- Thomas Hill Green
:"For the actor Thomas Hill, see Thomas Hill".
Thomas Hill Green (
April 7, 1836– March 26, 1882) was an English philosopher, political radical and temperance reformer, and a member of the British idealismmovement. Like all the British idealists, Green was influenced by the metaphysical historicismof G.W.F. Hegel. He was one of the thinkers behind the philosophy of social liberalism.
Green was born at
Birkin, in the West Riding of Yorkshire, England, where his father was rector. On the paternal side, he was descended from Oliver Cromwell. His education was conducted entirely at home until, at the age of 14, he entered Rugby, where he remained five years.
In 1855, he became an undergraduate member of
Balliol College, Oxford, and was elected fellow in 1860. He began a life of teaching (mainly philosophical) in the university — first as college tutor, afterwards, from 1878 until his death as Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy.
The lectures he delivered as professor form the substance of his two most important works, viz, the " [http://fair-use.org/t-h-green/prolegomena-to-ethics/ Prolegomena to Ethics] " and the " [http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/%7Eecon/ugcm/3ll3/green/obligation.pdf Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation] ", which contain the whole of his positive constructive teaching. These works were not published until after his death, but Green's views were previously known indirectly through the "Introduction" to the standard edition of Hume's works by Green and
T. H. Grose, fellow of Queen's College, in which the doctrine of the "English" or "empirical" philosophy was exhaustively examined.("The Philosophical Works of David Hume", ed. by T.H. Green and T.H. Grose, 4 vol. (1882–86)).
Green was involved in local politics for many years, through the University, temperance societies and the local Oxford Liberal association. During the passage of the
Second Reform Act, he campaigned for the franchise to be extended to all men living in boroughs, even if they did not own real property. In this sense, Green's position was more radical than that of most other Advanced Liberals, including W.E. Gladstone.
It was in the context of his Liberal party activities that in 1881 Green gave what became one of his most famous statements of his liberal philosophy, the "Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract." [ [http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111green.html Green ] ] At this time, he was also lecturing on religion, epistemology, ethics and political philosophy.
Green died from blood poisoning on March 15, 1882, age 45.
Most of his major works were published posthumously, including his lay sermons on "Faith and The Witness of God", the essay "On the Different Senses of "Freedom" as Applied to Will and the Moral Progress of Man", "Prolegomena to Ethics", "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation", and the "Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract".
In addition to Green's friends from his academic life, approximately two thousand local people attended his funeral.
He helped to found the
City of Oxford High School for Boys.
empiricismand biological evolution(derived from Herbert Spencer) were chief features in English thought during the third quarter of the 19th century. Green represents primarily the reaction against such doctrines. Green argued that when these doctrines were carried to their logical conclusion, they not only "rendered all philosophy futile," but were fatal to practical life. By reducing the human mind to a series of unrelated atomic sensations, these related teachings destroyed the possibility of knowledge, he argued. These teachings were especially important for Green to refute because they had underpinned the conception of mind that was held by the nascient science of psychology. Green tried to deflate the pretensions of psychologists who had claimed that their young field would provide a scientific replacement for traditional epistemology and metaphysics. [Alexander Klein, [http://individual.utoronto.ca/alex_klein/Scholarship.htm "The Rise of Empiricism: William James, Thomas Hill Green, and the Struggle over Psychology"] ]
Green further objected that such empiricists represented man as a "being who is simply the result of natural forces," and thereby made conduct, or any theory of conduct, unmeaning; for life in any human, intelligible sense implies a personal self that (1) knows what to do, (2) has power to do it. Green was thus driven, not theoretically, but as a practical necessity, to raise again the whole question of man in relation to nature. When (he held) we have discovered what man in himself is, and what his relation to his environment is, we shall then know his function--what he is fitted to do. In the light of this knowledge, we shall be able to formulate the moral code, which, in turn, will serve as a criterion of actual civic and social institutions. These form, naturally and necessarily, the objective expression of moral ideas, and it is in some civic or social whole that the moral ideal must finally take concrete shape.
What is man?
To ask "What is man?" is to ask "What is experience?" for experience means that of which I am conscious. The facts of
consciousnessare the only facts that, to begin with, we are justified in asserting to exist. On the other hand, they are valid evidence for whatever is necessary to their own explanation, i.e. for whatever is logically involved in them. Now the most striking characteristic of man, that in fact which marks him specially, as contrasted with other animals, is self-consciousness. The simplest mental act into which we can analyse the operations of the human mind--the act of sense-perception--is never merely a change, physical or psychical, but is the consciousness of a change.
