Second Battle of Sirte

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Second Battle of Sirte


caption=Italian battleship "Littorio", Admiral Iachino's flag ship
partof=the Mediterranean Theater of World War II
date=22 March 1942
place=Gulf of Sirte, Mediterranean Sea
result=British tactical victoryBelot:
*"one of their most brilliant naval actions" (159);Bradford:
*"a tactical and moral victory" (205); "brilliant naval action" (207)Llewellyn:
*"a heartening and thoroughly deserved victory" (54)Macintyre:
*"a tactical and moral triumph" (136)Playfair:
*"successful action" (172)Thomas:
*"successful defence" (152)Roskill:
*"defeated their purpose" (54)Shores, Cull, and Malizia:
*"a resounding triumph against odds" (140)Simpson:
*"a famous victory; one of the most brilliant retiring actions of the war, if not the most brilliant; Vian's triumph; a tactical victory" (119)Woodman (316):
*"a noteworthy tactical victory" (316)]
Axis strategic victory [Stephen, page 115:

*"In many ways the Battle of Sirte is like the Glorious First of June of 1794. Tactically it was a brilliant success for the British but operationally and strategically it was a failure. Iachino had succeeded in forcing the convoy to manoeuvre so far south that Axis air power was able to act in synergy to ensure its destruction".]
combatant1=flagicon|UK|naval United Kingdom
combatant2=
commander1=flagicon|UK|naval Philip Vian
commander2=
strength1=4 light cruisers
1 anti-aircraft cruiser
18 destroyers
1 submarine
strength2=1 battleship
2 heavy cruisers
1 light cruiser
8 destroyers
1 submarine
casualties1=3 light cruisers damaged
6 destroyers damaged
39 KIA
casualties2=None|

The Second Battle of Sirte was a naval battle between most of the escorting warships of a British convoy and the bulk of an Italian Navy ("Regia Marina") squadron. The British convoy was composed of four merchant ships escorted by four light cruisers, one anti-aircraft cruiser, and eighteen destroyers. The Italian force comprised a battleship, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers. The battle occurred on 22 March 1942, in the Mediterranean, north of the Gulf of Sirte and east of Malta, during the Second World War.

Background

Malta had long been a major factor in British successes against Italian convoys to North Africa, ["For most authors who have dealt with the Mediterranean theater, Malta was key to the war there. A constant thorn in the Axis side, the tiny island has been credited with miraculous achievements, from holding off the whole of the RAI with only three obsolete biplanes dubbed Faith, Hope and Charity, to playing a pivotal role in interdicting Italian convoys." Sadkovich, page 68] and in return became the target of an increasing number of heavy Axis air raids. By early 1942, however, the Allies lost the initiative in the central Mediterranean as Italian and German forces gained the upper hand in their attempts to isolate Malta and even made plans to remove it as a threat. ["In April and during the first half of May while Malta was writhing under the effects of the air offensive and the naval blockade, the Italian supply operations for Africa were characterized by an intensity of activity and an ease of operation such as was not experienced at any other time during the war. Malta, that painful thorn in the Italian's side, had been practically eliminated as a threat to the Italian supply routes, and it was possible to send out several convoys, escorted by only one or two destroyers, without meeting the least opposition. The convoys could now be safely routed scarcely 50 miles from Malta, thereby enjoying the advantage of a much shortened trip, without provoking the island to unleash even one of its terrible weapons." Bragadin, page 155] ["The dramatic experience of the last months of 1941 and the gravity of the situation which Malta had imposed on the Axis were such close and tangible matters to everyone that finally Italian and German leaders who were responsible for the conduct of the war, were convinced that the problem must be met with radical measures. It had now become evident that to win the Mediterranean war, it was necessary to take the Suez Canal. And it now appeared crystal clear that above all else it was necessary to "sink" the airbase that was Malta. Rome and Berlin, therefore, finally began to reconsider the possibilities of conquering Malta. This operation was to be carried out by landings of Italian and German troops both from the sea and the air." Bragadin, page 156] Indeed, after a series of Allied setbacks changed the overall scenario, the Italians achieved naval supremacy over their enemies by spring 1942."With Force K decimated and the battleships "Valiant" and "Queen Elizabeth" resting on the bottom of Alexandria harbor, the British navy could not contest the Italians in the central Mediterranean basin. An Axis air offensive against Malta and the loss of air bases in Cyrenaica further weakened the British, who were having problems reading the new GAF signals and lost the German army cipher in early 1942. Ultra continued to read C38m through the spring, but if this was unfortunate for Axis convoys, it was less so for the Italian fleet, which used the cipher only after putting to sea. As a result, Axis air and naval forces dominated the central and eastern basins, and Comando Supremo ran convoys to Africa with relative impunity through the early summer." Sadkovich, page 219] As Malta was running short of aircraft, antiaircraft guns, fuel, food and ammunition, convoy MW10 sailed from Alexandria on 21 March. [Woodman, page 293] [Thomas, page 143]

