Nyon Conference

The Nyon Conference, held in Nyon, Switzerland, in September 1937, addressed international piracy in the Mediterranean Sea, especially piracy aimed at intervention in the Spanish Civil War. The United Kingdom and France led the conference, which was also attended by Bulgaria, Egypt, Greece, Romania, Turkey, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

The first agreement, signed on 14 September, dealt with plans to counterattack aggressive submarines. Naval patrols were established; the United Kingdom and France were to patrol most of the western Mediterranean and parts of the east, and the other signatories were to patrol their own waters. Italy was to be allowed to join the agreement and patrol the Tyrrhenian Sea if it wished. A second agreement followed three days later, applying similar provisions to surface ships. Italy and Germany did not attend, although the former did take up naval patrols in November. In marked contrast to the Non-Intervention Committee and the League of Nations, this conference did succeed in preventing attacks by submarines.

Context and organisation

The Non-Intervention Committee, set up in 1936, had attempted to restrict the flow of weapons to the parties of the Spanish Civil War.^[1] Under a committee plan, neutral observers were posted to Spanish ports and borders.^[2] Zones of patrol were assigned to the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy.^[3] Following attacks on the German cruiser Leipzig on 15 and 18 June, Germany and Italy withdrew from the patrols.^[4][5] The United Kingdom and France offered to replace Germany and Italy in patrols of their sections, but the latter powers believed these patrols would be too partial.^[6] The British Admiralty believed that a significant control effort was the best solution, and four plans were put forward in response to attacks on British shipping;^[7] previous control measures had been widely evaded.^[1] These plans would be the basis for a Mediterranean meeting, suggested by French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos.^[7] Meanwhile, the Iride unsuccessfully attacked the British destroyer Havock, strengthening British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's sceptical stance towards Italy.^[8] The British representative in Rome protested to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.^[7]

On 5 or 6 September, the British arranged a conference for all parties with a Mediterranean coastline, along with Germany.^[9][10] France wanted the Soviet Union and Republican Spain to be invited, but the United Kingdom would grant only the former. Hence, no Spanish representative was invited.^[9] Direct intervention on the Spanish question was avoided in France, with the new prime minister, Camille Chautemps, against such a plan.^[11] The conference was held at Nyon, Switzerland – Geneva was avoided because Italians associated it with the actions of the League of Nations over the Abyssinian Crisis.^[10] The Soviet government formally accused the Italians of sinking two Soviet vessels, the Tuniyaev and the Blageav. This was perhaps an attempt by the Soviet Union to push Italy and Germany away from the conference.^[12] There were appeals by Italy and Germany that the piracy and other issues the conference was to discuss should be handled only by normal meetings of the Non-Intervention Committee, not a conference like Nyon. The United Kingdom and France rejected this suggestion, and continued to prepare for the conference.^[12] The British believed they could convince Italy to abandon Germany, as that was one of the aims of appeasement in general. Italy and Germany were not present on 10 September, at the start of the conference.^[13]

Provisions

Map of the Mediterranean, showing some of the features referred to at the conference.

In drawing up plans for the conference, British and French naval staffs rejected the idea of a convoy system. The British focused on efforts to curb submarine activity, while the French considered surface vessels and aircraft just as important.^[9] Air and surface attacks had been open, whereas submarine attacks were covert – focusing on submarines would help avoid confrontation. Groups of ships made up from different nations was unacceptable to the French, who were unhappy at the prospect of French ships under foreign command.^[9] On 8 September, plans were discussed in cabinet, including the setting up of eight groups of three destroyers for the western Mediterranean. Preliminary talks with the French were held on 9 September.^[14] The Conference began on the 10th. Proceedings took two forms: discussions between the British and French, and formal situations. The participation of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean was disputed by the lesser nations.^[14] The United Kingdom and France would take control of Aegean patrols, rather than the Soviet Union. This was, perhaps surprisingly, accepted by the Soviet Union.^[15]

It ended on 14 September with the signing of the "Mediterranean Agreement". Signatories to the agreement were the countries of Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Greece, Romania, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the USSR and Yugoslavia.^[16] The agreement noted attacks on neutral shipping by submarines. This was in contravention of the London Naval Treaty (signed in 1930) and the Submarine Protocol, part of the Second London Naval Treaty (signed in 1936).^[16]

