Frustration of purpose

Contract law
Part of the common law series
Contract formation
Offer and acceptance · Mailbox rule Mirror image rule · Invitation to treat Firm offer · Consideration
Defenses against formation
Lack of capacity Duress · Undue influence Illusory promise · Statute of frauds Non est factum
Contract interpretation
Parol evidence rule Contract of adhesion Integration clause Contra proferentem
Excuses for non-performance
Mistake · Misrepresentation Frustration of purpose · Impossibility Impracticability · Illegality Unclean hands · Unconscionability Accord and satisfaction
Rights of third parties
Privity of contract Assignment · Delegation Novation · Third party beneficiary
Breach of contract
Anticipatory repudiation · Cover Exclusion clause · Efficient breach Deviation · Fundamental breach
Remedies
Specific performance Liquidated damages Penal damages · Rescission
Quasi-contractual obligations
Promissory estoppel Quantum meruit
Related areas of law
Conflict of laws · Commercial law
Other common law areas
Tort law · Property law Wills, trusts and estates Criminal law · Evidence
v · d · e

In the law of contracts, frustration of purpose is a defense to enforcement of the contract. Frustration of purpose occurs when an unforeseen event undermines a party's principal purpose for entering into a contract, and both parties knew of this principal purpose at the time the contract was made. Despite frequently arising as a result of government action, any third party (or even nature) can frustrate a contracting party's primary purpose for entering into the contract. This concept is also called commercial frustration.

For example, if Joe gets a mortgage for a new home, and, after three years, the house is destroyed, for whatever reason, at no fault of Joe's. Without a hell or high water clause, Joe might be exempt from the remainder of the mortgage, as the principal purpose of the contract (to have a house to live in) has been compromised. However, he might still have a foreclosure on his credit rating.

Frustration of purpose is often confused with the closely related doctrine of impossibility. The distinction between the two is that impossibility concerns the duties specified in the contract, whereas frustration of purpose concerns the reason a party entered into the contract. For example, suppose entrepreneur Emily leases space from landlord Larry so she can open a restaurant that only serves Tibetan Speckled Lizard meat. If the city rezones the property to forbid commercial uses, or if the property is destroyed by a tornado, then both Larry and Emily are excused from performing the contract by impossibility.

However, if the Tibetan Speckled Lizard suddenly goes extinct, then Emily may be excused from performing the contract because Larry knew her primary purpose for entering into the lease was to serve Tibetan Speckled Lizard, and that purpose has been frustrated. In the second scenario, the parties could still carry out their obligations under the lease, but one of them no longer has a reason to.

The Restatement of Contracts, Second § 265 defines frustration of purpose:

A circumstance is not deemed to be a "basic assumption on which the contract is made" unless the change in circumstances could not have been reasonably foreseen at the time the contract was made. As a result, it is rarely invoked successfully. Successful invocations usually come in waves during times of substantial tumult, such as after the passage of Prohibition, when bars and taverns no longer had a reason for their leases, or during major wars, when demand for many consumer goods and services drops far below normal.

If successfully invoked, the contract is terminated, and the parties are left as they are at the time of the litigation.

In English law

The leading case in English law on the subject is the famous 1903 case of Krell v. Henry, which concerned a party who had rented a room for the purpose of watching the coronation procession of Edward VII. When the king fell ill, the coronation was indefinitely postponed. The hirer refused to pay for the room; the owner sued for breach of contract and the hirer then counter-sued for the return of his £25 deposit. The court determined that the cancellation of the coronation was unforeseeable by the parties, and discharged the contract, leaving the parties as they were: the hirer lost his one third deposit and the owner lost the rest of the rent.

In addition, the Court also noted that the doctrine of 'impossibility' could not be applied in this manner, because it would not have technically been 'impossible' for the lessee (the 'renter') to take possession of the flat on that prescribed day and merely sit in front of the window and view the street where the coronation parade was to have occurred. The point the Court was making is this: The illness of the King did not make the execution of the contract 'impossible.' Rather, the cancellation of the parade merely frustrated the purpose for which both men originally contracted.