Human experience consists, not of processes in an animal organism, but of these processes recognized as such. That which we perceive is from the outset an apprehended fact—that is to say, it cannot be analysed into isolated elements (so-called sensations) which, as such, are not constituents of consciousness at all, but exist from the first as a synthesis of relations in a consciousness which keeps distinct the "self" and the various elements of the "object," though holding all together in the unity of the act of perception. In other words, the whole mental structure we call knowledge consists, in its simplest equally with its most complex constituents, of the "work of the mind." Locke and Hume held that the work of the mind was "eo ipso" unreal because it was "made by" man and not "given to" man. It thus represented a subjective creation, not an objective fact. But this consequence follows only upon the assumption that the work of the mind is arbitrary, an assumption shown to be unjustified by the results of exact science, with the distinction, universally recognized, which such science draws between truth and falsehood, between the real and "mere ideas." This (obviously valid) distinction logically involves the consequence that the object, or content, of knowledge, viz., reality, is an intelligible ideal reality, a system of thought relations, a spiritual cosmos. How is the existence of this ideal whole to be accounted for? Only by the existence of some "principle which renders all relations possible and is itself determined by none of them"; an eternal self-consciousness which knows in whole what we know in part. To
Godthe world is, to man the world becomes. Human experience is God gradually made manifest.
Carrying on the same analytical method into the area of
moral philosophy, Green argued that ethicsapplies to the peculiar conditions of social life--that investigation into man's nature which metaphysics began. The faculty employed in this further investigation is no "separate moral faculty," but that same reason which is the source of all our knowledge - ethical and other.
Self-reflection gradually reveals to us human capacity, human function, with, consequently, human responsibility. It brings out into clear consciousness certain potentialities in the realization of which man's true good must consist. As the result of this analysis, combined with an investigation into the surroundings man lives in, a "content"--a moral code--becomes gradually evolved. Personal good is perceived to be realizable only by making real and actual the conceptions thus arrived at. So long as these remain potential or ideal, they form the motive of action; motive consisting always in the idea of some "end" or "good" that man presents to himself as an end in the attainment of which he would be satisfied; that is, in the realization of which he would find his true self.
The determination to realize the self in some definite way constitutes an "act of will," which, as thus constituted, is neither arbitrary nor externally determined. For the motive which may be said to be its cause lies in the person himself, and the identification of the self with such a motive is a self-determination, which is at once both rational and free. The "freedom of man" is constituted, not by a supposed ability to do anything he may choose, but in the power to identify himself with that true good that reason reveals to him as his true good.
This good consists in the realization of personal character; hence the final good, i.e. the moral ideal, as a whole, can be realized only in some society of persons who, while remaining ends to themselves in the sense that their individuality is not lost but rendered more perfect, find this perfection attainable only when the separate individualities are integrated as part of a social whole.
Society is as necessary to form persons as persons are to constitute society. Social union is the indispensable condition of the development of the special capacities of its individual members. Human self-perfection cannot be gained in isolation; it is attainable only in inter-relation with fellow-citizens in the social community.
The law of our being, so revealed, involves in its turn civic or political duties. Moral goodness cannot be limited to, still less constituted by, the cultivation of self-regarding virtues, but consists in the attempt to realize in practice that moral ideal that self-analysis has revealed to us as our ideal. From this fact arises the ground of political obligation, because the institutions of political or civic life are the concrete embodiment of moral ideas in terms of our day and generation. But, since society exists only for the proper development of Persons, we have a criterion by which to test these institutions--namely, do they, or do they not, contribute to the development of moral character in the individual citizens?
It is obvious that the final moral ideal is not realized in any body of civic institutions actually existing, but the same analysis that demonstrates this deficiency points out the direction that a true development will take.
Hence arises the conception of rights and duties that should be maintained by law, as opposed to those actually maintained; with the further consequence that it may become occasionally a moral duty to rebel against the state in the interest of the state itself--that is, in order better to subserve that end or function that constitutes the "raison d'être" of the state. The state does not consist in any definite concrete organization formed once for all. It represents a "general will" that is a desire for a common good. Its basis is not a coercive authority imposed upon the citizens from without, but consists in the spiritual recognition, on the part of the citizens, of that which constitutes their true nature. "Will, not force, is the basis of the state."
Influence of Green's thought
Green's teaching was, directly and indirectly, the most potent philosophical influence in England during the last quarter of the 19th century, while his enthusiasm for a common
citizenship, and his personal example in practical municipallife, inspired much of the effort made in the years succeeding his death to bring the universitiesmore into touch with the people, and to break down the rigour of class distinctions. His ideas spread to the University of St. Andrewsthrough the influence of Prof. David George Ritchie, a former student of his, who eventually help found the Aristotelian Society. Green was directly cited by many New Liberal politicians, such as Herbert Samueland H. H. Asquith, as an influence on their thought. It is no coincidence that these politicians were educated at Balliol College, Oxford. Roy Hattersleyhas called for Green's work to be applied to the problems of 21st century Britain. [ [http://www.newstatesman.com/200312010041 New Statesman - Forgotten favourites - Politics of aspiration. T H Green was the first philosopher of social justice. Today's cabinet ministers would do well to read him, writes Roy Hattersley ] ]
Works and commentary
Green's most important treatise—the " [http://fair-use.org/t-h-green/prolegomena-to-ethics/ Prolegomena to Ethics] " practically complete in manuscript at his death--was published in the year following, under the editorship of A. C. Bradley (4th ed., 1899). Shortly afterwards, R. L. Nettleship's standard edition of his "Works" (exclusive of the "Prolegomena") appeared in three volumes:
# Reprints of Green's criticism of Hume, Spencer,
G. H. Lewes
# Lectures on Kant, on Logic, on the " [http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/%7Eecon/ugcm/3ll3/green/obligation.pdf Principles of Political Obligation] "
#"Miscellanies", preceded by a full "Memoir by the Editor".
