely proud when, one fine day, I was informed that the airman whom I had brought down on the twenty- third of November, 1916, was the English [version of] Immelmann.... First we circled twenty times to the left, and then thirty times to the right. Each tried to get behind and above the other. Soon I discovered that I was not meeting a beginner. He had not the slightest intention of breaking off the fight. He was traveling in a machine which turned beautifully. However, my own was better at rising than his, and I succeeded at last in getting above and beyond my English waltzing partner.... The impertinent fellow was full of cheek and when we had got down to about 3,000 feet he merrily waved to me as if he would say, "Well, how do you do?" The circles which we made around one another were so narrow that their diameter was probably no more than 250 or 300 feet. I had time to take a good look at my opponent.... When he had come down to about three hundred feet he tried to escape by flying in a zig-zag course during which, as is well known, it is difficult for an observer to shoot. That was my most favorable moment. I followed him at an altitude of from two hundred and fifty feet to one hundred and fifty feet, firing all the time. The Englishman could not help falling. But the jamming of my gun nearly robbed me of my success. My opponent fell, shot through the head, one hundred and fifty feet behind our line.[9]

By the end of the war, the underpowered machines from just ten years prior had been transformed into fairly powerful, swift, and heavily armed fighter planes, and the basic tactics for dogfighting had been laid down.

Spanish Civil War

Airplane technology rapidly increased in sophistication after World War I. By 1936, dogfighting was thought to be a thing of the past, since aircraft were reaching top speeds of over 250 miles per hour (400 km/h).[10] This was proved wrong during the Spanish civil war, as quoted by the U.S. Attaché in 1937, “The peacetime theory of the complete invulnerability of the modern type of bombardment airplane no longer holds. The increased speeds of both the bombardment and pursuit plane have worked in favor of the pursuit … The flying fortress died in Spain.”

Large scale bombing of the civilian population, thought to be demoralizing to the enemy and impossible to stop ("The bomber will always get through"), proved to have the opposite effect. Dr. E. B. Strauss surmised, “Observers state that one of the most remarkable effects of the bombing of open towns in Government Spain had been the welding together into a formidable fighting force of groups of political factions who were previously at each other’s throats…”, to which Hitler’s Luftwaffe, supporting the Spanish Nationalists, generally agreed.[11]

At the beginning of the war new tactics were developed, most notably by the Luftwaffe's Condor Legion lieutenant, Werner Mölders. He advised abandoning the standard “V” formation used in combat, and grouping fighters in pairs, starting the practice of having a wingman at one's side. He advised that pairs of aircraft approaching a fight should increase the distance between them instead of holding tight formations, which became a precursor to the combat spread maneuver. He also started the practice of training pilots to fly at night, and with instruments only. Using the new tactics, and flying the newest Me-109 fighters, the Germans shot down 22 Spanish Republican fighters within a five day period, suffering no losses of their own.[12]

World War II

Strategies for fighter development

Fighter contrails overhead during the Battle of the Philippine Sea

During the 1930s two different streams of thought about air-to-air combat began to emerge, resulting in two different streams of monoplane fighter development. In Japan and Italy especially, there continued to be a strong belief that lightly armed, highly maneuverable single seat fighters would still play a primary role in air-to-air combat. Aircraft such as the Nakajima Ki-27 and Nakajima Ki-43 and the Mitsubishi A6M Zero in Japan, and the Fiat G.50 and Macchi C.200 in Italy epitomised a generation of monoplanes designed to this concept.

The other stream of thought, which emerged primarily in Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union and the United States was the belief the high speeds of modern combat aircraft and the g-forces imposed by aerial combat meant that dogfighting in the classic WW I sense would be impossible. Fighters such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109, the Supermarine Spitfire, the Yakovlev Yak-1 and the Curtiss P-40 were all designed for high level speeds and a good rate of climb. Good maneuverability was not a primary objective.

