Academic views on Falun Gong

Academic views on Falun Gong

Falun Gong has received a range of scholarly attention — including ethnographic studies, analysis on the teleology of practice and also some studies focusing on its relationship to qigong and Buddhism. Attention from the Academic community has increased following the onset of Chinese Communist Party's persecution of Falun Gong in 1999.

Prominent Falun Gong scholar David Ownby delineates three core themes in the teachings: first, "Li presents his vision both as a return to a lost, or neglected spiritual tradition, and as a major contribution to modern science";David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (2008) Oxford University Press] second, "Falun Gong is profoundly "moral"; third, "Falun Dafa promises practitioners supernatural powers". Ownby also lists its "Chineseness" as a major part of the practice's appeal.

In relation to qigong and its roots in Chinese culture

In 1992, Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong and along with teachings that touched upon a wide range of topics, from detailed exposition on qigong related phenomenon and cultivation practice to science and morality. In the next few years, Falun Gong quickly grew in popularity across China to become the most popular qigong practice in Chinese History. Falun Gong was welcomed into the state-controlled Scientific Qigong Research Association, which sponsored and helped to organize many of his activities between 1992 and 1994, including 54 large-scale lectures. In 1992 and 1993 he won government awards at the Beijing Oriental Health Expos, including the "Qigong Master most acclaimed by the Masses" and "The Award for Advancing Boundary Science." The Past, Present and Future of Falun Gong, A lecture by Harold White Fellow, Benjamin Penny, at the National Library of Australia, Canberra, 2001, [http://www.nla.gov.au/grants/haroldwhite/papers/bpenny.html] , accessed 31/12/07] [Clearwisdom.net, [http://www.clearwisdom.net/eng/weekly_category/recognition.html#china Awards and Recognitions] ] .

According to academics, Falun Gong originally surfaced in the institutional field of alternative Chinese science, not religion. The debate between what can be called "naturalist" and "supernaturalist" schools of "qigong" theory has produced a considerable amount of literature. Xu Jian stated in The Journal of Asian Studies 58 (4 November 1999): "Situated both in scientific researches on "qigong" and in the prevailing nationalistic revival of traditional beliefs and values, this discursive struggle has articulated itself as an intellectual debate and enlisted on both sides a host of well-known writers and scientists — so much so that a veritable corpus of literature on "qigong" resulted. In it, two conflicting discourses became identifiable. Taking “discourse” in its contemporary sense as referring to forms of representation that generate specific cultural and historical fields of meaning, we can describe one such discourse as rational and scientific and the other as psychosomatic and metaphysical. Each strives to establish its own order of power and knowledge, its own “truth” about the “reality” of "qigong", although they differ drastically in their explanation of many of its phenomena. The controversy centers on the question of whether and how "qigong" can induce “supranormal abilities” ("teyi gongneng"). The psychosomatic discourse emphasizes the inexplicable power of "qigong" and relishes its super-normal mechanisms or which causative factors which go beyond wht canbe explained by presentday scietific models, whereas the rational discourse strives to demystify many of its phenomena and to situate it strictly in the knowledge present day modern science." The Chinese government has generally tried to encourage "qigong" as a science and discourage religious or supernatural elements. However, the category of science in China tends to include things that are generally not considered scientific in the West, including "qigong" and traditional Chinese medicine.

David Aikman has written in American Spectator (March 2000): "Americans may believe that "qigong" belongs in a general category of socially neutral, New Age-style concepts that are merely subjective, not necessarily harmful, and incapable of scientific proof. But China's scientific community doesn't share this view. Experiments under controlled conditions established by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s concluded that qi, when emitted by a "qigong" expert, actually constitutes measurable infrared electromagnetic waves and causes chemical changes in static water through mental concentration. Qi, according to much of China's scientific establishment, for all intents existed." [American Spectator, March 2000, Vol. 33, Issue 2]

Theories about the cultivation of elixir ("dan"), "placement of the mysterious pass" ("xuanguan shewei"), among others, are also found in ancient Chinese texts such as The Book of Elixir ("Dan Jing"), Daoist Canon ("Tao Zang") and Guide to Nature and Longevity ("Xingming Guizhi"). Falun Gong's teachings tap into a wide array of phenomena and cultural heritage that has been debated for ages. It is noteworthy that the definitions of many terms usually differ somewhat from Buddhist and Daoist traditions.

