Bureaucracy is the structure and set of regulations in place to control activity, usually in large organizations and government. As opposed to
adhocracy, it is represented by standardized procedure (rule-following) that dictates the execution of most or all processes within the body, formal division of powers, hierarchy, and relationships. In practice the interpretation and execution of policycan lead to informal influence.
Bureaucracy is a concept in
sociologyand political sciencereferring to the way that the administrative execution and enforcement of legal rules are socially organized. Four structural concepts are central to any definition of bureaucracy:
# a well-defined division of administrative labor among persons and offices,
# a personnel system with consistent patterns of recruitment and stable linear careers,
# a hierarchy among offices, such that the authority and status are differentially distributed among actors, and
# formal and informal networks that connect organizational actors to one another through flows of information and patterns of cooperation.
Examples of everyday bureaucracies include
governments, armed forces, corporations, hospitals, courts, ministries and schools.
While the concept as such exist at least from the early forms of nationhood in ancient times, the word "bureaucracy" itself stems from the word "bureau", used from the early 18th century in Western Europe not just to refer to a writing desk, but to an office, i.e., a workplace, where officials worked. The original French meaning of the word "bureau" was the
baizeused to cover desks. The term bureaucracy came into use shortly before the French Revolutionof 1789, and from there rapidly spread to other countries. The Greek suffix - "kratia" or "kratos" - means "power" or "rule".
In a letter of
July 1, 1790, the German Baron von Grimm declared: "We are obsessed by the idea of regulation, and our Masters of Requests refuse to understand that there is an infinity of things in a great state with which a government should not concern itself." Jean Claude Marie Vincent de Gournaysometimes used to say, "We have an illness in France which bids fair to play havoc with us; this illness is called "bureaumania"." Sometimes he used to refer to a fourth or fifth form of government under the heading of "bureaucracy".
In another letter of
July 15, 1765Baron Grimm wrote also, "The real spirit of the laws in France is that bureaucracy of which the late Monsieur de Gournay used to complain so greatly; here the offices, clerks, secretaries, inspectors and "intendants" are not appointed to benefit the public interest, indeed the public interest appears to have been established so that offices might exist." [Baron de Grimm and Diderot, "Correspondence littéraire, philosophique et critique, 1753-69", 1813 edition, Vol. 4, p. 146 & 508 - cited by Martin Albrow, "Bureaucracy". London: Pall Mall Press, 1970, p. 16]
This quote refers to a traditional controversy about bureaucracy, namely the perversion of means and ends so that means become ends in themselves, and the greater good is lost sight of; as a corollary, the substitution of "sectional" interests for the "general" interest. The suggestion here is that, left uncontrolled, the bureaucracy will become increasingly self-serving and corrupt, rather than serving society.
Perhaps the early example of a bureaucrat is the
scribe, who first arose as a professional on the early cities of Sumer. The Sumerian script was so complicated that it required specialists who had trained for their entire lives in the discipline of writing to manipulate it. These scribes could wield significant power, as they had a total monopoly on the keeping of records and creation of inscriptions on monuments to kings.
In later, larger empires like Achaemenid Persia, bureaucracies quickly expanded as government expanded and increased its functions. In the Persian Empire, the central government was divided into administrative
provincesled by satraps. The satraps were appointed by the Shahto control the provinces. In addition, a generaland a royal secretarywere stationed in each province to supervise troop recruitment and keep records, respectively. The Achaemenid Great Kings also sent royal inspectors to tour the empire and report on local conditions.
The most modernesque of all ancient bureaucracies, however, was the Chinese bureaucracy. During the chaos of the
Spring and Autumn Periodand the Warring States, Confuciusrecognized the need for a stable system of administrators to lend good governance even when the leaders were inept. Chinese bureaucracy, first implemented during the Qin dynasty but under more Confucian lines under the Han, calls for the appointment of bureaucratic positions based on merit via a system of examinations. Although the power of the Chinese bureaucrats waxed and waned throughout China's long history, the imperial examination system lasted as late as 1905, and modern China still employs a formidable bureaucracy in its daily workings.