Intercepting a large formation of German bombers on their way to bomb an airplane factory, two Heinkel He 111s are shown from the guncamera in a British Spitfire Mark I. Tracer ammunition can be seen hitting the rear quarter of one plane.

Immediately following the Spanish civil war came World War II, during which dogfighting was most prevalent. It was widely believed that strategic bombing alone was synonymous with air power; a fallacy that would not be fully understood until Vietnam.[13] After the failings in Spain, a greater emphasis was placed on the accuracy of air-to-ground attacks. The need to stop bombers from reaching their targets, or to protect them on their missions, was the primary purpose for most dogfights of the era.[14]

Dogfighting over Europe

Dogfighting was very prominent in the skies over Europe. The air force in France, while a major force during the first world war, was inadequate and poorly organized, and quickly fell to the German onslaught. As the first battles between the Germans and the English began, the power of the German’s anti-aircraft artillery became readily apparent, with 88 millimeter shells capable of firing 50,000 feet in the air. General Wolfram von Richthofen noted that these guns were equally destructive when used for ground fire, when they were not preoccupied with destroying airplanes. The German Bf-109 and the British Spitfire were some of the most common fighters used in the European theater.[15] A typical dogfight is described by an unnamed pilot,

Pulling up into his blind spot I watched his plane grow larger and larger in my sight. But this German pilot was not content to fly straight and level. Before I could open fire his plane slewed to the right, and seeing me on his tail, he jerked back on the stick into the only defensive maneuver his plane could make. I banked my 47 over to the right and pulled back on the stick, striving to get him once more into my ring sight. The violent maneuver applied terrific G’s to my body, and I started to black out as the blood rushed from my head. Fighting every second to overcome this blackness about me, I pulled back on the stick, further and further, so that the enemy would just show at the bottom of my ring sight to allow for the correct deflection. We were both flying in a tight circle. Just a little more and I’ll have him. Pressing the [trigger] I waited expectantly for the 109 to explode. I’ve hit his wing. A section two-feet long broke loose from the right wing as the machine gun cut like a machete through it. Too low, a little more rudder and the bullets will find his cockpit. I could see occasional strikes further up the wing, but it was too late. The 109, sensing that I was inside him on the turn, slunk into a nearby cloud. Straightening my plane, I climbed over the top of the bank, and poised on the other side, waiting for him to appear. But the 109 did not appear, and not wishing to tempt the gods of fate further, I pushed my stick forward, entered the protective cover of the clouds, and headed home.[16]

Soviet fighters

During this time, three new Russian fighters, the LaGG-1, the Yak-1, and the MiG-1 were just coming off of the production line. The Soviet Air Defense Force had been fraught with problems since World War I.[17] The German Barbarossa offensive on June 22, 1941, destroyed more than 2000 Soviet aircraft on the first day, and more than 5000 before October. With great desperation, the Soviets fought in dogfights over Leningrad, Moscow, and the Ukraine for more than a year. It became common practice at this time for Soviet pilots to simply ram an opponent.[17]

Struggling with morale problems, the Soviets slowly and methodically began to regain air supremacy after the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943.[18]

USA and Japan

After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, in the Hawaiian Islands, the United States entered the war. The Japanese used the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, an extremely lightweight fighter known for its exceptional range and maneuverability.[19] The U.S. military tested out an A6M2, which was captured intact in 1942, advising "Never attempt to dogfight a Zero."[20] Even though its engine was rather low in power, the Zero had very low wing loading characteristics, a small turn radius, a top speed over 330 MPH, and could climb better than any fighter used by the U.S. at that time, although it was poorly armored compared to U.S. aircraft.