Li Hongzhi states in [http://www.falundafa.org/book/eng/europe1998a.htm Falun Buddha Fa Lectures in Europe] :

"Since the time Dafa was made public, I have unveiled some inexplicable phenomena in "qigong" as well as things that hadn’t been explained in the "qigong" community. But this isn’t the reason why so many people are studying Dafa. It’s because our Fa can truly enable people to Consummate, truly save people, and allow you to truly ascend to high levels in the process of cultivation. Whether it’s your realm of mind or the physical quality of your body, the Fa truly enables you to reach the standards of different levels. It absolutely can assume this role."

Andrew P. Kipnis is quoted as stating: "...to the Western layperson, "qigong" of all sorts may seem to be religious because it deals with spiritual matters. Because Li Hongzhi makes use of many concepts from Buddhism and Taoism in his writings, this may make Falun Gong seem even more like a religion to the outsider; bur Falun Gong grew initially into a space termed scientific [in China] , but was mostly insulated from the spaces formally acknowledged as institutionalized science in Western countries" [Porter 2003, pp. 38-39. Available online: [http://www.lib.usf.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-06122003-113105/unrestricted/FalunGongInTheUS-NoahPorter-Thesis.pdf] ]

The term 'qigong' was coined in the early 1950s as an alternative label to past spiritual disciplines rooted Buddhism or Taoism, that promoted the belief in the supernatural, immortality and pursuit of spiritual transcendence. The new term was constructed to avoid danger of association with ancient spiritual practices which were labeled "superstitious" and persecuted during the Maoist era. [http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~tnchina/commentary/ownby1000.html "Falungong as a Cultural Revitalization Movement: An Historian Looks at Contemporary China."] Professor David Ownby, Department of History, University of Montreal, , accessed 31/12/07] In Communist China, where spirituality and religion are looked-down upon, the concept was "tolerated" because it carried with it no overt religious or spiritual elements; and millions flocked to it during China's spiritual vacuum of the 1980s and 1990s. Scholars argue that the immense popularity of qigong in China could, in part, lie in the fact that the public saw in it a way to improve and maintain health. According to Ownby, this rapidly became a social phenomenon of considerable importance.

Falun Gong in relationship with Buddhism and Daoism

The teachings of Falun Gong makes a distinction between "fojia", Buddha School, and "fojiao", the religion of Buddhism p 39] and also the Dao School ("daojia") and the religion of Daoism ("daojiao"). Li states that there are two main systems of Xiu Lian or Cultivation practice the 'Buddha School' and the 'Dao School'. According to Li, Cultivation ways of the Buddha school focus on cultivation of "Compassion" while the Dao school lays emphasis on cultivation of "Truthfulness". In Falun Gong, "Truthfulness" and "Compassion" are apprently understood to be aspects of Cosmos's fundamental nature, Zhen-Shan-Ren, translated approximately as Truthfulness, Compassion and Endurance, each of which are said to further unfold into Zhen-Shan-Ren. Thus, cultivation practice whether in the in Buddha School or the Dao School is considered a process of assimilation to this cosmic characteristic. Hongzhi, Li [http://www.falundafa.org/book/eng/doc/zflus.doc Zhuan Falun, Third Translation Edition (Updated March, 2000) USA Internet Version] retrieved June 14, 2006 ] . Li states that there are many cultivation ways in the Dao school and the Buddha School which are unrelated to secular religions and are often handed down from Master to disciple in secret or "has always been practiced quietly, either among the populace or deep in the mountains." Li states that "These kinds of practices have their uniqueness. They need to choose a good disciple—someone with tremendous virtue who is truly capable of cultivating to an advanced level."