Its clauses provided for any submarine that attacked neutral shipping to be confronted and if possible sunk. This would also be the case if the submarine was in the vicinity of a recent attack and there were suitable grounds to believe it was responsible.^[16] It was decided that French and British fleets patrol the areas of sea west of Malta and attack any suspicious submarines.^[12] The division of patrols between the United Kingdom and France would be decided by their governments. They would patrol both the high seas and territorial waters of signatory countries.^[16] The possibility of the Tyrrhenian Sea coming under Italian patrols was agreed.^[15] In the Eastern Mediterranean, British and French ships would patrol up to the Dardanelles, but not in the Adriatic Sea.^[16] In this area, signatory countries would patrol their own territorial waters, and would provide any reasonable assistance to the French and British patrols. The revision of these provisions, including the way the area had been divided into zones, would be allowed.^[16] Submarine activity would be banned, subject to two exemptions: submarines on the surface, accompanied by a surface ship; and activity in certain areas for training purposes. Each of the governments would only allow foreign submarines into each of their territorial waters in extreme situations, such as immediate distress. Merchant shipping would also be advised to stick to particular shipping routes.^[16] The agreement also repeated the suggestion Italy join in the proposal.^[17] Delbos mentioned that similar proposals about surface craft would be prepared. The provisions of the agreement would come into force on 20 September.^[15] The British and French knew that Italian "pirate" submarine operations had already been paused,^[14] but actions to enforce the conference started at midnight on 19/20 September.^[15] The French and British camps moved to Geneva.^[18] The parties to the agreement were happy; The Times likened them to cricketers, "reviewing their innings, over by over".^[15]

A second agreement was signed into force on 17 September 1937 by the same signatories.^[18][19] It was signed in a second meeting in Geneva, and official versions were made in French and English.^[20] It made the rules governing submarine warfare also applicable to surface vessels.^[19] Several proposals were not implemented. The British wanted the Spanish parties to be able to verify flags, thereby preventing innocent British shipping being attacked if Republican ships continued to use the British flag as a means of escape. This would have benefited the Nationalists, and the French made sure it was dropped.^[18] A suggestion to fire at any attacking aircraft was easily passed. Another, on surface ships (which incorrectly stated no attack had yet been proven) was eventually hardened on request of the French, so text stating aggressors would be attacked was added. A Soviet proposal strengthening the agreement was made.^[18] Greece and Turkey, keen not to be forced to fire on a German or Italian warship, wished ships with a clear identifying mark to be excluded; this was impractical, but an amendment was made to this effect, covering only ships in their own territorial waters.^[18]

Aftermath

Neville Chamberlain in September 1938.

Italy was very discontented at the agreement, whereas Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet representative, was pleased. Italy requested that it be included in the plans, in what it called "parity of duties". However, on the 15th, Benito Mussolini's government sent two submarines to Francisco Franco's National Faction.^[12] The agreement also allowed for greater military resources to be deployed to the Mediterranean as required. Litvinov, in particular, stressed the Soviet Union's "indisputable right" to commit naval forces to the Mediterranean (something Germany and Italy had opposed in meetings of the Non-Intervention Committee). He also said he regretted that Spanish merchant shipping had been left out – on the basis this would have been intervention.^[17] Anthony Eden noted the barbarous nature of submarine attacks, that attacks on submarines would be restricted to suitably extreme circumstances, and that the two parties in the war would still not be able to engage neutral vessels.^[17] British press was in favour, although The Times and The Guardian expressed some concerns. French public opinion was strongly in favour of the outcome of the conference.^[21] The German mood was restrained; in Spain, the Republicans – on the verge of disaster – were largely in favour, the Nationalists strongly against. The Nationalists made several complaints, none of which were accepted.^[22]