A pilot who realized that new tactics had to be devised was Lieutenant Commander John S. "Jimmy" Thach, commander of Fighting Three in San Diego. He read the early reports coming out of China and wrestled with the problem of his F4F Wildcats being relatively slower and much less maneuverable than the Japanese planes. He devised a defensive maneuver called the "Thach Weave", (named by Lieutenant Commander James H. Flatley, another fighter tactician and contemporary of Thach). Lieutenant Commander Thach reasoned that two planes, a leader and his wingman, could fly about 200 feet apart and adopt a weaving formation when under attack by Japanese fighters. He later faced the A6M Zero during the Battle of Midway, in June 1942, for the test of his theory. Although outnumbered, he found that a Zero would lock onto the tail of one of the fighters. In response, the two planes would turn toward each other. When the Zero followed its original target through the turn it would come into a position to be fired on by the target's wingman, and the predator would become the prey. His tactic proved to be effective and was soon adopted by other squadrons. The Thach Weave helped make up for the inferiority of the US planes in maneuverability and numbers, until new aircraft could be brought into service. The usefulness of this strategy survives until today. Another effective maneuver used by the U.S. Pilots was a simple break, which consisted of turning sharply across an attacker's flight path, which worked well because the large nose of the Zero tended to obstruct the pilot's view.[21] Still another good tactic was to dive upon the Zero, shoot in one pass, and use the speed to climb back above the fight to dive again.[22] By 1943 the U.S. technology began to produce planes that were better matched against the Japanese planes, such as the Grumman F6F Hellcat, and the Vought F4U Corsair.[23]


Technology advanced extremely fast during World War II in ways that would change dogfighting forever. Jet propulsion had been demonstrated long before the war, by German engineer Hans von Ohain in 1934, and by a British engineer named Frank Whittle in 1937. The Messerschmitt Me 262 was the first jet fighter to be used in battle, with a speed over 500 mph, and began taking a toll on Allied bombing missions in 1944. The British were testing a jet that same year, the Gloster Meteor, which would later see action in the Korean War. Although U.S. General Hap Arnold test flew the XP-59A in 1942, the plane was never used in combat. Other prime inventions of the era include radar and air-to-air missiles.[24]


Enemy pilots were construed as weak and evil. For example in World War II, describing the Soviet tactics, the Luftwaffe claimed that, "The characteristic feature of the average Soviet fighter pilot were a tendency toward caution and reluctance instead of toughness and stamina, brute strength instead of genuine combat efficiency, abysmal hatred instead of fairness and chivalry...." [17]

Korean War

After World War II, the question began to rise about the future usefulness of fighter aircraft. This was especially true for the U.S., where the focus was placed on small, fast, long-range bombers capable of delivering atomic bombs.[25] The Korean War began in June 1950, and the North Koreans were outmatched by the U.S. Air Force. The war was nearly over by October, with the surrender of North Korea when, on November 1, Chinese MiG-15s attacked. The Chinese began supplying North Korea with troops and provisions, and the war quickly resumed.

At 100 MPH faster, the MiG-15 was more than a match for the U.S. P-80 Shooting Star, using the same dive and shoot tactic that the Americans found so useful against Japan. The U.S. jets had inferior weaponry, and suffered from problems with production and parts. The U.S. resorted to using mainly the more maneuverable propeller driven fighters during the war, such as the P-51 Mustang and the P-47 Thunderbolt, which were both carried over from World War II.[26]

To combat the MiGs, the F-86 Sabre was put into production. The U.S. pilots had one major advantage over the Chinese, the G-suit. Chinese fighters were often seen spinning off out of control during a hard turn because the pilot had lost consciousness. The Chinese were very competent in a dogfight, and large swirling battles were fought in the skies over Korea.[27] However, it is highly suspected by many U.S. pilots that the opponents they faced over Korea were in fact well-trained Soviet pilots.[citation needed] Major Robinson Risner recalls,

Seeing one another about the same time, the MiG flight and my flight dropped [our extra fuel] tanks.. He was so low he was throwing up small rocks. I dropped down to get him, but to hit him I had to get down in his jet wash. He'd chop the throttle and throw out his speed brakes. I would coast up beside him, wingtip to wingtip. When it looked like I was going to overshoot him, I would roll over the top and come down on the other side of him. When I did, he'd go into a hard turn, pulling all the Gs he could. This guy was one fantastic pilot.[28]

The war in the air, however, eventually came to a stalemate as fighting ceased between the two factions.