The British expected opposition from German and Italian aircraft as well as Italian surface units. In December 1941, they had suffered the loss of their two battleships (HMS "Queen Elizabeth" and HMS "Valiant") in the eastern Mediterranean, after an underwater attack from the Italian frogmen led by Luigi Durand De La Penne, and so their Alexandria squadron consisted only of cruisers and destroyers. Meanwhile a diversion was organized from Gibraltar: on the morning of March 20, the battleship HMS "Malaya" with the aircraft carriers HMS "Eagle" and HMS "Argus", supported by the cruiser HMS "Hermione" and eight destroyers set sail from the "Rock". The next day, the squadron aborted the operation and returned to port. The carriers were unable to fly off aircraft reinforcements to Malta due to defective long-range fuel tanks. [Woodman, page 295]

The escort of convoy MW10 relied heavily on destroyers, including lighter-built escort destroyers, to provide anti-submarine protection and included the anti-aircraft cruiser "Carlisle" to bolster the convoy's anti-aircraft capability. Additional destroyers and another light cruiser were also sent from Malta. ["With Vian's cruisers, Carlisle and the Hunts, the escort was well provided with anti-aircraft firepower as the entire force united on the morning of 21 March." Woodman, page 294]

In case of an Italian surface attack, the British planned to divide the convoy, with the light cruisers and half of the destroyers acting as a rearguard to lay smoke and delay the enemy while the "Carlisle" and the remaining destroyers proceeded with the cargo ships to Malta. [Woodman, page 298]