In the book "Falun Gong", Li Hongzhi states:

I hereby solemnly clarify that Falun Gong is qigong of the Buddha School. It is a righteous, great cultivation way and has nothing to do withBuddhism. Buddha School qigong is Buddha School qigong, while Buddhism is Buddhism. They take different paths, even though they have the same goal incultivation.

Li states that religion of Buddhism "is a system of cultivation practice that Sakyamuni enlightened to on his own in India more than two thousand years ago, and it is based on his original cultivation practice." [ [http://www.falundafa.org/book/eng/pdf/flg_2001.pdf Falun Gong] , Li Hongzhi, 2001 Revised Edition]

In Falun Gong, as in Buddhism or Daoism, practitioners are required to gradually let go of negative attachments. According to David Ownby, the requirement in Falun Gong to abandon human attachments not for achieving selfish ends, but "quite the contrary. Practitioners are enjoined to treat others with compassion and benevolence in order to cultivate virtue and work off karma." He says that such compassion and benevolence should not be reserved to those with whom one had a prior attachment, nor should the goal be to inspire gratitude or love. "Instead, one should be good because this conforms to the nature of the universe, not for any ulterior motive, be it as innocuous as 'feeling good about oneself and others.'" Li also insists that practitioners do not withdraw from the world, and that they maintain interactions with non-practitioners, including "even those who are hostile to practice." The point here, according to Ownby, is that before the practitioner cultivates to such a point that they are dispassionate in their compassion, the stress experienced in the secular environment "constitutes a form of suffering which will enable them to reduce their karma."

Stephen Chan, writing in the International Relations journal "Global Society", suggests that in providing a metaphysical system which relates the life of man with the greater cosmos, Falun Gong presents a philosophy which in a sense bypasses the communist-atheist ideology of Chinese state. He suggests that this may have lead to the decision of ban made by the Chinese authorities. Chan writes that Falun Gong poses no political threat to the Chinese government, and there is no deliberate political agenda within the Falun doctrine. He concludes that Falun Gong is banned not because of the doctrines, but simply because Falun Gong is outside of the communist apparatus.p 195]

Chan draws parallels between Falun Gong and Buddhism, in saying that the two share a central doctrine on goodness and unconditional compassion towards others. Chan, Stephen, "A New Triptych for International Relations in the 21st Century: Beyond Waltz and Beyond Lacan's Antigone, with a Note on the Falun Gong of China," "Global Society", 2003, 17:2, 187 - 208] Chan also provides a point of differentiation between Falun Gong and Buddhism p 203] Penny writes that another one of Li Hongzhi's critiques of Buddhism is that the original form of Buddhism, Sakyamuni's Buddhism, was somehow pure, it has declined over the centuries through the intervention of a degenerate priesthood, thus distorting the Buddhist Dharma.p 42] Falun Gong teaches the essential elevation of good as a governing norm, where good creates the society, although in a conservative way.p 203]

China scholar Benjamin Penny's 2005 publication "The Falun Gong, Buddhism and "Buddhist qigong" point out that after the crackdown, the Chinese Buddhist Association, the official representative of Buddhism in Communist China, was eagar to denounce Falun Gong, and other Buddhist groups followed suit in fear of persecution Penny, Benjamin, “The Falun Gong, Buddhism and ‘Buddhist qigong’”, "Asian Studies Review" (March 2005) Vol 29, pp.35-46.] He also points out that the Buddhist community's response to Falun Gong could also have been due in part to Falun Gong's rapid growth in China.p 36] According to Penny, Li tells that the features of the Buddha school includes the cultivation of Buddhahood and the belief in predestined relationships, which are included in the teachings of Falun Gong. p 40]

