Battle of Jezzine (1982)

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict = Battle of Jezzin
partof = the 1982 Lebanon War


caption =
date = June 8, 1982
place = Jezzine, Lebanon
coordinates =
territory =
result = Tactical Israeli victory
status =
combatant1 = flagicon|Israel Israel
combatant2 = flagicon|Syria Syria
combatant3 =
commander1 = Hagai Cohen
commander2 =
commander3 =
strength1 = ~1 brigade
strength2 = ~1 brigade
Several commando companies
strength3 =
casualties1 = 7 dead
8 tanks destroyed
casualties2 = 1 tank battalion destroyed
casualties3 =
notes = The Battle of Jezzine was fought on June 8, 1982 between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Syrian Army in the Lebanese town of Jezzine. It was the first battle between Israel and Syria in the 1982 Lebanon War. It resulted in Israel capturing the town.

Prelude

Jezzine was considered strategically important due to its location near a junction in which one road passed through the town and led to the southern Beqaa Valley and the other led north to Jebel Baruk, passing west of Lake Karoun. Menachem Einan's division was driving down a road that that ended in a fork west of Jezzine and had to pass through the town. Control of both the town and the junction would have given the IDF access to the southern Beqaa Valley from the west. The Syrian 424th Infantry Battalion was stationed in the town. On June 7, Syria detected an Israeli division advancing north and sent several commando companies and a tank battalion to ambush the Israelis on their way to Jezzine.Pollack (2002), p. 530]

On the night of Tuesday June 8, Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, said at a meeting in the Northern Command headquarters "We know today that there will be a direct confrontation with the Syrians" and argued that it would be best to move deeper into Lebanon. He said to the other officers that "We have to build a context because we know that tomorrow we will take on the Syrians". Israel was not yet aware that a reduced Syrian battalion of tanks and a commando unit had joined the defending forces in Jezzine.Schiff & Yaari (1985), p. 157]

Einan was ordered to reach the main highway as quickly as possible. He avoided the crossroads as he closed in on the town at 1:00 AM on Tuesday, June 8. He left a blocking force behind as he pushed north. The blocking force spilled over the slope above the town and opened fire at the Syrians. It did not assault the town, but a battle ensued and the IDF lost two tanks. Meanwhile, an Israeli drone had discovered a Syrian force moving south through the Shouf Mountains toward Jezzine. Israeli Air Force planes accurately attacked that Syrian force. The Syrian SAMs were not activated against them.

The battle

The brigade under Colonel Hagai's command had crossed the Litani River on the Hardele Bridge on Monday. it was supposed to follow the column headed for the Beirut-Damascus Highway. After the Syrian force moving south was detected, it was ordered to change course and move east through Jezzine. At that point, Hagai was convinced that a fight with the Syrians was imminent. Shortly after 1:30 PM, Maj. Gen. Avigdor Ben-Gal, commander of the eastern sector, ordered Hagai to prepare for an attack on the town. Hagai had no artillery or infantry. He tried to get Einan's artillery officer to send him an artillery unit, but by 2:00 AM Ben-Gal ordered him to attack immediately.Schiff & Yaari (1985), p. 158]

One tank company waited on the outskirts of the town while another moved up the main street. When it reached the center of town, it was assaulted by RPG's and grenades from several buildings. The company made it across town and destroyed three T-62 tanks stationed to block the exit. The former company was attacked by Syrian commandos using Sagger missiles, who knocked out three tanks. The company retreated. The Israeli battalion was now split between the two sides of town while the Syrians were firmly positioned in it.

At this point, Hagai sent his second battalion. One of its companies entered the town, but then it took a wrong turn at a fork in the road and reached a dead end. It was now positioned in a high commanding area, but exposed to Syrian armor behind the opposite ridge, northeast of town. In a few minutes, five of its tanks were lost and the company was out of action. The other companies continued fighting the Syrians until the company that entered the town reached the nearby village of Huna. Jezzine had fallen by nightfall.Schiff & Yaari (1985), pp. 158-159]

Aftermath

Syrian President, Hafez al-Assad, was convinced that the Israelis were lying when they said they were only interested in striking at the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and were in fact interested in fighting Syria. He decided to speed up the deployment of the 3rd Armored Division in the Beqaa Valley and sent additional commando battalions to Lebanon.Pollack (2002), p. 531]

On Tuesday afternoon, Syria sent five additional Surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries into Lebanon, bringing the system to a total of nineteen. Israel saw the fact that those SAMs were brought to Lebanon from the Golan Heights as a sign that Syria was not interested in expanding the war. The Israeli Air Force considered this to be an encouraging sign, and decided to launch Operation Mole Cricket 19.Cite journal
volume = 85
issue = June 2002
last = Grant
first = Rebecca
title = The Bekaa Valley Ward
journal = Air Force Magazine Online
accessdate = 2008-09-10
url = http://www.afa.org/magazine/june2002/0602bekaa.asp]

References

Bibliography

*Cite book
publisher = Bison Books
isbn = 0803287836
pages = 717
last = Pollack
first = Kenneth M.
title = Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991
date = 2004-09-01
*Cite book
publisher = Touchstone
isbn = 0671602160
pages = 320
last = Schiff
first = Ze'ev
coauthors = Ehud Ya'ari
title = Israel's Lebanon War
date = 1985-06-03