The battle

At 2:30pm next day, the British were faced by a pair of heavy cruisers and escorting destroyers. Admiral Vian immediately implemented his plan; the cargo ships and escorts turned away to the south while the light cruisers and remaining destroyers laid smoke and charged the Italians. After an exchange of fire, the two Italian heavy cruisers backed off to lure the British toward the incoming main Italian squadron, and at 4:37pm they returned to attack with the battleship "Littorio", a light cruiser and their screening destroyers. [Woodman, pp. 299-300] The battle [Bernotti, pag. 78/79:
* "An Italian submarine, Platino, pointed out, north of Cirenaica, a convoy of 4 steamships heading to Malta, under the escort of 5 cruisers and 11 destroyers of the Alexandria fleet, which was in that time without battleships. 3rd Cruiser Division (Bolzano, Trento and Bande Nere) from Messina, and Battleship Littorio from Taranto, followed by a total of 10 destroyers, left to intercept the convoy. In the afternoon of 22 March, at 14.26, Italian cruisers were in contact with British ones and retreated to lure them to the Littorio, which was arriving: meanwhile the convoy had moved south, covered behind smoke screens. The British formation followed the Italian one, but in the shooting no damage was done; at 15.20 British cruisers lost touch, convinced they had chased the Italians from the convoy (indeed, at 15.35, they signaled to their Alexandria Command: "enemy repelled"). In the meantime Italian forces met and the formation's commander, Admiral Iachino, decided to follow a southwesterly course that permitted him to "cut the T" to the enemy formation; this was a choice that was, later, criticized: indeed it was a faster route but risky, because at the contact Italian formation would be downwind of the British one and risked being blinded by smoke-screens from the enemy fleet. However, at 16.31, Italian fleet was in sight of the British one: the visibility was very bad, there was a stiff force 5 Scirocco wind and the sea was rough; at 16.43 the battle began between the two fleets: fire was opened from both sides at a range of 17,000 meters and the British emitted smoke-screens which reduced Italian visibility; a "152" shell from Bande Nere's struck home: cruiser Cleopatra, the British flagship, was hit. 15 sailors died and a targeting station was put out of use. The British formation hid itself behind smoke-screens and there was a pause in firing. When four British destroyers attacked in order to protect their cruisers, the Italian fleet opened fire, including the powerful "381" guns of the Littorio. Having discovered, and only at this point, that the Italian fleet included a battleship, the British destroyers began the tactic darting in and out of smoke-screens to deter the Italian fleet from coming closer because of the threat to the Italian fleet of a torpedo attack if they had gone too near to the smoke-screens. Meanwhile Italian destroyer Grecale had to return to base for a rudder breakdown caused by the rough sea. At 17.40 Italian units, nevertheless, approached closer and opened fire again: CA Trento hit the British destroyer Sikh but without causing heavy damage. The sea by that time was stormy, Italian cruisers were rolling between 10 and 27 degrees and destroyers hardly held the sea. By 17.52 fire had again ceased. At 17.59 the British attacked, emerging from the smoke-screens, Cleopatra ahead, opening fire at a range of 12,000 meters on Littorio and launching 3 torpedoes that missed. At 18.31 the Italians formed a line and charged into English formation, Littorio leading. English destroyers launched themselves into the very middle of the Italian ships, drawing the "381" volleys to save their cruisers. It seemed a suicide charge, and Italian officers who, from their bridges, observed them arriving in the stormy sea later were said to have expressed admiration for them. DD Kingston took a shell by CA Trento that ignited a fire on board but it succeeded in disengaging itself. DD Lively was hit by a salvo from the Littorio aft turret and had to retreat. However, at a range of only 5,000 meters British destroyers succeeded in launching their torpedoes, forcing the Italian formation to make evasive maneuvers. No torpedo hit its target (an aircraft aboard Littorio caught fire from the flash of the ship's own guns, causing the British to think they had hit the battleship), but the attack had given the British time to put greater distance between the fleets. Admiral Iachino, at 18.51, seeing the coming of nightfall, ordered his ships to cease fire and 18.58 saw the last salvo. The second battle of Sirte had ended. In Alexandria the British celebrated victory: although they had inflicted no losses, considering the enormous difference in the force ratio, a cruiser division had succeeded in blocking a much stronger formation without suffering losses. However, the Italian main objective had been the destruction of the convoy by any means, and here they had been totally successful: battle maneuvers had forced the British convoy to detour far south and it was delayed, so that the next morning, at dawn, German and Italian aircraft were able to attack it. At 10.30 on 23 March the first cargo ship was sunk, then, 8 miles from Malta, the tanker Breconshire was hit, forced to ran aground and was then destroyed. The last two cargo ships entered Malta and docked but were attacked in port by aircraft and destroyed: of the 26,000 tons of supplies which had left for Malta from Egypt, less than 5000 were unloaded.] raged for two and a half hours, with the British ships leaving the safety of their huge smoke screen to fire a few volleys and then returning to it when the Italian salvoes got too close. During one of these exchanges, ""Havock"" suffered heavy damage when fired at by the Italian battleship. At 6:34pm Vian decided to send his destroyers in to launch torpedo attacks from about 5,000 yards, the closest the Italians would allow the British to approach. None of the torpedoes found their target, but ""Kingston"" was hit by a 15" round from the "Littorio". ""Lively"" was also struck by shrapnel from the battleship's main guns that pierced a bulkhead, causing some flooding but no casualties. [Greene & Massignani, page 220]

Meanwhile "Littorio" had been hit by a 4.7" round, with negligible damage. Her floatplane caught fire from a burst of her main guns at the same time. This led to the claim by the British that one of the torpedoes struck home. [Bragadin, page 162]