Ethnographic, demographic and financial aspects

Porter writes that "Most who have written about Falun Gong have simply relied upon the writings of Li Hongzhi, the websites, and newspaper articles for their information about Falun Gong, and then applied the theoretical perspective of their discipline and their personal perspective in analyzing it." Noah Porter, (Masters Thesis for the University of South Florida) July 18, 2003, [http://www.lib.usf.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-06122003-113105/unrestricted/FalunGongInTheUS-NoahPorter-Thesis.pdf "Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Study"] , retrieved June 14, 2006 ] Porter writes that he has hoped to "bridge" this communications gap with an anthropological study of Falun Gong, "to promote a broader understanding." He states in his thesis that "…practitioners do not isolate themselves from non-practitioners" and are always exposed to different "identity streams," which he defines as "different forms of media, people, and ideas."

Sociologist Susan Palmer's field notes and a preliminary research report on Falun Dafa practitioners were released in the Nova Religio journal (nr. 4, 1 October 2000). She writes however, that "...Falun Gong does not behave like other new religions. For one thing, its organization - if one can even call it that - is quite nebulous. There are no church buildings, rented spaces, no priests or administrators. At first I assumed this was defensive [...] now, I'm beginning to think that what you see is exactly what you get - Master Li's teachings on the Net on the one hand and a global network of practitioners on the other. Traveling through North America, all I dug up was a handful of volunteer contact persons. The local membership (they vehemently reject that word) is whoever happens to show up at the park on a particular Saturday morning to do qigong."

Noah Porter in his thesis also takes up the issue of Falun Gong and finance in Mainland China. He quotes and responds to some of the allegations of the Chinese Communist Party that Li benefited financially from teaching the practice. Porter writes that when teaching seminars, there was an admission of 40 yuan per new practitioner and 20 yuan for repeat practitioners--with the repeat practitioners making up for 50-75% of the admissions. He goes on to say with respect to the CCP's claims: "...but the Chinese government figures for the profits of the seminars counted all attendees as paying the 40-yuan fee charged to newcomers. Also, the Chinese Qigong Research Society received 40% of admission receipts from July 1993 to September 1994. Falun Gong's first four training seminars took in a total of 20,000 yuan, which is only 10% of the 200,000 figure cited by the Chinese government. Finally, from that 20,000 yuan, they had several operating expenses..." [Porter 2003, p 197]

Ian Johnson points out that during the greatest period of Falun Gong book sales in China, Li Hongzhi never received any royalties because all publications were bootleg.Johnson, Ian. "Wild Grass: three stories of change in modern China". Pantheon books. 2004. pp 23-229]

James Tong writes about the competing claims by Falun Gong and the Chinese government in 'The China Quarterly' journal, 2003. He writes that the government has attempted to portray Falun Gong as being financially savvy with a centralized administration system and a variety of mechanisms for deriving profit from the practice. He also looks over Falun Gong's claims of having no hierarchy, administration, membership or financial accounts, and that seminar admission was charged at a minimal rate. [ James Tong, "An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing", The China Quarterly, 2002, 636-660: p 636] Tong writes that it was in the government's interest, in the post-crackdown context, to portray Falun Gong as being highly organised: "The more organized the Falun Gong could be shown to be, then the more justified the regime's repression in the name of social order was." [Tong 2002, p 638 ] He writes that the government's charges that Falun Gong made excessive profits, charged exorbitant fees, and that Li Hongzhi led a lavish lifestyle "...lack both internal and external substantiating evidence" and points out that that despite the arrests and scrutiny, the authorities "had disclosed no financial accounts that established the official charge and credibly countered Falun Gong rebuttals." [Tong 2002, p 657]

Li Hongzhi stipulates in his books "Falun Gong" and "Zhuan Falun" that practitioners should only voluntarily help others learn the exercises and that this could never be done for fame and money, and also stipulates that practitioners must not accept any fee, donation or gift in return for their voluntarily teaching the practice. According to Falun Gong, Li's insistence that the practice be offered free of charge caused a rift with the China Qigong Research Society, the state administrative body under which Falun Dafa was initially introduced. Li subsequently withdrew from the organization.