Modern bureaucracies arose as the government of states grew larger during the modern period, and especially following the
Industrial Revolution. Tax collectors, perhaps the most reviled of all bureaucrats, became increasingly necessary as states began to take in more and more revenue, while the role of administrators increased as the functions of government multiplied. Along with this expansion, though, came the recognition of the corruption and nepotismoften inherent within the managerial system, leading to civil service reform on a large scale in many countries towards the end of the 19th century.
Views on the concept
In "The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy," Daniel Carpenter argues that bureaucratic autonomy emerges only upon the historical achievement of three conditions:
# the autonomous bureaucracies are politically differentiated from the actors who seek to control them.
# the bureaucratic autonomy requires the development of unique organizational capacities - capacities to analyze, to create new programs, to solve problems, to plan, to administer programs with efficiency, and to ward off corruption.
# bureaucratic autonomy requires political legitimacy, or strong organizational reputations embedded in an independent power base.
Karl Marx's and Friedrich Engels's theory of historical materialism, the historical origin of bureaucracy is to be found in "four" sources: religion, the formation of the state, commerce and technology.
Thus, the earliest bureaucracies consisted of castes of "religious" clergy, officials and scribes operating various rituals, and armed functionaries specifically delegated to keep order. In the historical transition from primitive egalitarian communities to a civil society divided into social classes and estates, beginning from about 10,000 years ago, authority is increasingly centralized in, and enforced by a state apparatus existing separately from society. This state formulates, imposes and enforces laws, and levies taxes, giving rise to an officialdom enacting these functions. Thus, the state mediates in conflicts among the people and keeps those conflicts within acceptable bounds; it also organizes the defense of territory. Most importantly, the right of ordinary people to carry and use weapons of force becomes increasingly restricted; in civil society, forcing other people to do things becomes increasingly the legal right of the state authorities only. [Friedrich Engels; "The origin of the family, private property and the state". [http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1884/origin-family/ch05.htm] ]
But the growth of trade and commerce adds a new, distinctive dimension to bureaucracy, insofar as it requires the keeping of accounts and the processing/recording of transactions, as well as the enforcement of legal rules governing trade. If resources are increasingly distributed by
pricesin markets, this requires extensive and complex systems of record-keeping, management and calculation, conforming to legal standards. Eventually, this means that the total amount of work involved in commercial administration outgrows the total amount of work involved in government administration. In modern capitalist society, private sector bureaucracy is "larger" than government bureaucracy, if measured by the number of administrative workers in the division of laboras a whole. Some corporations nowadays have a turnover larger than the national income of whole countries, with large administrations supervising operations.
A fourth source of bureaucracy Marxists have commented on inheres in the technologies of mass production, which require many standardized routines and procedures to be performed. Even if mechanization replaces people with machinery, people are still necessary to design, control, supervise and operate the machinery. The technologies chosen may not be the ones that are best for everybody, but which create "incomes" for a particular class of people or maintain their power. This type of bureaucracy is nowadays often called a technocracy, which owes its power to control over specialized technical knowledge or control over critical information.
In Marx's theory, bureaucracy rarely creates new wealth by itself, but rather controls, co-ordinates and governs the production, distribution and consumption of wealth. The bureaucracy as a social stratum derives its income from the appropriation of part of the social
surplus productof human labor. Wealth is appropriated by the bureaucracy by law through fees, taxes, levies, tributes, licensing etc.
Bureaucracy is therefore always a "cost" to society, but this cost may be accepted insofar as it makes
social orderpossible, and maintains it by enforcing the rule of law. Nevertheless there are constant conflicts about this cost, because it has the big effect on the distribution of incomes; all producers will try to get the maximum return from what they produce, and minimize administrative costs. Typically, in epochs of strong economic growth, bureaucracies proliferate; when economic growth declines, a fight breaks out to cut back bureaucratic costsFact|date=July 2007.
