- Battle of Adwa
Infobox Military Conflict
caption=Tapestry of the Battlescene
conflict=Battle of Adwa
First Italo–Ethiopian War
1 March, 1896
place=coord|14|1|8|N|38|58|24|E|name=Adwa|display=inline,title|name=Battle of Adwa
result=Decisive Ethiopian victory
strength1=~100,000 (80,000 with firearms), Unknown number of artillery and machine guns
strength2=17,700 (all with firearms),
56 artillery guns
8,000 woundedvon Uhlig, Siegbert, "
Encyclopaedia Aethiopica: A-C" (Wiesbaden:Harrassowitz Verlag, 2003), pp. 108.]
The Battle of Adwa (also known as Adowa or sometimes by the Italian name "Adua") was fought on
1 March, 1896between Ethiopiaand Italynear the town of Adwa, Ethiopia, in Tigray. It was the climactic battle of the First Italo–Ethiopian War.
As the twentieth century approached,
Africahad been carved up between the various European powers, with the exception of the tiny republic of Liberiaon the west coast of the continent and the ancient kingdom of Ethiopia in the strategic Horn of Africa. A relative newcomer to the colonial scramble for Africaand having been left with only two impoverished territories on the Horn ( Eritreaand Somalia), Italy sought to improve its position in Africa by conquering Ethiopia, which would join its two territories. Italy and Ethiopia faced off in the First Italo-Ethiopian War. After advancing deep into Ethiopian territory, the Italians were forced to withdraw to defensible positions in Tigray, where the two armies faced each other.
By late February 1896, supplies on both sides were running low. General
Oreste Baratieri, commander of the Italian forces, knew the Ethiopian forces had been living off the land, and once the supplies of the local peasants were exhausted, Emperor Menelik's army would begin to melt away. However, the Italian government insisted that General Baratieri act. On the evening of 29 February, Baratieri met with his brigadiers Matteo Albertone, Giuseppe Arimondi, Vittorio Dabormida, and Giuseppe Ellena, concerning their next steps. He opened the meeting on a negative note, revealing to his brigadiers that provisions would be exhausted in less than five days, and suggested retreating, perhaps as far back as Asmara. His subordinates argued forcefully for an attack, insisting that to retreat at this point would only worsen the poor morale. [Harold G. Marcus, "The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844-1913", 1975 (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1995), p. 170] Dabormida exclaiming, "Italy would prefer the loss of two or three thousand men to a dishonorable retreat." Baratieri delayed making a decision for a few more hours, claiming that he needed to wait for some last-minute intelligence, but in the end announced that the attack would start the next morning at 9:00. [David Levering Lewis, "The Race for Fashoda" (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), p. 116. ISBN 1-55584-058-2] His troops began their march to their starting positions shortly after midnight.
The Italian army comprised four brigades totalling 17,700 troops, with fifty-six artillery pieces. [Lewis, "Fashoda", pp. 116f. He breaks down their numbers into 10,596 Italian and 7,104 Eritrean officers and soldiers.] However, it is likely that even fewer men were on the Italian side: Harold Marcus notes that "several thousand" soldiers were needed for support and to guard the lines of communication to the rear, so he estimates the Italian army to have consisted of 14,500 effectives. [Marcus, "Menelik II", p. 173] One brigade under General Albertone was made up of
Eritrean askariled by Italian officers. The remaining three brigades were Italian units under Brigadiers Dabormida, Ellena and Arimondi. While these included elite Bersaglieri, Alpiniand Cacciatoriunits, a large proportion of the troops were inexperienced conscripts recently drafted from metropolitan regiments in Italy into newly formed battalions for service in AfricaGeorge Fitz-Hardinge Berkley "The Campaign of Adowa and the rise of Menelik", London: Constable 1901.] .
As Chris Prouty describes:
They [the Italians] had inadequate maps, old model guns, poor communication equipment and inferior footgear for the rocky ground. (The newer Remingtons were not issued because Baratieri, under constraints to be economical, wanted to use up the old cartridges.) Morale was low as the veterans were homesick and the newcomers, too inexperienced to have any "esprit de corps". There was a shortage of mules and saddles. [Prouty, "Empress Taytu and Menilek II" (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1986), p. 155. ISBN 0-932415-11-3.]