Falun Gong website often state on their pages that "All Falun Gong Activities Are Free of Charge and Run by Volunteers" [Learning the Practice, [http://www.falundafa.org/] , accessed 21 July 2007]

In an interview in Sydney on May 2, 1999, mentioning his financial status, Li said : "In mainland China I published so many books, but added together, they haven't exceeded twenty thousand Renminbi (equivalent to US $ 2,469). This is what the publishing company gave me. When publishing books in other countries of the world, you know there is a rule, which pays 5 or 6% royalties to the author, so each time I can only get a little bit, a few hundred, or a few thousand dollars." [Li Hongzhi, Lecture in Sydney, 1999, [http://www.falundafa.ca/library/english/sydney/xini_e.html] , accessed 21 July 2007]

Use of the 'cult' label as a tool of repression

:"See also: Persecution of Falun Gong

Falun Gong related sources say that the 'cult' label was first used against Falun Gong by the CCP three months after the onset of the persecution campaign. They point out that "it was not arrived at by scholars of religion, nor sociologists, or psychologists. Nor was it the consensus of the government." [ [http://www.faluninfo.net/article/656/ The Falun Dafa Information Centre] ] . A November 9, 1999, report by the Washington Post states, “It was Mr. Jiang who ordered that Falun Gong be branded a ‘cult,’ and then demanded that a law be passed banning cults.” Former Canadian Secretary of State David Kilgour and human rights lawyer David Matas, authors of investigative reports on alleged organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners in China, profess that the 'cult' label "is a manufactured tool of repression, but not its cause." They state that the "cult" label was used as a tool incite hatred and dehumanize practitioners, and is merely a pretext for the government's persecution of the practice. "

Ian Johnson of the Wall Street Journal, and Pulitzer Prize winner in 2001 for his writing on the plight of Falun Gong practitioners, writes that declaring Falun Gong a cult was the most "brilliant" move: the Party quickly erected websites with "overnight experts" likening Li Hongzhi to Jim Jones or L. Ron Hubbard, effectively putting Falun Gong on the defensive, cloaking the crackdown with the "legitimacy of the West's anti-cult movement," forcing practitioners to prove their innocence.Johnson, Ian. "Wild Grass: three stories of change in modern China". Pantheon books. 2004. pp 23-229] The CCP controlled media portrayed Li as a "charlatan", while snapshots of manufactured accounting records were shown on television, "purporting to prove that [he] made huge amounts of money off his books and videos." Ian Johnson points out that those, the CCP controlled media projected as purported "victims", were never allowed to be interviewed independently, making their claims "almost impossible to verify"; during the greatest period of Falun Gong book sales in China, Li Hongzhi never received any royalties because all publications were bootleg; and fundamentally, "the group didn't meet many common definitions of a cult," since Falun Gong practitioners do not live isolated from society; they marry outside the group; they have non-practitioner friends; they hold normal jobs; they do not believe that "the world's end is imminent"; they do not give over large amounts of money for Falun Gong, and most importantly, they believe that "suicide is not accepted, nor is physical violence."

Julia Ching opines that calling Falun Gong an "cult" after the crackdown had already begun made previous illegal arrests and imprisonments constitutional. She states that "cult" was defined by an atheist government "on political premises, not by any religious authority" , and that the pronouncement was made without defining what a good cult, or a good religion would be.p. 9]

David Ownby, Director of the Centre of East Asian studies at the University of Montreal and a specialist in modern Chinese history, concludes as part of his key fieldwork-based findings, that Falun Gong is "by no means a cult," and that Falun Gong practitioners in North America are well-educated and tend to live in nuclear families. "Many work with computers or in finance; some are engineers." It is further contended that practitioners do not have "financial obligations to their faith community," and that they do not "live in isolation" and are "law-abiding." [David Kilgour, notes for address At a conference of the International Society for Human Rights, Konigstein (near Frankfurt), Germany, 30 March 2007]

