Australian Secret Intelligence Service
Infobox Government agency
agency_name = Australian Secret Intelligence Service
nativename =
logo_width = 250px
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headquarters =
formed = 13 May 1952
preceding =
dissolved =
superseding =
jurisdiction =
employees =
budget = $162.5m
minister1_name = The Hon. Stephen Smith MP
minister1_pfo = Minister for Foreign Affairs
chief1_name = David Irvine
chief1_position =
parent_agency = Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
child1_agency =
child2_agency =
website = [http://www.asis.gov.au asis.gov.au]
footnotes = [ [http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/budget/2007_2008_pbs/2007-2008_FA+T_PBS_06_ASIS.pdf ASIS Budget Statement] ] The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) is the Australian government
According to its website, the mission of ASIS is to:
"Protect and promote Australia's vital interests through the provision of unique foreign intelligence services as directed by Government." [cite web|url=http://www.asis.gov.au/mission.html|title=Our Mission|publisher=The Australian Secret Intelligence Service|accessdate=2006-05-01]
As its mission statement implies, ASIS's focus is on overseas operations. This distinguishes it from the "the functions of [ASIS and
]
ASIS is part of the
History
On 13 May 1952, in a meeting of the Executive Council, Prime Minister Its Charter of 15 December 1954 described ASIS's role as "to obtain and distribute secret intelligence, and to plan for and conduct special operations as may be required". [Brian Toohey and William Pinwill, Oyster: The story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1989, p. 288] ASIS was expressly required to 'operate outside Australian territory'. A Ministerial Directive of 15 August 1958 indicated that its special operations role included conducting 'special political action'. [Toohey and Pinwill, op. cit., pp. 291-292] It also indicated that the organisation would come under the control and supervision of the Minister for External Affairs rather than the Minister for Defence. At the time, ASIS was substantially modelled on the United Kingdom On 1 November 1972, ASIS was sensationally exposed by "The Daily Telegraph". [Richard Farmer, 'School for Aust. spies: Top-Secret Espionage Ring Exposed', The Daily Telegraph, 1 November 1972. See also Max Suich, 'Untangle the intelligence web', The Australian Financial Review, November 3, 1972] This paper ran an exposé regarding recruitment of ASIS agents from Australian universities for espionage activities in Asia. This article was followed by a more in-depth piece in " The article in "The Australian Financial Review" stated that ' [t] he ASIS role is to collect and disseminate facts only. It is not supposed to be in the analytical or policy advising business though this is clearly difficult to avoid at times'. [Max Suich, 'Untangle the intelligence web', The Australian Financial Review, November 3, 1972, p. 3] The Ministerial Statement of 1977 stated that the 'main function' of ASIS was to 'obtain, by such means and subject to such conditions as are prescribed by the Government, foreign intelligence for the purpose of the protection or promotion of Australia or its interests'.Mr Malcolm Fraser, 'Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security', Ministerial Statement, House of Representatives, Debates, 25 October 1977, p. 2339] On 25 October 1977, then Prime Minister In 1992 two reports were prepared on ASIS by officers within the Royal Commissions examining ASIS Three First Hope Royal Commission On 21 August 1974, the econd Hope Royal Commission On 17 May 1983 the Hawke Government reappointed Justice Hope to conduct a second Royal Commission into ASIS, ASIO, ONA, DSD and JIO (now DIO). The inquiry was to examine progress in implementing the previous recommendations; arrangements for developing policies, assessing priorities and coordinating activities among the organisations; ministerial and parliamentary accountability; complaints procedures; financial oversight and the agencies' compliance with the law. As with the first Hope Royal Commission, the reports on ASIS and DSD, which included draft legislation on ASIS, were not made public. amuels and Codd Royal Commission In response to a "Four Corners" program aired on 21 February 1994, on 23 February 1994, the Minister for Foreign Affairs "Four Corners" reporter However, Samuels and Codd did find that certain grievances of the former officers were well founded. They appeared to support the officers' concerns regarding the grievance procedures: However, Samuels and Codd observed that the information published in the "Four Corners" program was 'skewed towards the false', [Ibid, p. xx] that 'the level of factual accuracy about operational matters was not high', [Ibid, p. xxiii] and, quoting an aphorism, that 'what was disturbing was not true and what was true was not disturbing'. [Ibid, p. xxiii] They concluded that the disclosure of the information was unnecessary and unjustifiable and had damaged the reputation of ASIS and Australia overseas. [The commissioners stated that 'evidence presented to us of action and reaction in other countries satisfies us that the publication was damaging': Ibid, p. xx] They rejected any suggestion that ASIS was unaccountable or 'out of control'. They said, 'its operational management is well structured and its tactical decisions are thoroughly considered and, in major instances, subject to external approval'. [Ibid, p. xxiii] They recommended that complaints regarding ASIS operations continue to be handled by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) but that staff grievances be handled by the In addition to their recommendations, Samuels and Codd put forward draft legislation to provide a statutory basis for ASIS and to protect various information from disclosure. The Samuels and Codd Bill, like the bulk of the reports, was not made public. Controversies The Sheraton Hotel incident On 30 November 1983, ASIS garnered unwanted negative attention when a training operation held at the Sheraton Hotel, now the Mercure (Spring Street), in Melbourne went disastrously wrong. The exercise was to be a mock surveillance and hostage rescue of foreign intelligence officers. It involved junior officers who had undergone 3 weeks prior training and who were given considerable leeway in planning and executing the operation. Ultimately, in executing the operation, the trainees were found to have used considerable force, distressed a number of the staff and guests and