Whether or not a bureaucracy as a social stratum can become a genuine
ruling classdepends greatly on the prevailing propertyrelations and the mode of productionof wealth. In capitalist society, the state typically lacks an independent economic base, finances many activities on credit, and is heavily dependent on levying taxes as a source of income. Therefore, its power is limited by the costs which private owners of the productive assets will tolerateFact|date=July 2007. If, however, the state owns the means of productionitself, defended by military power, the state bureaucracy can become much more powerful, and act as a ruling class or power elite. Because in that case, it directly controls the sources of new wealth, and manages or distributes the social product. This is the subject of Marxist theories of bureaucratic collectivism.
Marx himself however never theorized this possibility in detail, and it has been the subject of much controversy among Marxists. The core organizational issue in these disputes concerns the degree to which the "administrative" allocation of resources by government authorities and the "market" allocation of resources can achieve the social goal of creating a more free, just and prosperous society. Which decisions should be made by whom, at what level, so that an optimal allocation of resources results? This is just as much a moral-political issue as an economic issue.
Central to the Marxian concept of
socialismis the idea of workers' self-management, which assumes the internalization of a moralityand self-discipline among people that would make bureaucratic supervision and control redundant, together with a drastic reorganization of the division of labor in society. Bureaucracies emerge to mediate conflicts of interest on the basis of laws, but if those conflicts of interest disappear (because resources are allocated directly in a fair way), bureaucracies would also be redundant.
Marx's critics are however skeptical of the feasibility of this kind of socialism, given the continuing need for administration and the rule of law, as well as the propensity of people to put their own self-interest before the communal interest. That is, the argument is that self-interest and the communal interest might "never" coincide, or, at any rate, can always diverge significantly.
Max Weberhas probably been one of the most influential users of the word in its social sciencesense. He is well-known for his study of bureaucratization of society; many aspects of modern public administrationgo back to him; a classic, hierarchically organized civil serviceof the continentaltype is — if perhaps mistakenly — called "Weberian civil service" several different years between 1818 and 1860, prior to Weber's birth in 1864.
Weber described the
ideal typebureaucracy in positive terms, considering it to be a more rational and efficient form of organization than the alternatives that preceded it, which he characterized as " charismatic domination" and " traditional domination". According to his terminology, bureaucracy is part of legal domination. However, he also emphasized that bureaucracy becomes inefficient when a decision must be adopted to an individual case.
According to Weber, the attributes of modern bureaucracy include its impersonality, concentration of the means of administration, a leveling effect on social and economic differences and implementation of a system of authority that is practically indestructible.
Weber's analysis of bureaucracy concerns:
* the historical and administrative reasons for the process of bureaucratization (especially in the
* the impact of the
rule of lawupon the functioning of bureaucratic organisations
* the typical
personal orientationand occupational positionof a bureaucratic officials as a status group
* the most important attributes and consequences of bureaucracy in the modern world
A bureaucratic organization is governed by the following seven principles:
# official business is conducted on a continuous basis
# official business is conducted with strict accordance to the following rules:
## the duty of each official to do certain types of work is delimited in terms of impersonal criteria
## the official is given the authority necessary to carry out his assigned functions
## the means of coercion at his disposal are strictly limited and conditions of their use strictly defined
# every official's responsibilities and authority are part of a vertical hierarchy of authority, with respective rights of supervision and appeal
# officials do not own the resources necessary for the performance of their assigned functions but are accountable for their use of these resources
# official and private business and income are strictly separated
# offices cannot be appropriated by their incumbents (inherited, sold, etc.)
# official business is conducted on the basis of written documents
A bureaucratic official:
* is personally free and appointed to his position on the basis of conduct
* exercises the authority delegated to him in accordance with impersonal rules, and his or her loyalty is enlisted on behalf of the faithful execution of his official duties
* appointment and job placement are dependent upon his or her technical qualifications
* administrative work is a full-time occupation
* work is rewarded by a regular salary and prospects of advancement in a lifetime career
An official must exercise his or her judgment and his or her skills, but his or her duty is to place these at the service of a higher authority; ultimately he/she is responsible only for the impartial execution of assigned tasks and must sacrifice his or her personal judgment if it runs counter to his or her official duties.
Weber's work has been continued by many, like
Robert Michelswith his Iron Law of Oligarchy.