Following CCP's declaration of Falun Gong as a "cult", some members of the American "anti-cult movement", including Rick Ross and Margaret Singer , and criticised and attacked Falun Gong, suggesting that it is, or shares some characteristics of "a cult." Academics and institutions in the west have rejected these claims, and as with the ACM as a whole, the theories which underlie these views have also been criticised as "pseudoscience." Several North American researchers such as Susan Palmer, David Ownby and Noah Porter have engaged in both ethnographic and textual studies of Falun Gong, and published findings which are contrary to the Anti-Cult Movement, stating that Falun Gong is has no characteristics a cult, has no formal organisation, no obligations of any kind, and that practitioners live normal lives and "participate in Falun Gong as much or as little as they like."

Edelman and Richardson, writing in the "Journal of Church and State", state that despite a lack of "empirical verification or general acceptance in the scientific community," the doctrines and theories behind the ACM have strongly influenced, and been largely adopted by the China Anti Cult Association (CACA), and employed specifically to assist in the persecution of Falun Gong in China.Brian Edelman and James T. Richardson, "Imposed limitations of Freedom of Religion in China: A Legal Analysis of the Crackdown on the Falun Gong and other "Evil Cults," "Journal of Church and State" (Vol. 47, Issue 2), pp. 243-268] Edelman and Richardson see the "cult" label in this context as no more than a "convenient political tool" for the Chinese Communist Party to repress Falun Gong under false pretences. David Kilgour and David Matas have come to similar conclusions in their report, and see the "cult" label as a means of attempting to make the persecution appear legitimate. [http://organharvestinvestigation.net/ BLOODY HARVEST: Revised Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China] , retrieved May 21, 2007]

Bryan Edelman and James T. Richardson stated that "Over the years, the CCP has also become more sensitive to international criticisms concerning China's human rights record. In this context, the anti-cult movement and its ideology have served as useful tools, helping efforts by the party to try to maintain a delicate balance and create the illusion that the rule-of-law has been upheld, even as actions in violation of international customary law are being taken against the Falun Gong. The social construction of the cultic threat posed to Chinese society and the rest of the world, the subsequent government's response to that threat, and its lax definition of the term 'cult" has armed the CCP with the weapons necessary to attack any religious, qigong, or sectarian movement its sees as a potential threat to its authority. By applying the label and embracing theories that posit passive followers under the mental control of a dangerous leader, the government can aggressively destroy the group, all the while claiming to be protecting religious freedom. In this respect, the Western Anti-Cult Movement has served, unwittingly or not, as a lackey in the party's efforts to maintain its political dominance." [Journal of Church and State, Spring 2005, Vol. 47 Issue 2, p265-267]

Ian Johnson writes that the Communist Party's claim that Falun Gong was a "cult" gave the western anti-cult movement a new cause.p. 227] People external to the events in China would spend their time "debating obscure definitions of Master Li's works, trying to prove that the group was potentially dangerous." He says that one western academic published a paper which pleaded for an understanding of the Party's response to Falun Gong over concerns related to its teachings, and that there was a "legitimate right to fear the group." "This, even though the government had only interested itself in Falun Gong because of its demonstration in downtown Beijing, not because of its teachings." Most fundamentally, he contends, "what was often forgotten in the learned discourse was that the government, not Falun Gong, was killing people."