Vietnam war

During the Vietnam war, the limitations of strategic bombing were becoming very apparent, but the use of air strikes to provide battle field support had proved to be of value. Despite the many aerial engagements during the Korean war, the U.S. continued with its emphasis on long-range fighter/bombers, such as the F-105 Thunderchief, a plane known for its high speed, but lack of maneuverability. Believing that long-range radar interception and guided air-to-air missiles would render dogfighting obsolete, the U.S. equipped their top fighter, the F-4 Phantom, with missiles only, leaving out the guns that were necessary for in-close combat. However, the U.S. rules of engagement required visual identification of enemy targets, which usually ensured that in-close combat would occur.[29]

Being designed as a long-range fighter/bomber, the F-4 was very heavy, and far less maneuverable that the lighter MiG-17s and MiG-21s that were used by the North Vietnamese. The missiles used by the U.S. were not very effective against the small, fast, and highly maneuverable MiGs. Heat seeking missiles, like the AIM-4 Falcon and the AIM-9 Sidewinder, and radar guided missiles, like the AIM-7 Sparrow, were originally designed to target the slower moving Russian-made bombers. The Sparrow had difficulty tracking the small radar signature of the MiGs. The Sidewinder could easily be out-maneuvered by the Russian built fighters, while the Falcon's lack of a proximity trigger required a direct hit, making it practically useless. The most reliable of the missiles, the Sidewinder, only scored one hit out of every seven that were fired, and, quite often, engagements occurred too close for a missile to be used.[29]

Adding to the misfortune of the U.S., surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) had become an ever increasing threat. U.S Air Force Brigadier General Robin Olds describes a typical encounter with surface-to-air missiles.

Here come the SAMs. The trick is seeing the launch. You can see the steam. It goes straight up, turns more level, then the booster drops off. If it maintains a relatively stable position, it's coming right for you and you're in trouble. You're eager to make a move but can't. If you dodge too fast it will turn and catch you; if you wait too late it will explode near enough to get you. What you do at the right moment is poke your nose down, go down as hard as you can, pull maybe three negative Gs at 550 knots and once it follows you down, you go up as hard as you can. It can't follow that and goes under.[30]

Learning from the mistakes in Vietnam, the U.S. was forced to confront the problems with their tactics and designs. John R. Boyd, a fighter pilot from the Korean war, began to examine the performance characteristics of aircraft, noting that the U.S. aircraft designers emphasized speed, range, and the ability to make a tight turn. Boyd recalled from the Korean war that, while the F-86 could not out-run or out-turn the MiG-15s, its better performance came from its ability to quickly switch from one maneuver to another, or from its "agility," allowing it to defeat the Russian planes. In 1960, Boyd devised special theory for determining an aircraft's agility based on its energy-to-weight ratio. Boyd's "energy-maneuverability theory" described in scientific terms how an aircraft will perform as a function of speed (kinetic energy) and altitude (potential energy), resulting in the modern energy-management diagram. Boyd's work helped pave the way for the design of modern fighter planes, starting with the F-15 Eagle, which was released in 1972, near the end of the war.[29]

Persian Gulf War

In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, dogfighting once again proved its usefulness, when the Coalition Air Force, had to face off against the Iraqi Air Force, which at the time was the fiveth largest in the world.

An F-105D shoots down a MiG-17, 1967.