On 18 September, the Italian government was provided with the text of the agreement, and asked for some interpretation of "parity". Improved relations with Italy were desired by the British government, particularly Neville Chamberlain.^[19] This feeling would lead to the Anglo-Italian Agreements of 1938. An invitation was made to Italy to patrol the Tyrrhenian Sea, but this met with defiance. Italy demanded "absolute parity" with the United Kingdom and France, meaning the same right of patrol in the Mediterranean.^[22][23] The Soviet Union refused to use routes patrolled by the Italians; the Turks, Greeks and Yugoslavs refused to let the Italians use their ports.^[22] A compromise was signed on the 29 September, and Italian patrols started on 10 November.^[24] The patrols were a strain on the Royal Navy and the provisions were relaxed with French agreement, effective from January. However, submarine activity resumed and the patrol was brought up to full strength almost immediately.^[25] On the whole, submarine activity during this period did not amount to much; patrols were again relaxed in May, and the agreement suspended in August.^[26] The success of the conference was in marked contrast to the failure of the Non-Intervention Committee.^[27] However, the Nationalists and Italians switched to using air power against shipping.^[26]

Italian historians tend to downplay the importance of the Nyon Conference (often seeing it as a mere extension of the Non-Intervention Committee). British historians, however, have tended to see the Nyon Conference as an important stand against aggression, but have had reservations.^[28] Christopher Seton-Watson describes it as a "diplomatic victory",^[28] Jill Edwards points out that the Italian nonchalance means it failed to achieve a change in Italian policy.^[29] It would also provide a further division between Anthony Eden as foreign minister and Neville Chamberlain as prime minister.^[29]

Notes

1. ^ ^{a b} Gretton (1975). p. 103.
2. ^ Thomas (1961). p. 394.
3. ^ Thomas (1961). p. 395.
4. ^ Thomas (1961). p. 457.
5. ^ Bulletin of International News (August 1937). pp. 4–5.
6. ^ Bulletin of International News (August 1937). p. 7.
7. ^ ^{a b c} Gretton (1975). p. 105.
8. ^ Mills (1993). p. 12.
9. ^ ^{a b c d} Gretton (1975). p. 106.
10. ^ ^{a b} Thomas (1961). p. 475.
11. ^ Mills (1993). p. 13.
12. ^ ^{a b c d} Thomas (1961). p. 476.
13. ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 475–476.
14. ^ ^{a b c} Gretton (1975). p. 107.
15. ^ ^{a b c d e} Gretton (1975). p. 108.
16. ^ ^{a b c d e f g} Bulletin of International News (September 1937). p. 12.
17. ^ ^{a b c} Bulletin of International News (September 1937). p. 13.
18. ^ ^{a b c d e} Gretton (1975). p. 109.
19. ^ ^{a b c} Thomas (1961). pp. 476–477.
20. ^ Schindler, Toman (1988). p. 890.
21. ^ Gretton (1975). pp. 109–110.
22. ^ ^{a b c} Gretton (1975). p. 110.
23. ^ Bulletin of International News (September 1937). p. 14.
24. ^ Gretton (1975). p. 111.
25. ^ Gretton (1975). pp. 111–112.
26. ^ ^{a b} Buchanan (1997). pp. 59–60.
27. ^ Gretton (1975). p. 112.
28. ^ ^{a b} Mills (1993). p. 3.
29. ^ ^{a b} Mills (1993). p. 4.

Sources

Books

• Buchanan, Tom (1997). Britain and the Spanish Civil War. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521455693. 
• Schindler, Dietrich; Toman, Jiří (1988). The Laws of Armed Conflicts: a Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents. Scientific collection of the Henry Dunant Institute (3 ed.). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. ISBN 9024733065. http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=k5FqSAX9HyMC. 
• Thomas, Hugh (1961). The Spanish Civil War (1st ed.). London, United Kingdom: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 

Journals

• "Spain: the British Compromise Plan". Bulletin of International News (London, United Kingdom: Royal Institute of International Affairs) 14 (3). 7 August 1937. ISSN 20443986. JSTOR 25639692. 
• "The Nyon Conference and its Result". Bulletin of International News (London, United Kingdom: Royal Institute of International Affairs) 14 (6). 18 September 1937. ISSN 20443986. JSTOR 25639708. 
• Gretton, Peter (January 1975). "The Nyon Conference - The Naval Aspect". The English Historical Review (London, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press) 90 (354). ISSN 00138266. JSTOR 567512. 
• Mills, William C. (February 1993). "The Nyon Conference: Neville Chamberlain, Anthony Eden, and the Appeasement of Italy in 1937". The International History Review (Abingdon, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis) 15 (1). ISSN 07075332. JSTOR 40107260.