;CriticismAs Max Weber himself noted, real bureaucracy will be less optimal and effective than his ideal type model. Each of Weber's seven principles can degenerate:Fact|date=April 2008
* Vertical hierarchy of authority can become chaotic, some offices can be omitted in the decision making process, there may be conflicts of competence;
* Competences can be unclear and used contrary to the spirit of the law; sometimes a decision itself may be considered more important than its effect;
Nepotism, corruption, political infighting and other degenerations can counter the rule of impersonality and can create a recruitment and promotion system not based on meritocracy but rather on oligarchy;
* Officials try to avoid
accountabilityand seek anonymity by avoiding documentation of their procedures (or creating extreme amounts of chaotic, confusing documents, see also: transparency)
Even a non-degenerated bureaucracy can be affected by common problems:
* Overspecialization, making individual officials not aware of larger consequences of their actions
* Rigidity and inertia of procedures, making decision-making slow or even impossible when facing some unusual case, and similarly delaying change, evolution and adaptation of old procedures to new circumstances;
* A phenomenon of "group thinking" - zealotry, loyalty and lack of critical thinking regarding the organisation which is "perfect" and "always correct" by definition, making the organisation unable to change and realise its own mistakes and limitations;
* Disregard for dissenting opinions, even when such views suit the available data better than the opinion of the majority;
* A phenomenon of "Catch-22" (named after a famous book by
Joseph Heller) - as bureaucracy creates more and more rules and procedures, their complexity rises and coordination diminishes, facilitating creation of contradictory and recursive rules
* Not allowing people to use common sense, as everything must be as is written by the law.
In the most common examples bureaucracy can lead to the treatment of individual human beings as impersonal objects. This process has been criticised by many philosophers and writers (
Aldous Huxley, George Orwell, Hannah Arendt) and satirized in the comic strip " Dilbert",TV show " The Office", Franz Kafka's novels " The Trial" and "The Castle" , Douglas Adams' story " The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy", and the films "Brazil" and " Office Space".
Michel Crozierwrote The Bureaucratic Phenomenon [Crozier, M. (1964). The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (M. Crozier, Trans.). London: Tavistock Publications.] (1964) as a re-examination of Weber's (1922) concept of the efficient ideal bureaucracy in the light of the way that bureaucratic organizations had actually developed. Where as for Weber, bureaucracy was the ultimate expression of a trend toward the efficient, rational organization, Crozier examined bureaucracy as a form of organization that evokes:
"... the slowness, the ponderousness, the routine, the complication of procedures and the maladapted responses of the bureaucratic organization to the needs which they should satisfy" (Crozier, 1964, p 3)"
He examined a number of culturally specific examples of bureaucratic organizations in an attempt to understand why bureaucracies so often became dysfunctional.
After reviewing the different ways in which the term is used, Crozier describes the sense in which he uses the term bureaucracy thus:
"A bureaucratic organization is an organization that can not correct its behaviour by learning from its errors" (Crozier, 1964, p 187)"
"... not only a system that does not correct its behaviour in view of its errors; it is also too rigid to adjust, without crises, to the transformations that the accelerated evolution of the industrial society makes more and more imperative" (Crozier, 1964, p 198)"
In essence, Crozier presents an argument against the Tayloristic notion of 'the one best way' to organize an activity and Weber's view of bureaucracy as the ultimate expression of rationality and efficiency. He notes that in 1964 'advanced organizations' had already:
"... been obliged to discard completely the notion of the one best way [and] are beginning to understand that the illusion of perfect rationality has to long persisted, weakening the possibilities of action by insisting on rigorous logic and immediate coherence" (Crozier, 1964, p 159)"
From his analysis of his case studies, he develops a theory of bureaucratic dysfunction based on his observations. Although he later extends his ideas to cover other settings, the two main cases on which he bases his theory are both located in France: "The Clerical Agency" and "The Industrial Monopoly". Crozier chose these examples not only because he was French, but also because he claims that socially and culturally France has developed in such a way that it created organizations that closely resembled the Weberian notion of an ideal bureaucracy.