Modern air combat

Since World War II there have been many cases of air-to-air combat[citation needed]. Even in the jet age, modern air-to-air combat can develop into dogfights. A fighter can evade a missile by abrupt maximum-performance turns and employing countermeasures—such as chaff and flares—provided they can detect the missile via a radar warning receiver (RWR) or visually. If beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles can be defeated, pilots can press the attack and very quickly arrive at the within-visual-range (WVR) arena. This will typically result in a high-speed neutral pass (or merge) from which the opposing pilots must decide to turn and continue the fight with their opponent or continue straight and 'bug-out'. The turning fight that develops can be commonly called a dog fight, or air combat maneuvering (ACM).

Superiority in a dog fight can depend on a pilot's experience and skill, and the agility of his fighter when flown at minimum air speeds approaching loss of control (causing a danger of stalling); the winner typically plays to the strengths of his own aircraft while forcing his adversary to fly at a design disadvantage. Dogfights are generally contests fought at low airspeeds, while maintaining enough energy for violent acrobatic maneuvering, as pilots attempt to remain within air speeds with a maximum turn rate and minimum turn radius: the so-called "corner speed" that often lies between 300 and 400 knots, depending on the aircraft's design. Therefore a dogfight has nothing to do with supersonic speed, but much to do with the engine power that makes supersonic flight possible. The supermaneuverable F-22 Raptor can stand on its steerable nozzles at less than 100 knots airspeed, yet quickly maneuver to bring its M-61 Vulcan cannon to bear on a nearby evasive target, while an F-15 Eagle is more likely to use its thrust to maintain its relatively high corner speed, working to counter the drag caused by tight turns.

The continued importance of maintaining dogfighting proficiency was demonstrated during the Vietnam War. American pilots flew aircraft such as the F-4 Phantom II, equipped with long-range AIM-7 Sparrow missiles and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. However, air crews were required not to fire any missiles without having visually identified the target first, to make absolutely sure they were not an ally, thus losing this technological advantage. The AIM-7 missile was also not very reliable, making heavy use of delicate components such as vacuum tubes, which could not endure tropical climates, carrier takeoffs, and high-G maneuvers. Also, they had semi-active radar homing, meaning that they used the carrier plane's radar signals to home in on the target. The missiles themselves did not have a radar system, but "listened" to the pings of the attacker's radar and used the reflection of the prey aircraft to home in on it. AIM-9 missile were heat-seeking fire-and-forget missiles, meaning that once they had a lock on a heat source, they would attempt to hit it. They were only useful in short range, and in many cases failed, due to a number of factors, including delicate instruments and false heat sources (such as the sun). Additionally, early versions of the F-4 (prior to the E model) relied solely on missiles, having no guns nor lead-computing Gyro gunsight, and were therefore very vulnerable in the gun-range combat that could ensue.

Lightweight, short-endurance, point-defense fighters such as the MiG-17 and MiG-21 are typically far more agile than heavy, long-range, fighter-bombers (see the F-105 Thunderchief). Still, using superior tactics, the AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range missiles, and cannon fire, American pilots were able to gain significant victories in the air over North Vietnam, especially after the 1969 establishment of the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) to restore dogfighting ability to its pilots. At this school, pilots learned to exchange airspeed for altitude, using maneuvers like the Immelman turn and the Split-S, and to master tricks that put him behind an enemy fighter, where the enemy is vulnerable to heat-seeking Sidewinder missiles.

Referring back the previous section, which focused on tactics developed during World War II, the North Vietnamese MiG-17 resorted to use of the Lufbery maneuver on occasion when cornered by faster F-4 Phantom fighters. Whereas the Thach Weave is used as aircraft move towards a point in space, the Lufbery is employed over a fixed point.

With modern air-to-air AMRAAM guided missiles greatly extending the general engagement range of jet fighters, some experts hypothesize that dogfighting may be headed toward extinction, but others cite the occurrences in Vietnam as evidence otherwise. However, it is worth noting that there have been a great number of Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) kills occurring during and after Operation Desert Storm. This was due to the improved reliability of BVR missiles, radars, and most importantly, the integration of C3I assets such as AWACS aircraft into the realm of aerial warfare. This provided Coalition forces with a superior picture of the battlefield and in conjunction with airspace management allowed utilization of BVR weaponry.