At dusk, about 7pm, the Italians gave up and turned for home. Without radar, they would have been at a significant disadvantage in a night action (as in the Battle of Cape Matapan). ["However, without radar, Iachino could not exploit his success after the sun had set, and so at 18:41, well before the hit on the Littorio and a half-hour after Rome had ordered him to return if he could not close to Vian, he decided to turn for home." Sadkovich, page 245] The Italians outgunned their British counterparts and might have easily attacked the convoy with either battle group, but they appeared unwilling to close for a decisive blow, perhaps wary of the torpedo threat from the numerically superior British destroyer force. ["Despite the difficult weather conditions, the Italian ships had maneuvered perfectly correctly along the lines laid down by their commander, and they fought the long battle with decision and tenacity. The British, however, maneuvered in a disorganized fashion and with unusual timidity-except for the last courageous attack carried out by their destroyers. It should not be forgotten either, that while the Italians had greater fire power on three of their ships, the British had the advantage in number of units engaged, and this factor was unquestionably important given the particular conditions of the battle." Bragadin, pp. 165-166] According to British reports, ""Cleopatra"" had one of her turrets destroyed by 6" fire from the ""Giovanni dalle Bande Nere""; 16 seamen were killed. [Greene & Massignani, page 219] Cruisers ""Euryalus"" [Woodman, page 301] and ""Penelope"" were also damaged. "Kingston" was hit amidships by a shell that killed 15 men of her crew [http://www.naval-history.net/xDKCas1942-03MAR2.htm#prof Naval-History.net] ] and left the ship dead in the water for a time, although she was able to get underway later. [Thomas, page 152] "Havock" was also badly damaged in a boiler by a near miss, suffering 8 deaths. "Lively" was forced to retreat to Tobruk for repairs. [Sierra, p. 364 (probably from Vian, Adm. Philip: "Action this day", London, Frederick Mueller Ltd., 1960). Also "London Gazette", Supplement of 16th of September, 1947:
* "At 2248 LIVELY reported that she was unable to maintain more than 17 knots and she was detached to Tobruk where it was considered she could repair damage before proceeding to Alexandria."] Three more destroyers, ""Sikh"", ""Legion"" and ""Lance"", suffered lesser damage from 8" cruiser fire. [Woodman, pp. 301-305]

Follow-up actions

Most of the escort force, now short of fuel and ammunition due to the protracted engagement and unable to find the convoy, turned back for Alexandria. [Woodman, pp. 307-308; Llewellyn, pp. 51-52: "As soon as the Italian ships had disappeared, Rear-Admiral Vian collected his force and steered to close the convoy, 10 miles or so southward. At 19:40, in the growing darkness with the convoy not yet in sight, the Rear-Admiral decided to shape course for Alexandria with force “B” and to send the convoy to Malta under the arrangements laid down in the operations orders."] The damaged destroyers and the cargo ships were sent on to Malta, with "Carlisle", "Penelope" and "Legion". The next day they were subjected to continuous air attacks. The cargo ship "Clan Campbell" was sunk twenty miles from harbour, and the oil tanker "Breconshire" was heavily damaged. Nonetheless, the other two merchantmen, "Talabot" and steamer "Pampas", reached Malta's Grand Harbour virtually unharmed, save for two bombs that hit "Pampas" but failed to explode. [Llewellyn (52), Thomas (150), Roskill (55), Playfair (170-171), Macintyre (136), Holland (246), Bradford (206), and Greene & Massignani (220-221). By contrast, Woodman (309) claims a near-miss from a Ju-88 on "Pampas" that shook the ship and caused the taking of water aft. On the other hand, Belot (162-163) maintains that "Clan Campbell" and "Beconshire" were sunk on March 23, while Sadkovich (245) has all four convoy ships sunk on March 23.] "Breconshire" was later towed to a protected bay. [Green & Massignani, pp. 220-221.]