His theory is based on the observation that in situations where almost every outcome has been decided in advance according to a set of impersonal and predefined rules and regulations, the only way in which people are able to gain some control over their lives is to exploit 'zones of uncertainty' where the outcomes are not already known.
" [an] unintended consequence of rationalisation [is] the predictability of ones behaviour is the sure test of ones own inferiority" (Crozier, 1964, p158)"
For Crozier, organizations are not autonomous entities but social constructs that are:
"... man made and socially created [and] the indirect result of the power struggles within the organization" (Crozier, 1964, p 162)"
Attacking both the rationalists and the human relations school for ignoring the role that such power struggles play in the shaping of an organization he argues that organizational relations are in fact a series of strategic games where the protagonists attempt either to exploit any areas of discretion for their own ends, or to prevent others from gaining an advantage:
"Each group fights to preserve and enlarge the area upon which it has some discretion, attempts to limit its dependence upon other groups and accept such dependence only insofar as it is a safeguard ... [preferring] retreatisim if there is no other choice but submission" (Crozier, 1964, p 156)"
The result of this is that goals are subverted and the organization becomes locked into a series of inward looking power struggles. Thus, paradoxically, the result of attempting to design an efficient organization that runs on rational and impersonal lines is to create a situation where the opposite to is true.
;Theory of bureaucratic dysfunctionCrozier argues that:
"... the bureaucratic system of organization is primarily characterized by the existence of a series of relatively stable vicious circles that stem from centralisation and impersonality" (Crozier, 1964, p 193)"
He outlines four such 'vicious circles' that he observed in the organizations he studied.
* The development of impersonal rulesIn an attempt to be rational and egalitarian, bureaucracies attempt to come up with a set of abstract impersonal rules to cover all possible events. Crozier gives the example of the concours (competitive examinations) which mean that, one the exams are passed, promotion become simply a matter of seniority and avoiding damaging conflicts. The result, he argues, is that hierarchical relationships decline in importance or disappear completely which means that higher level in the bureaucracy have effectively lost the power to govern the lower levels.
* The centralization of decisionsIf one wishes to maintain the impersonal nature of decision making, it is necessary to ensure that decision are made at a level where those who make them are protected from the influence of those who are affected by them. The effect of this is that problems are resolved by people who have no direct knowledge of the problems they are called upon to solve, and so, priority is given to the resolution of internal political problems instead. In this case, the power to influence events over which one has direct experience is lost and it is passed to some impartial central body.
* The isolation of strata and group pressure within strataThe suppression of the possibility of exercising discretion among superiors and the removal of opportunities for bargaining from subordinates results in an organization that consists of a series of isolated strata. The notional equality within the strata becomes the only defence for the individual against demands form other parts of the organization and allows groups some degree of control over their own domain. The result is very strong per group pressure to conform to the norms of the strata regardless of individual beliefs or the wider goals of the organization.
* The development of parallel power relationshipsIt is impossible to account for every eventuality, even by the constant addition of impersonal rules and the progressive centralisation of decision making; consequently, individuals or groups that control the remaining zones of uncertainty, wield a considerable amount of power. This can lead to the creation of parallel power structures that give certain groups or individuals in certain situations, disproportionate power in an otherwise regulated and egalitarian organization. Once again, this can lead to decisions being made based on factors separate from the overall goals of the organization.
Woodrow Wilson, writing as an academic, professed: [ Wilson, Woodrow. "The Study of Administration" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jun., 1887), pp. 197-222 ]
... [A] dministration in the United States must be at all points sensitive to public opinion. A body of thoroughly trained officials serving during good behavior we must have in any case: that is a plain business necessity. But the apprehension that such a body will be anything un-American clears away the moment it is asked. What is to constitute good behavior? For that question obviously carries its own answer on its head. Steady, hearty allegiance to the policy of the government they serve will constitute good behavior. That policy will have no taint of officialism about it. It will not be the creation of permanent officials, but of statesmen whose responsibility to public opinion will be direct and inevitable. Bureaucracy can exist only where the whole service of the state is removed from the common political life of the people, its chiefs as well as its rank and file. Its motives, its objects, its policy, its standards, must be bureaucratic.