The Falun Dafa Information centre states that the cult label was, first, "meant to undercut public sympathy for the beleaguered Falun Gong, turning empathy instead into suspicion. Second, it would shift the spotlight away from the unlawful acts of the Party-state to instead the victim, calling into question his integrity. Thirdly, it would serve to dehumanize the Falun Gong, paving the way for more drastic violations of rights; indeed, torture and violence increased greatly in the years following" [ [http://www.faluninfo.net/article/656/ The Falun Dafa Information Center] ]
David Kilgour suggests that Ownby's conclusion is similar to that of many independent observers, including that of himself and David Matas, co-author of the [http://organharvestinvestigation.net organ harvesting report] . Kilgour says that in their experience, practitioners appear to be "…good citizens and exemplary members of their respective civil societies." Kilgour and Matas further opine that Falun Gong shares none of the characteristics of a cult, having no membership, offices or officials. They again draw on Ownby's research, and say that there is no penalty for leaving Falun Gong, "since there is nothing to leave." Practitioners are said to be free to engage in Falun Gong practice "as little or as much as they see fit. They can start and stop at any time. They can engage in their exercises in groups or singly." Li Hongzhi is referred to as the "author of the books which inspired Falun Gong practitioners," and is "not worshipped," nor receives money from practitioners. "He is a private person who meets rarely with practitioners," and transmits his "advice to practitioners" in the form of "conference lectures" and "published books"--which is "publicly available information."

Additionally, Li Hongzhi emphasizes in his lectures the importance of maintaining normal relationships in society. In Zhuan Falun Li states "The majority of people in our school will practice cultivation in ordinary human society, so you should not distance yourself from ordinary human society and you must practice cultivation with a clear mind. The relationships among one another should remain normal." Hongzhi, Li [http://www.falundafa.org/book/eng/lecture8.html#6 "Attachment to Zealotry" in "Zhuan Falun" Third Translation Edition (Updated March, 2000) USA Internet Version] retrieved June 14, 2006 ]

References


Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.

Игры ⚽ Нужна курсовая?

Look at other dictionaries:

  • Persecution of Falun Gong — Falun Gong was introduced to the general public by Li Hongzhi(李洪志) in Changchun, China, in 1992. For the next few years, Falun Gong was the fastest growing qigong practice in Chinese history and, by 1999, there were between 70 and 100 million… …   Wikipedia

  • Falun Gong — The Falun Dafa emblem Traditional Chinese 法輪功 Simplified Chinese …   Wikipedia

  • Teachings of Falun Gong — The teachings of Falun Gong were introduced to the public by Li Hongzhi (李洪志) in Changchun, China, in 1992. Falun Gong is also known as Falun Dafa (Great Law of the Law Wheel). The teachings cover a wide range of topics ranging from spiritual,… …   Wikipedia

  • china — /chuy neuh/, n. 1. a translucent ceramic material, biscuit fired at a high temperature, its glaze fired at a low temperature. 2. any porcelain ware. 3. plates, cups, saucers, etc., collectively. 4. figurines made of porcelain or ceramic material …   Universalium

  • China — /chuy neuh/, n. 1. People s Republic of, a country in E Asia. 1,221,591,778; 3,691,502 sq. mi. (9,560,990 sq. km). Cap.: Beijing. 2. Republic of. Also called Nationalist China. a republic consisting mainly of the island of Taiwan off the SE coast …   Universalium

  • Concerns and controversies over Confucius Institutes — The Confucius Institute (CI) program, which began establishing centers for Chinese language instruction in 2004, has been the subject of considerable controversy during its rapid international expansion. Much of this scrutiny stems from the… …   Wikipedia

  • religion — religionless, adj. /ri lij euhn/, n. 1. a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe, esp. when considered as the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies, usually involving devotional and ritual observances, and… …   Universalium

  • Li Hongzhi — Infobox Person name = Li Hongzhi zh c|c=李洪志 image size = 180px caption = Li Hongzhi birth name = birth date = Birth year and age|1951| birth place = Gongzhuling, China death date = death place = death cause = resting place = resting place… …   Wikipedia

  • Human rights in the People's Republic of China — Human rights in China redirects here. For the non governmental organization, see Human Rights in China (organization). People s Republic of China This article is part of the series: P …   Wikipedia

  • Jiang Zemin — 江泽民 General Secretary of the Communist Party of China In office 24 June 1989 – 15 November 2002 ( 1000000000000001300000013 years, 10000000000000144000 …   Wikipedia

Share the article and excerpts

Direct link
Do a right-click on the link above
and select “Copy Link”