Intense Axis air raids against Malta on March 24 and March 25 failed to damage the three surviving convoy ships. [Bragadin strongly implies that "Breconshire", "Talabot", and "Pampas" were all sunk sometime between March 24 and March 25. Shores, Cull, and Malizia (145, 148), however, state that Axis aircraft failed to hit the ships on those days.] However, on March 26, German dive bombers scored bomb hits on all three ships, sinking "Talabot" and "Pampas" that day with "Breconshire" capsizing on March 27. [For "Talabot" and "Pampas": Playfair (172), Macintyre (139), Shores, Cull, and Malizia (150), Bradford (207), Woodman (313-314), Greene and Massignani (221), Llewellyn (52), Thomas (151), and Holland (245-246). For Breconshire: Roskill (55), Playfair (171-172), Macintyre (221), Shores, Cull, and Malizia (151), Bradford (206), Greene and Massignani (221), and Llewellyn (52). However, Holland (248) avers that "Breconshire" sank on March 26.] Much of "Breconshire"'s oil was salvaged through the hole in her hull. Only about 5,000 tons of cargo had been unloaded, of the 26,000 tons that had been loaded in Alexandria.

The Italian fleet units were no more lucky after the battle. After failing to destroy the convoy by themselves, they were caught en-route to their bases by a severe storm that sank destroyers "Scirocco" and "Lanciere". [Thomas, page 150]

Destroyer HMS "Kingston" had been hit in the battle by a 15" shell fired by the Italian battleship Littorio. [ Some Italian authors -Massignani and Bragadin- maintain that the round was an 8" shell either from heavy cruisers "Trento" or "Gorizia".] Fifteen men of her crew were killed in this incident, which left the destroyer dead in the water, almost broken in two, her whaler torn apart, her anti-aircraft guns, searchlight tower and torpedo launchers shattered by the explosion. Although she had an engine in flames and a flooded boiler, she managed however to recover speed, reaching Malta the next day.

Whilst under repair in dry dock at Malta, "Kingston" was attacked a few days later by German aircraft and suffered further damage, this time beyond repair. HMS "Kingston" was scrapped at Malta in the following months. [ [http://www.warlinks.com/memories/davidson.html#prof Memories of Leading Seaman William Davinson] ]

Assessments

Almost all authors have assessed the battle as a British victory. On the other side, the fascist propaganda, through some prominent members of the Party (Starace, Grandi, Ciano) called the battle an "Italian victory" and some authors, most of them Italians [Trizzino, Giorgerini, Bernotti, Gigli, Sadkovich, Llewellyn and even Macintyre.] write of the battle as a partial achievement "not well exploited" by Admiral Iachino because of bad weather and lack of radar, which prevented him from continuing the pursuit of the convoy at night.

Nevertheless, nearly all sources also acknowledge the fact that the Italian fleet inflicted significant damage to the British warships which degraded their combat readiness, without any casualties of their own. [Cunningham, page 454:
* "Nor must the mistake be made of thinking the Italians were inefficient in this action. Our destroyers...were received by heavy and accurate fire, and was only by the mercy of Providence that many were not sunk and still more severely damage." Nearly all sources mention that two British cruisers and several destroyers were hit, for no damage to the Italian side.] Consequently, these references suggest that the Italian fleet prevailed in the gunnery engagement, [Bragadin, page 164:
* "As far as the balance sheet of the shooting is concerned, no Italian ship was damaged in the least, disregarding some scratches on the Littorio's deck caused by shell fragments. On the other hand, the Italian gunfire, in spite of its handicaps, caused considerably more damage to the enemy.""Ibidem", page 166:
* "The superiority of the Italian markmanship in comparison with that of the enemy can be judge from the known results of the engagement."Woodman, page 305:
* "The Italians were virtually untouched, whereas the British had had two destroyers badly damaged and had expended 36 torpedoes."Simpson, page 119:
* "Vian had won a famous victory -even though his ships had suffered more damage than the Italians- a single hit on the Littorio."And Sadkovich, page 245:
* "Italian gunners had fired 1,490 rounds without sinking any of Vian's ships, but they had damaged five, while British gunners fired over 1,000 rounds at close range, yet scored only one hit with a 120 mm round."] but also that the action represented a failure on the Italians' part to exploit their advantage. Indeed, they were unable to sink or cripple a single cargo ship. This was due to Admiral Vian's vigorous and skillful defense in the face of a superior adversary.