Nevertheless, American colloquial usage is usually derogatory unless established otherwise.Fact|date=August 2008 An example might be that an organization which puts its own comfort, convenience and longevity ahead of its mission could be called a bureaucracy.
It is no wonderClarifyme|date=August 2008 that popular dictionary definitions echo ourWho|date=August 2008 profound dislike of bureaucracy. "The American Heritage Dictionary"' the third and last definition of bureaucracy reads in part: "numerous offices and adherence to inflexible rules of operation;... any unwieldy administration." According to "Webster's New world Dictionary of the American Language", one of the definitions reads in part "bureaucracy is governmental officialism or inflexible routine." "Roget's Thesaurus" gives among the synonyms for "bureaucracy": "officialism", "officiousness", and "
science fictionwriter Jerry Pournellehas proposed a theoryhe refers to as [http://www.jerrypournelle.com/archives2/archives2mail/mail408.html#Iron "Pournelle's Iron Law of Bureaucracy"] , which states:
"In any bureaucracy, the people devoted to the benefit of the bureaucracy itself always get in control and those dedicated to the goals the bureaucracy is supposed to accomplish have less and less influence, and sometimes are eliminated entirely."
This robust tendency is purported to operate to the effect that:
"...in any bureaucratic organization there will be two kinds of people: those who work to further the actual goals of the organization, and those who work for the organization itself. Examples in education would be teachers who work and sacrifice to teach children, vs. union representative who work to protect any teacher including the most incompetent. The Iron Law states that in all cases, the second type of person will always gain control of the organization, and will always write the rules under which the organization functions."
Austrian School Analysis
The analysis of bureaucracy by the
Austrian schoolreflects its characteristic focus on economics, and emphasizes the distinction between bureaucratic management and profitmanagement. [cite book |last=von Mises |first=Ludwig | authorlink=Ludwig von Mises |title=Bureaucracy | origyear=1944 |url=http://www.mises.org/etexts/bureaucracy.pdf |accessdate=2006-11-10 | year=1962 ]
Current academic debates
Modern academic research has debated the extent to which elected officials can control their bureaucratic agents. Because bureaucrats have more information than elected officials about what they are doing and what they should be doing, bureaucrats might have the ability to implement policies or regulations that go against the public interest. In the American context, these concerns led to the "Congressional abdication" hypotheses--the claim that Congress had abdicated its authority over public policy to appointed bureaucrats.
Theodore Lowi initiated this debate by concluding in a 1979 book that the U.S. Congress does not exercise effective oversight of bureaucratic agencies. Instead, policies are made by "
iron triangles", consisting of interest groups, appointed bureaucrats, and Congressional subcommittees (who, according to Lowi, were likely to have more extreme views than the Congress as a whole). [Lowi. 1979. The end of liberalism. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.] It is thought that since 1979 interest groups have taken a large role and now do not only effect bureaucracy, but also the money in congress. The idea of "iron triangles" has since evolved to "iron hexagons" and then to a "hollow sphere."
The relationships between the Legislatures, the Interest Groups, Bureaucrats, and the general public all have an effect on each other. Without one of these pieces the entire structure would completely change. This relationship is considered "mu", or such that not one single piece can describe or control the entire process. The public votes in the legislatures and the interest groups provide information, but the legislature and bureaucrats also have an effect on the interest groups and the public. The entire system is codependent on each other.
William Niskanen's earlier (1971) 'budget-maximizing' modelcomplemented Lowi's claims; where Lowi claimed that Congress (and legislatures more generally) failed to exercise oversight, Niskanen argued that rational bureaucrats will always and everywhere seek to increase their budgets, thereby contributing strongly to state growth. Niskanen went on to serve on the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors under President Reagan, and his model provided a strong underpinning for the worldwide move towards cutbacks of public spending and the introduction of privatization in the 1980s and '90s. Fact|date=August 2007
Two branches of theorizing have arisen in response to these claims. The first focuses on bureaucratic motivations; Niskanen's universalist approach was critiqued by a range of pluralist authors who argued that officials' motivations are more public interest-orientated than Niskanen allowed. The
bureau-shapingmodel (put forward by Patrick Dunleavy) also argues against Niskanen that rational bureaucrats should only maximize the part of their budget that they spend on their own agency's operations or give to contractors or powerful interest groups (that are able to organize a flowback of benefits to senior officials). For instance, rational officials will get no benefit from paying out larger welfare checks to millions of poor people, since the bureaucrats' own utilities are not improved. Consequently we should expect bureaucracies to significantly maximize budgets in areas like police forces and defense, but not in areas like welfare state spending.