Estimates for the Ethiopian forces under Menelik range from a low of 80,000 to a high of 150,000, outnumbering the Italians by an estimated five or six times. [Richard K.P. Pankhurst has published one collection of these estimates, "Economic History of Ethiopia" (Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie University, 1968), pp. 555-557. See also Herausgegeben von Uhlig, Siegbert, "
Encyclopaedia Aethiopica: A-C". Wiesbaden:Harrassowitz Verlag, 2003, p. 108.] The forces were divided among Emperor Menelik, Empress Taytu, "Ras" Welle, Ras Mengesha Atikem, Ras Mengesha Yohannesand Ras Alula Engida, Ras Mikael of Wollo, Ras Makonnen, " Fitawrari" Gebeyyehu, and "Negus" Tekle Haymanot of Gojjam. [Pétridès (as well as Pankhurst, with slight variations) break the troop numbers down (over 100,000 by their estimates) as follows: 35,000 infantry (25,000 riflemen and 10,000 spearmen) and 8,000 cavalry under Emperor Menelik; 5,000 infantry under Empress Taytu; 8,000 infantry (6,000 riflemen and 2,000 spearmen) under Ras Wale; 8,000 infantry (5,000 riflemen and 3,000 spearmen) under Ras Mengesha Atikem, 5,000 riflemen, 5,000 spearmen, and 3,000 cavalry under Ras Mengesha Yohannes and Ras Alula Engida; 6,000 riflemen, 5,000 spearmen, and 5,000 Oromocavalry under Ras Mikael of Wollo; 25,000 riflemen under Ras Makonnen; 8,000 infantry under "Fitawrari" Gebeyyehu; 5,000 riflemen, 5,000 spearmen, and 3,000 cavalry under "Negus" Tekle Haymanot of Gojjam, von Uhlig, "Encyclopaedia", pp. 109.] In addition, the armies were followed by a similar number of traditional peasant followers who supplied the army, as had been done for centuries. Most of the army was composed of riflemen, a significant percentage of which were in Menelik's reserve; however, the army was also composed of a significant number of cavalry and infantry only armed with lances. On the night of Feb 29and the early morning of March 1, three Italian brigades advanced separately towards Adwa over narrow mountain tracks, while a fourth remained camped.von Uhlig, "Encyclopaedia", p. 109.] David Levering Lewis states that the Italian battle plan
called for three columns to march in parallel formation to the crests of three mountains — Dabormida commanding on the right, Albertone on the left, and Arimondi in the center – with a reserve under Ellena following behind Arimondi. The supporting crossfire each column could give the others made the… soldiers as deadly as razored shears. Albertone's brigade was to set the pace for the others. He was to position himself on the summit known as
Kidane Meret, which would give the Italians the high ground from which to meet the Ethiopians.Lewis, "Fashoda", p. 117.]
However, the three leading Italian brigades had become separated during their overnight march and at dawn were spread across several miles of very difficult terrain. Their sketchy maps caused Albertone to mistake one mountain for Kidane Meret, and when a scout pointed out his mistake, Albertone advanced directly into Ras Alula's position.
Unbeknownst to General Baratieri, Emperor Menelik knew his troops had exhausted the ability of the local peasants to support them and had planned to break camp the next day (2 March). The Emperor had risen early to begin prayers for divine guidance when spies from Ras Alula, his chief military advisor, brought him news that the Italians were advancing. The Emperor summoned the separate armies of his nobles and with the Empress Taytu beside him, ordered his forces forward. Negus Tekle Haymanot commanded the right wing, Ras Alula the left, and Rasses Makonnen and Mengesha the center, with Ras Mikael at the head of the
Oromocavalry; the Emperor and his consort remained with the reserve. The Ethiopian forces positioned themselves on the hills overlooking the Adwa valley, in perfect position to receive the Italians, who were exposed and vulnerable to crossfire.
Albertone's askari brigade was the first to encounter the onrush of Ethiopians at 6:00, near Kidane Meret, where the Ethiopians had managed to set up their mountain artillery. His heavily outnumbered askaris held their position for two hours until Albertone's capture, and under Ethiopian pressure the survivors sought refuge with Arimondi's brigade. Arimondi's brigade beat back the Ethiopians who repeatedly charged the Italian position for three hours with gradually fading strength until Menelik released his reserve of 25,000
Shewans and swamped the Italian defenders. Two companies of Bersaglieri who arrived at the same moment could not help and were annihilated.