When the main objective, to re-supply Malta, is included in the assessment, however, the outcome is clearer. The British intention to reach Malta before dawn with a substantial escort was disrupted by the "Regia Marina"´s intervention. This left the cargo ships exposed to axis air supremacy. [Bragadin, page 166:
* "The four British supply ships with their precious cargo for Malta did not suffer any direct damage from the Italians in the battle itself, but the fight indirectly brought important results. The convoy was scheduled to arrive at Malta during the night, and was to begin unloading before the (expected) air raids began, but the naval battle made it at least four hours late in arriving, and this delay proved fatal. When the axis aircraft began its air raids next morning, the convoy was still considerably south of Malta."

:Llewellyn adds, page 52:
* "Captain Hutchison, of the "Breconshire", the convoy commodore, had in fact complied with the operation orders on his own initiative at 19:00, dispersing the ships on diverging courses with a destroyer or two apiece for escort, each ship to make her best speed so as to reach Malta as early as possible next morning; they had been intended to arrive at dawn, but the Italian fleet, by forcing the convoy south of its route, had given the German bombers a second chance, as Admiral Iachino had foreseen."

:Bauer, Young & others, page 763:
*"The result of this second battle of Sirte was not as disappointing for the Italians as it might at first have seemed. Admiral Cunningham had lost the destroyers Havock and Kingston, which had been heavily damaged and had had to make for Malta. The convoy, having had to sail south-west for hours, could not now reach Valletta before dawn on the 23rd. "

:Macintyre, page 136:
* Even if this author concludes that Vian had gained "a tactical and moral triumph", he adds that Iachino "had partially achieved his aim. The diversion of the convoy to the southward, under the threat posed by his approach, had caused just enough delay to prevent the ships from reaching Malta at first light on 23rd."

:and finally, Simpson, pp. 119-120:
*"However, Vian's triumph was only a tactical victory (even that is disputed by Italian apologists). The action had delayed the convoy and pushed it far to the south, thus bringing it well within the range of enemy bombers on the following day.(...) The March convoy represented, therefore, a strategic defeat; though the Italian fleet had failed to locate it, its pressure had placed the ships in the palms of Axis airmen. The collective gunfire of the warships might have saved ships which, supported by a single warship, became easy targets."

:These conclusions are also corroborated by Woodman (page 307), Thomas (150), Weichold (cited by Sadkovich, page 246), Sadkovich, page 245, Shore & Malizia, page 140, Sierra, page 365, and Bernotti (page 79).]

Thereafter, Italian and German aircraft caught the British convoy at sea and chased the surviving steamers to the harbour; more than 80% of the supplies were lost. The British convoy operation was, therefore, a clear failure. [Woodman, page 316:
*"Althought the squadron had achieved a notheworthy tactical victory against considerable odds, as Vian's immediate knighthood attested, Operation MG1 as a whole had been a strategic failure".

:Thomas, page 154:
*"From the British point of view the convoy battle was a failure: of the 25,900 tons of stores fought through to Malta only about 5,000 tons finally came ashore."]

Order of battle

Italy

*Admiral Angelo Iachino
** 1 battleship: "Littorio"
** 6 destroyers: "Alfredo Oriani", "Ascari", "Aviere", "Geniere", "Grecale", "Scirocco" (sunk by a storm after the action)
*2nd division, Admiral Parona
** 2 heavy cruisers: "Gorizia", "Trento"
** 1 light cruiser: "Giovanni dalle Bande Nere" (damaged)
** 4 destroyers: "Alpino", "Bersagliere", "Fuciliere", "Lanciere" (sunk by a storm after the action)
* Submarine: "Platino". [Greene & Massignani, page 217]

United Kingdom

*"Carlisle" squadron::: 1 cruiser: "Carlisle";:: 5th Destroyer Flotilla (Hunt class): "Southwold" (sunk by a mine on March 23); "Beaufort"; "Dulverton"; "Hurworth"; "Avon Vale"; "Eridge".:: 4 cargo ships: "Clan Campbell", "Breconshire", "Pampas" and "Talabot".