A second branch of responses has focused more on Lowi's claims, asking whether legislatures (and usually the American Congress in particular) can control bureaucrats. This empirical research is motivated by a normative concern: If we wish to believe that we live in a
democracy, then it must be true that appointed bureaucrats cannot act contrary to elected officials' interests. (This claim is itself debatable; if we fully trusted elected officials, we would not spend so much time implementing constitutional checks and balances. [Scholz and Wood. 1988. Controlling the IRS: Principals, principles, and public administration. "American Journal of Political Science" 42 (January): 141-162.] )
Within this second branch, scholars have published numerous studies debating the circumstances under which elected officials can control bureaucratic outputs. Most of these studies examine the American case, though their findings have been generalized elsewhere as well. [Huber and Shipan. 2002. Deliberate discretion: The institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.] [Ramseyer and Rosenbluth. 1993. Japan's political marketplace. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.] These studies argue that legislatures have a variety of oversight means at their disposal, and they use many of them regularly. These oversight mechanisms have been classified into two types: "Police patrols" (actively auditing agencies and looking for misbehavior) and "fire alarms" (imposing open administrative procedures on bureaucrats to make it easier for adversely affected groups to detect bureaucratic malfeasance and bring it to the legislature's attention). [McCubbins and Schwartz. 1984. Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. "American Journal of Political Science" 28: 16-79.]
A third concept of self-interested bureaucracy and its effect on the production of
public goodshas been forwarded by Faizul Latif Chowdhury. In contrast to Niskanen and Dunleavy, who primarily focused on the self-interested behaviour of only the top-level bureaucrats involved in policy making, Chowdhury in his thesis submitted to the London School of Economicsin 1997 drew attention to the impact of the low level civil servants whose rent-seekingbehaviour pushes up the cost of production of public goods. Particularly, it was shown with reference to the tax officials how rent-seeking by them causes loss in government revenue [cite book|last=Chowdhury|first=Faizul Latif|date=2006|title=Corrupt Bureaucracy and Privatization of Tax Enforcement|] . Chowdhury’s model of rent-seeking bureaucracycaptures the case of administrative corruption whereby public money is directly expropriated by public servants in general.
References & notes
* On Karl Marx: Hal Draper, "Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, Volume 1: State and Bureaucracy". New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.
* Marx comments on the state bureaucracy in his "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" [ [http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/index.htm Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 1843-4 ] ] and Engels discusses the origins of the state here: [ [http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1884/origin-family/index.htm Origins of the Family ] ]
*Ernest Mandel, "Power and Money: A Marxist Theory of Bureaucracy". London: Verso, 1992.
* On Weber: cite book | first=Tony J. | last=Watson | coauthors= | title=Sociology, Work and Industry | publisher=Routledge | location= | year=1980 | editor= | id=ISBN 0-415-32165-4
*Neil Garston (ed.), "Bureaucracy: Three Paradigms". Boston: Kluwer, 1993.
*Chowdhury, Faizul Latif (2006), "Corrupt Bureaucracy and Privatization of Tax Enforcement". Dhaka: Pathak Samabesh, ISBN 984-8120-62-9.
* [http://wikisum.com/w/Category:Bureaucracy Abstracts of academic books and articles about bureaucracy]
* [http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.705/pub_detail.asp Kevin R. Kosar, "What Ought a Bureaucrat Do?"] Claremont.org, (A review piece that ponders the values that should guide bureaucrats in their work.)
* [http://www.geocities.com/jamil_03/index.html "Corrupt Bureaucracy and Privatization of Tax Enforcement in Bangladesh" by Faizul Latif Chowdhury]
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