The "Principles of Political Obligation" was afterwards published in separate form. A criticism of Neo-Hegelianism will be found in
Andrew Seth( Pringle Pattison), "Hegelianism and Personality".
* articles in "Mind" (January and April 1884) by
A. J. Balfourand Henry Sidgwick
* in the "Academy" (xxviii. 242 and xxv. 297) by
* in the "Philosophical Review" (vi., 1897) by
S. S. Laurie
Geoffrey Thomas, "The Moral Philosophy of T.H. Green" (Oxford and New York 1988)
W. H. Fairbrother, "Philosophy of T.H. Green" (London and New York, 1896)
David George Ritchie, "The Principles of State Interference" (London, 1891)
Henry Sidgwick, "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant" (London, 1905)
J. H. Muirhead, "The Service of the State: Four Lectures on the Political Teaching of T.H. Green" (1908)
A. W. Benn, "English Rationalism in the XIXth Century" (1906), vol. ii., pp. 401 foll.
Contributions to liberal theory
* " [http://fair-use.org/t-h-green/prolegomena-to-ethics/ Prolegomena to Ethics] " (1883)
* " [http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/%7Eecon/ugcm/3ll3/green/obligation.pdf Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation] " (1883)
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/green/#6 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry]
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Thomas Hill Green — (7 avril 1836 – 26 mars, 1882) est un philosophe britannique membre de l idéalisme britannique, un mouvement influencé par la métaphysique de G.W.F. Hegel. Ce courant philosophique a été influent à la fin du 19° siècle avec notamment Francis… … Wikipédia en Français
Thomas Hill Green — (* 7. April 1836 in Birkin; † 15. März 1882) war ein englischer Philosoph und sozialliberaler Politiker. Der Hegelianer war ein führender Vertreter des britischen Idealismus. I … Deutsch Wikipedia
Thomas Hill Green — (7 de abril de 1836 – 26 de marzo de 1882), filósofo inglés y conocido idealista de Oxford, que desarrolló junto a Bernard Bosanquet el llamado liberalismo orgánico, en el que defendían la intervención activa del estado como algo positivo para… … Wikipedia Español
Thomas M. Green junior — Thomas Martston Green junior (* 26. Februar 1758 in Williamsburg, Virginia; † 7. Februar 1813 im Jefferson County, Mississippi) war ein US amerikanischer Politiker. Zwischen 1802 und 1803 vertrat er das Mississippi Territorium als Delegierter im… … Deutsch Wikipedia
Green, Thomas Hill — (1836–1882) English absolute idealist . Green was born in Yorkshire, and educated at Oxford. He was a tutor of Balliol College, and in 1878 became professor of moral philosophy at Oxford. His introduction to his edition of Hume s works (produced… … Philosophy dictionary
Green, Thomas Hill — (1836–82) Philosopher. Green was educated at the University of Oxford and taught at Balliol College under the mastership of Benjamin jowett. From 1878 he held a Chair in Moral Philosophy. He is remembered for his propagation of the views of … Who’s Who in Christianity
GREEN, THOMAS HILL — philosopher, born in Yorkshire; studied at Balliol College, Oxford; was elected a Fellow and became eventually Whyte s professor of Moral Philosophy; his philosophy had a Kantian root, developed to a certain extent on the lines of Hegel, which … The Nuttall Encyclopaedia
Green, Thomas Hill — (1836 1882) Philosopher, was b. at Birken Rectory, Yorkshire, and ed. at Rugby and Balliol Coll., Oxf., where he became Whyte Prof. of Moral Philosophy and, by his character, ability, and enthusiasm on social questions, exercised a powerful… … Short biographical dictionary of English literature
Giggs Hill Green — is a large triangular stretch of common ground in Thames Ditton, bordered on one side by the Portsmouth Road, Southern England. Previously part of the waste belonging to the manor of Kingston, the eight acres of Giggs Hill Green were purchased in … Wikipedia
Thomas Green — may refer to:* Thomas Green (athlete) (1894–1975), British athlete * Thomas Green (bishop), 18th century Bishop of Norwich * Thomas Green (captain) (1679/1680–1705), English sailor and alleged pirate, hanged in Scotland * Thomas Green (general),… … Wikipedia