*15th Cruiser Squadron (Admiral Vian)::: 3 cruisers: "Dido"; "Euryalus" (slightly damaged); "Cleopatra" ("seriously damaged").:: 14th Destroyer Flotilla: "Jervis"; "Kipling"; "Kelvin"; "Kingston" (heavily damaged).::22nd Destroyer Flotilla: "Hasty"; "Havock" ("heavily damaged"); "Hero"; "Lance" ("damaged"); "Lively" ("seriously damaged"); "Sikh" (slightly damaged); "Zulu" ("damaged").

*Support squadron from Malta::: 1 cruiser: "Penelope";:: 1 destroyer: "Legion" ("damaged");:: 4 submarines: "Unbeaten", "Upholder" and "P-34".

*Submarine based in Alexandria:::"Proteus". [Thomas, pp. 144-145]

Footnotes

ources

* Bauer, Eddy, Young, Peter & others: "The Marshall Cavendish Encyclopedia of World War Two". Marshall Cavendish, 1985. ISBN 0856859540.

* Belot, Raymond de: "The Struggle for the Mediterranean 1939-1945", Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1951.

* Bernotti, Romeo: "La guerra sui mari nel conflitto mondiale:1940-1945" Tirrena Editoriale. Livorno, 1954. it

* Bradford, Ernle: "Siege: Malta 1940-1943", William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1986.

* Bragadin, Marc'Antonio: "The Italian Navy in World War II", United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1957. ISBN 0405130317.

* Cunningham, Andrew: "A Sailor's Life", New York, 1955.

* Giorgerini, Giorgio: "Le navi da battaglia della seconda guerra mondiale". Albertelli editore. Parma, 1972. it

* Greene, Jack & Massignani, Alessandro: "The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940-1943", Chatam Publishing, London, 1998. ISBN 1861760574.

* Gigli, Guido: "La Seconda Guerra Mondiale". Laterza, 1964. it

* Holland, James: "Fortress Malta: An Island Under Siege, 1940-1943", Miramax Books, New York, 2003.

* Jellison, Charles A.: "Besieged: The World War II Ordeal of Malta, 1940-1942", University Press of New England, 1984.

* Llewellyn, M. L.: "The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean convoys", Naval Staff series, London, 2006.

* Macintyre, Donald: "The Battle for the Mediterranean". Norton ed., New York, 1965.

* Playfair, I.S.O., et.al.: "British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb", "History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, The Mediterranean and Middle East", Volume III (September 1941 to September 1942), Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1960.

* Roskill, S.W.: "The Period of Balance", "History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, The War at Sea 1939-1945", Volume III, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1956.

* Sadkovich, James: "The Italian Navy in World War II", Greenwood Press, Westport, 1994. ISBN 031328797X.

* Shores, Christopher and Brian Cull with Nicola Malizia: "Malta: The Spitfire Year, 1942". Grub Street, London, 1991. ISBN 094881716X.

* Sierra, Luis de la: "La guerra naval en el Mediterráneo, 1940-1943", Ed. Juventud, Barcelona, 1976. ISBN 8426102646. es

* Simpson, Michael: "A life of Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham. A Twentieth-century Naval Leader". Rutledge Ed., 2004. ISBN 0714651974.

* Stephen, Martin; Grove, Erik: "Sea Battles in Close-up: World War Two". Naval Institute press, 1988. ISBN 07110 2118 X.

* Thomas, David A.: "Malta Convoys", Leo Cooper Ed., South Yorkshire, 1999. ISBN 0850526639.

* Trizzino, Antonino: "Navi e poltrone". Longanesi Editore. Milano, 1952. it

* Weichold, Eberhard: "Die deutsche Führung und das Mittelmeer unter Blickwinkel der Seestrategie". Wehrwissenschaftlichen Rundschau, 1959. ger

* Woodman, Richard: "Malta Convoys, 1940-1943", Jack Murray Ltd., London, 2000. ISBN 0719557534.

References and external links

* [http://users.swing.be/baten/bat/931.html#62351 Second battle of the Gulf of Syrte]
* [http://www.regiamarina.net/battles/sirte2/sirte2_us.htm The 2nd Battle of the Sirte]
* [http://digilander.libero.it/planciacomando/WW2/secondasirte1.htm Seconda Battaglia della Sirte] - _it. Plancia di Comando