Despite this the improvement of all-aspect IR, missiles coupled with helmet-mounted sights, has reduced the necessity of tail-chase attacks. In addition, Russian development of tail-mounted radar and rear-firing missiles has reduced Russian planes' vulnerability to tail-chase attacks.

Yet because this feature is only present on the most modern jets, and missiles are a finite resource, the US Navy (TOPGUN) and the US Air Force (Red Flag) continue to teach postgraduate-level classes in air-combat-maneuvering engagements. Russian aircraft manufacturers heavily emphasize supermaneuverability and dogfight capabilities in fighter design, with aircraft such as the Su-37 or the Su-30MKI demonstrating advanced thrust vectoring systems to achieve these goals, pushing the aircraft to its limits to give it an advantage in combat. USAF fighters, such as the F-15 and F-16, tend to favor higher speeds, because of their emphasis on high power-to-weight ratio and low wing-loading; although the F-22 has supermaneuverability with its own vectored thrust.

See also

Citations and notes

  1. ^ Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War By Richard P. Hallion – Smithsonian Institution Press 1992 – Page 1-10
  2. ^ Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering by Robert Shaw - Pages xi and xii
  3. ^ Books Google
  4. ^ Oxford English Dictionary
  5. ^
  6. ^ Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)
  7. ^ a b c BBC
  8. ^ a b c Public Broadcasting Service (PBS
  9. ^ The Red Fighter Pilot
  10. ^ Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War By Richard P. Hallion – Smithsonian Institution Press 1992 – Page 8
  11. ^ Air Power by Stephen Budiansky – Viking Penguin Books 2004 – Page 200-208
  12. ^ Air Power by Stephen Budiansky – Viking Penguin Books 2004 – Page 213-214
  13. ^ Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War By Richard P. Hallion – Smithsonian Institution Press 1992 - Pages 12-17
  14. ^ Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War By Richard P. Hallion – Smithsonian Institution Press 1992 – Page 8-13
  15. ^ Air Power by Stephen Budiansky – Viking Penguin Books 2004 – Page 219-235
  16. ^ Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering by Robert Shaw - Pages 19-20
  17. ^ a b c Aircraft, Strategy and Operations of the Soviet Air Force by Air Vice Marshal R. A. Mason and John W. R. Taylor - Jane's Publishing Co Ltd. - Page 26
  18. ^ Aircraft, Strategy and Operations of the Soviet Air Force by Air Vice Marshal R. A. Mason and John W. R. Taylor - Jane's Publishing Co Ltd. - Page 28
  19. ^ Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)
  20. ^ Fighter: The World's Greatest Aces and Their Planes by Edwards Park - Thomasson-Grant Inc. 1990 - Page 144
  21. ^ Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)</]
  22. ^ Fighter: The World's Greatest Aces and Their Planes by Edwards Park - Thomasson-Grant Inc. 1990 - Page 136
  23. ^ Air Power by Stephen Budiansky – Viking Penguin Books 2004 – Page 275
  24. ^ Fighter: The World's Greatest Aces and Their Planes by Edwards Park - Thomasson-Grant Inc. 1990 - Page 155-160
  25. ^ Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War By Richard P. Hallion – Smithsonian Institution Press 1992 - Page 13-15
  26. ^ History of the U.S. Air Force by Bill Yenne - Bison Book Corp 1984 - Page 46-51
  27. ^ Fighter Jets by Bryce Walker - Time Life Books 1983 - Page 46-64
  28. ^ Fighter Jets by Bryce Walker - Time Life Books 1983 - Page 64
  29. ^ a b c Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas That Revolutionized War, from Kitty hawk to Iraq By Stephen Budiansky - Penguin Books 2004
  30. ^ Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering by Robert Shaw - Page 52


  • Shaw, Robert L. (1985). Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-059-9. 


  1. ^ Su-37 Flanker Report from Farnborough '96 (

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