Dabormida's Italian brigade had moved to support Albertone but was unable to reach him in time. Cut off from the remainder of the Italian army, Dabormida began a fighting retreat towards friendly positions. However, he inadvertently marched his command into a narrow valley where the Oromo cavalry slaughtered his brigade, while shouting "Ebalgume! Ebalgume!" ("Reap! Reap!"). Dabormida's remains were never found, although his brother learned from an old woman living in the area that she had given water to a mortally wounded Italian officer, "a chief, a great man with spectacles and a watch, and golden stars". [George Fitz-Hardinge Berkeley, "Campaign of Adowa" (1902), quoted in Lewis, "Fashoda", p. 118.]
The remaining two brigades under Baratieri himself were outflanked and destroyed piecemeal on the slopes of
Mount Belah. By noon, the survivors of the Italian army were in full retreat and the battle was over.
The Italians suffered about 7,000 killed and 1,500 wounded in the battle and subsequent retreat back into Eritrea, with 3,000 taken prisoner; Ethiopian losses have been estimated around 4,000-5,000, but with 8,000 wounded.Pankhurst, Richard. "The Ethiopians: A History" (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp.191-2.] In their flight to
Eritrea, the Italians left behind all of their artillery and 11,000 rifles, as well as most of their transport. As Paul B. Henze notes, "Baratieri's army had been completely annihilated while Menelik's was intact as a fighting force and gained thousands of rifles and a great deal of equipment from the fleeing Italians." [Henze, "Layers of Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia" (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p.170.] The 3,000 Italian prisoners, who included General Albertone, appear to have been treated as well as could be expected under difficult circumstances, though about 200 died of their wounds in captivity. [Chris Prouty notes that Albertone was given into the care of Azaj Zamanel, commander of Empress Taytu's personal army, and "had a tent to himself, a horse and servants". "Empress Taytu", pp. 169f.] However, 800 captured askaris, regarded as traitors by the Ethiopians, had their right hands and left feet amputated. There does not appear to be any foundation for reports that some Italians were castrated and these may reflect confusion with the atrocious treatment of the askari prisoners. [Prouty has collected the few documented experiences of these POWs, none of whom claim to have been treated inhumanely ("Empress Taytu", pp.170-183). She repeats the opinion of the Italian historian Angelo del Boca, that "the paucity of the record is attributable to the glacial welcome received in Italy by the returning prisoners for having lost a war, and the fact that they were subjected to long interrogations when they debarked, were defrauded of their back pay, had their mementoes confiscated and were ordered not to talk to journalists." (p.170)]
Baratieri was relieved of his command and later charged with preparing an "inexcusable" plan of attack and for abandoning his troops in the field. He was acquitted on these charges but was described by the court martial judges as being "entirely unfitted" for his command. Chris Prouty offers a panoramic overview of the response in Italy to the news:: When news of the calamity reached Italy there were street demonstrations in most major cities. In Rome, to prevent these violent protests, the universities and theatres were closed. Police were called out to disperse rock-throwers in front of Prime Minister Crispi's residence. Crispi resigned on
9 March. Troops were called out to quell demonstrations in Naples. In Pavia, crowds built barricades on the railroad tracks to prevent a troop train from leaving the station. The Association of Women of Rome, Turin, Milan and Pavia called for the return of all military forces in Africa. Funeral masses were intoned for the known and unknown dead. Families began sending to the newspapers letters they had received before Adwa in which their menfolk described their poor living conditions and their fears at the size of the army they were going to face. King Umberto declared his birthday (14 March) a day of mourning. Italian communities in St. Petersburg, London, New York, Chicago, Buenos Aires and Jerusalem collected money for the families of the dead and for the Italian Red Cross. [Prouty, "Empress Taytu", pp. 159f.]
One question much asked – both then and long afterwards – is why did Emperor Menelik fail to follow up his victory and drive the routed Italians out of their colony? The victorious Emperor limited his demands to little more than the abrogation of the deceptive
Treaty of Wuchale. In the context of the prevailing balance of power, the emperor's crucial goal was to preserve Ethiopian independence. In addition, Ethiopia had just begun to emerge from a long and brutal famine; Harold Marcus reminds us that the army was restive over its long service in the field, short of rations, and the short rains which would bring all travel to a crawl would soon start to fall. [Marcus, "Menelik II", p. 176.] At the time, Menelik claimed a shortage of cavalry horses with which to harry the fleeing soldiers. Chris Prouty observes that "a failure of nerve on the part of Menelik has been alleged by both Italian and Ethiopian sources." [Prouty, "Empress Taytu", p. 161.] Lewis believes that it "was his farsighted certainty that total annihilation of Baratieri and a sweep into Eritrea would force the Italian people to turn a bungled colonial war into a national crusade" [Lewis, "Fashoda", p. 120.] that stayed his hand.
