EC-121 shootdown incident

The EC-121 shoot down incident occurred on April 15, 1969 when an American EC-121 Warning Star on a reconnaissance mission was shot down by North Korean MiG aircraft over the Sea of Japan. The plane crashed convert|90|nmi|km|0 away from the North Korean coast and all 31 Americans on board were killed.

The Nixon administration chose not to retaliate against North Korea apart from staging a naval demonstration in the Sea of Japan a few days later. Instead it resumed the reconnaissance flights within a week to demonstrate that it would not be intimidated by the action while at the same time avoiding a confrontation. cite web | last =Pearson | first =David E. | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Books/Pearson/Pearson.pdf| title = Chapter 5 Three WWMCCS Failures| format = | work =The World Wide Military Command and Control System | publisher = AU Press| accessdate = 23 May| accessyear = 2007]

Flight of Deep Sea 129

Beggar Shadow mission

At 07:00 local time of Tuesday, April 15, 1969, an EC-121M of the U.S. Navy's Fleet Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1) took off from NAS Atsugi, Japan, on an intelligence-gathering reconnaissance mission. cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://www.willyvictor.com/History/Korean_Shootdown/Korea.html| title = Korea shootdown of Navy EC-121 in 1969| format = | work = | publisher = Willy Victor| accessdate = 21 May| accessyear = 2007 This site compiles information from "Pacific Stars and Stripes", "Washington Post" articles, and "Cryptolog", a veteran's association newsletter.] The aircraft, Bureau number 135749, bore the nose (PR) number 21 and used the radio call sign "Deep Sea 129". Aboard were 8 officers and 23 enlisted men under the command of LCDR James Overstreet. Nine of the crew, including one Marine NCO, were Naval Security Group cryptologic technicians (CTs) and linguists in Russian and Korean.

Deep Sea 129's assigned task was a routine "Beggar Shadow" signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection mission. cite web | last =Bermudez | first =Joseph S., Jr. | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH13.pdf| title = Chapter 13| format = | work =Bytes and Bullets | publisher = APCSS| accessdate = 23 May| accessyear = 2007] Its flight profile northwest over the Sea of Japan took it to an area offshore of Musu Point, where the EC-121M would turn northeast toward the Soviet Union and orbit along a convert|120|nmi|km|0|sing=on long elliptical track. These missions, while nominally under the command of Seventh Fleet and CINCPAC, were actually controlled operationally by the Naval Security Group detachment at NSF Kamiseya, Japan, under the direction of the National Security Agency.

LCDR Overstreet's orders included a prohibition from approaching closer than convert|50|nmi|km|-1 to the North Korean coast. VQ-1 had flown the route and orbit for two years, and the mission had been graded as being of "minimal risk." During the first three months of 1969 nearly 200 similar missions had been flown by both Navy and U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft off North Korea's east coast without incident.

The mission was tracked by a series of security agencies within the Department of Defense that were pre-briefed on the mission, including land-based Air Force radars in Japan and South Korea. The USAF 6918th Security Squadron at Hakata Air Station, Japan, and Detachment 1, 6922nd Security Wing at Osan Air Base monitored the North Korean reaction by intercepting its air defense search radar transmissions. The Army Security Agency communications interception station at Osan listened to North Korean air defense radio traffic, and the Naval Security Group at Kamiseya, which provided the seven of the nine CTs aboard "Deep Sea 129", also intercepted Soviet Air Force search radars.

Interception and shootdown

At 12:34 local time, roughly six hours into the mission, the Army Security Agency and radars in Korea detected the takeoff of two North Korean Air Force MiG-21s and tracked them, assuming that they were responding in some fashion to the mission of "Deep Sea 129". In the meantime the EC-121 filed a scheduled activity report by radio on time at 13:00 and did not indicate anything out of the ordinary. 22 minutes later the radars lost the picture of the MiGs and did not reacquire it until 14:37, closing with "Deep Sea 129" for a probable intercept. The communications that this activity generated within the National Security network was monitored by the EC-121's parent unit, VQ-1, which at 13:44 sent "Deep Sea 129" a "Condition 3" alert by radio, indicating it might be under attack. LCDR Overstreet acknowledged the warning and complied with procedures to abort the mission and return to base. At 13:47 the radar tracks of the MiGs merged with that of "Deep Sea 129", which disappeared from the radar picture two minutes later.

Initial reaction

At first none of the agencies was alarmed, since procedures also dictated that the EC-121 rapidly descend below radar coverage, and Overstreet had not transmitted that he was under attack. However when it did not reappear within ten minutes, VQ-1 requested a scramble of two Air Force F-102 interceptors to provide combat air patrol for the EC-121.

By 14:20 the Army Security Agency post had become increasingly concerned. It first sent a FLASH message (a high priority intelligence message to be sent within six minutes) indicating that "Deep Sea 129" had disappeared, and then at 14:44, an hour after the shoot-down, sent a CRITIC ("critical intelligence") message (the highest message priority, to be processed and sent within two minutes) to six addressees within the National Command Authority, including President Richard M. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.

earch efforts

A search and rescue effort was immediately launched by VQ-1 using aircraft of both the U.S. Air Force and Navy. The first response was by an Air Force HC-130, with a KC-135 tanker in support and an escort of fighters, but the search effort rapidly expanded to a total of 26 aircraft. At short notice, two U.S. Navy destroyers, USS "Henry W. Tucker" and USS "Dale", sailed from Sasebo, Japan, on the afternoon of April 15 toward the area of last contact (coord|41|28|00|N|131|35|00|E|), a position approximately convert|90|nmi|km|0 off the North Korean port of Ch'ŏngjin.

The first debris sighting occurred at 09:30 the next morning, April 16, with two destroyers of the Soviet Navy already on scene. [ The reported side numbers of the destroyers were D-429 and D-580.] The Air Force SAR aircraft dropped the Soviet ships URC-10 survival radios and eventually made voice contact in the afternoon as the Soviet craft were departing. Both Soviet ships indicated they had recovered debris from the aircraft but had not found any indication of survivors. That evening "Tucker" arrived in the area and after midnight recovered part of the aircraft perforated with shrapnel damage.

At approximately noon of April 17 "Tucker" recovered the first of two crewmen's bodies, then rendezvoused with the Soviet destroyer "Vodokhnovenny" (D-429) and sent over her whaleboat. The Soviets turned over all of the debris they had collected. The bodies of Lt.j.g. Joseph R. Ribar and AT1 Richard E. Sweeney were taken to Japan but those of the other 29 crewmen were not recovered.

North Korea publicly announced that it had shot down the plane, claiming it had violated its territorial airspace. The U.S. government acknowledged that it was conducting a search for a missing aircraft but stated that it had explicit orders to remain at least convert|50|nmi|km|0 offshore.

Reference notes

* David E. Pearson (2000). "The World Wide Military Command and Control System: Eveloution and Effectiveness", Air University Press, ISBN 1585660787

* Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. (2005). "Chapter 13 SIGINT, EW and EIW in the Korean People's Army, an Overview", "Bytes and Bullets: The Information Technology Revolution and National Security on the Korean peninsula" (ed. Alexandre Y. Mansourov), APCSS, ISBN 0971941696

* [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=230972&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc_id=474527&group_id=474507 NKIDP: Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: 1968-1969, A Critical Oral History]

External links

* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5068662.stm BBC News "N Korea in 'US spy plane' warning"] 11 June 2006
* [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=230972 North Korean International Documentation Project (NKIDP)]