As a direct result of the battle, Italy signed the
Treaty of Addis Ababa, recognizing Ethiopia as an independent state. Almost forty years later, on October 3rd, 1935, after the League of Nationsweak response to the Abyssinia Crisis, in a new military campaign endorsed by Benito Mussolini, the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, the Italians soundly defeated the Ethiopian forces. Following the war, Italy occupied Ethiopia for five years (1936-41), before eventually being driven out during World War IIby British Empireforces, aided by Ethiopian patriots, in the East African Campaign.
"The confrontation between Italy and Ethiopia at Adwa was a fundamental turning point in Ethiopian history," writes Henze, who compares this victory to Japan's naval victory over Russia at Tsushima. "Though apparent to very few historians at the time, these defeats were the beginning of the decline of Europe as the center of world politics." [Henze, "Layers of Layers of Time", p.180.]
On a similar note, the Ethiopian historian
Bahru Zewdeobserved that "few events in the modern period have brought Ethiopia to the attention of the world as has the victory at Adwa;" however, Bahru Zewde puts his emphasis on other elements of this triumph: "The racial dimension was what lent Adwa particular significance. It was a victory of blacks over whites. Adwa thus anticipated by almost a decade the equally shattering experience to the whites of the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905." [Bahru Zewde, "A History of Modern Ethiopia" (London: James Currey, 1991), p. 81.]
This defeat of a colonial power and the ensuing recognition of African sovereignty became rallying points for later African nationalists during their struggle for decolonization, as well as activists and leaders of the Pan-African movement. [Professor Kinfe Abraham, "The Impact of the Adowa Victory on The Pan-African and Pan-Black Anti-Colonial Struggle," Address delivered to The
Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, February 8, 2006] As the Afrocentric scholar Molefe Asante explains, "After the victory over Italy in 1896, Ethiopia acquired a special importance in the eyes of Africans as the only surviving African State. After Adowa, Ethiopia became emblematic of African valour and resistance, the bastion of prestige and hope to thousands of Africans who were experiencing the full shock of European conquest and were beginning to search for an answer to the myth of African inferiority." [Molefe Asante, quoted in Rodney Worrell, "Pan-africanism in Barbados", (New Academia Publishing: 2005) p. 16]
Battle of Isandlwana
Notes and references
*Berkeley, G.F.-H. (1902) "The campaign of Adowa and the rise of Menelik", Westminister : A. Constable, 403 p.
*Henze, P.B. (2004) "Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia", London : Hurst & Co., ISBN 1-85065-522-7
*Lewis, D.L. (1988) "The race to Fashoda : European colonialism and African resistance in the scramble for Africa", 1st ed., London : Bloomsbury, ISBN 0-7475-0113-0
*Marcus, H.G. (1995) "The life and times of Menelik II : Ethiopia, 1844-1913", Lawrenceville, N.J. : Red Sea Press, ISBN 1-5690-2010-8
*Pankhurst, R. (1968) "Economic history of Ethiopia, 1800-1935", Addis Ababa : Haile Sellassie I University Press, 772 p.
*Pankhurst, R. (1998) "The Ethiopians : a history", The peoples of Africa Series, Oxford : Blackwell Publishers, ISBN 0-631-22493-9
*Rosenfeld, C.P. (1986) "Empress Taytu and Menelik II : Ethiopia 1883-1910", London : Ravens Educational & Development Services, ISBN 0-947895-01-9
*Uhlig, S. (ed.) (2003) "
Encyclopaedia Aethiopica", 1 "(A-C)", Wiesbaden : Harrassowitz, ISBN 3-447-04746-1
*Worrell, R. (2005) "Pan-Africanism in Barbados : An Analysis of the Activities of the Major 20th-Century Pan-African Formations in Barbados", Washington, DC : New Academia Publishing, ISBN 0-9744934-6-5
*Bahru Zewde (1991) "A history of modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974", Eastern African studies series, London : Currey, ISBN: 0-85255-066-9
*"Adwa" (1999). Directed by
* [http://www.thehistorynet.com/mh/bladowa/ Historynet: Ethiopia's Decisive Victory at Adowa]
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