physically assaulting the Hotel Manager. Fact|date=March 2007 Within 2 days the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that 'an immediate and full investigation' would be conducted under the auspices of the second Hope Royal Commission, which was still in progress. A report was prepared and tabled by February 1984. It described the exercise as being 'poorly planned, poorly supervised and poorly run' [Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies, Report on the Sheraton Hotel incident, February 1984, p. 68] and recommended that measures be taken in training to improve planning and eliminate adverse impacts on the public. Following the incident, At the time of the Sheraton Hotel incident, the extant Ministerial Directive permitted ASIS to undertake 'covert action', including 'special operations' which, roughly described, comprised 'unorthodox, possibly para-military activity, designed to be used in case of war or some other crisis'. [Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies, Report on the Sheraton Hotel incident, February 1984, p. 17] Following the incident and the recommendations of the Hope Royal Commission, the covert action function was apparently abolished. The Functions of ASIS can be found in section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act, as can those functions which are proscribed by the act. [Commission of Inquiry into the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Report on the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (Public Edition), March 1995 (hereinafter Samuels and Codd), p. 2] Involvement in Papua New Guinea Between 1989 and 1991 ASIS came under scrutiny following allegations relating to its role and activities in Chinese embassy bugging In 1990, unwelcome attention for the agency was also garnered by the outing of a "Four Corners" programme Towards the end of 1993 ASIS became the subject of media attention after allegations were made by former ASIS officers that ASIS was unaccountable and out of control. One newspaper alleged that 'ASIS regularly flouted laws, kept dossiers on Australian citizens ... and hounded agents out of the service with little explanation'. In particular it alleged that agents were being targeted in a purge by being threatened with criminal charges relating to their official conduct, reflecting a pattern which suggested to some that ASIS or a senior ASIS officer had been 'turned' by a foreign intelligence service. [Brad Crouch, 'ASIS "Like the KGB"', The Sunday Telegraph, 26 December 1993] On 21 February 1994 "Four Corners" ran a programme which aired the key allegations. Two former ASIS officers made claims regarding cultural and operational tensions between ASIS and the The officers and the reporter The bulk of the personal statements by the officers concerned their private grievances. They raised two issues of public interest regarding the effect of secrecy on the operation of grievance procedures and the extent to which the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade was aware of or in control of ASIS operations. The reporter directly raised the issue of the appropriateness of ASIS operations particularly with respect to priority setting in overseas postings and operations, cooperation with foreign intelligence services, and the privacy of Australian persons and organisations. By implication, the program queried the extent to which ASIS is or should be accountable to the Minister, to Government and to Parliament. The following day, the Two days after the program aired, the Alleged management and staffing problems In 2005, The unnamed officers pointed out various problems within the agency that were plaguing the organisation's ability to collect vital and timely intelligence, such as the pitting of "..."young mostly white university educated agents with limited language skills and little knowledge of Islam against poor, zealous extremists intent on becoming suicide bombers".", the "inappropriate" assignment of "..."young female IOs" (Intelligence Officers) "against Islamic targets"...", poor staff retention rates, and general lack of officers possessing meaningful field experience. The officers also cite a lack of proper support given to IO's tasked against terrorist targets, and the doctoring of intelligence by ASIS management, as also contributing to the lack of progress of the agency in the war on terrorism. [ [http://news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=66730 Lack of qualified spies in ASIS: agent ] ] Legislative changes affecting ASIS Intelligence Services Act 2001 :"See main article: ASIS was created as a result of an Executive Order in 1952, and as such, had no legislative basis. On 27 June 2001, the In relation to ASIS, the Act: * converted ASIS into a statutory body, headed by the Director General; Intelligence Services Amendment Act 2004 :"See main article: On 15 October 2003, the "Intelligence Services Amendment Bill 2003" was introduced into Parliament by Foreign Minister * be involved in the planning and undertaking of paramilitary or violent activities by others, and The Bill created controversy over its allowance for ASIS to work with other organisations (such as the The Bill was passed on 1 April 2004, five and a half months after it was introduced. ee also * References Credit A large portion of the history of ASIS was adapted from the Parliament of Australia [http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2001-02/02bd011.htm Bills Digest No. 11 of 2001-02] of External links * [http://www.asis.gov.au/ ASIS home page]
"Bearing in mind the context in which the members of ASIS work, it is not surprising that there should develop a culture which sets great store by faithfulness and stoicism and tends to elevate conformity to undue heights and to regard the exercise of authority rather than consultation as the managerial norm." [Samuels and Codd, op. cit., p. xxxi]
* set out the functions of ASIS and DSD and the limits on those functions;
* prohibited the use of weapons by ASIS (except for self defence) and the conduct of violent or para-military operations;
* authorised the minister responsible for each agency to issue directions to the agency;
* required ministerial authorisation for intelligence collection activities involving Australians;
* limited the circumstances in which ministers can authorise collection of intelligence on Australians;
* required the ministers to make rules regulating the communication and retention by the agencies of intelligence information concerning Australian persons; and
* provided for the establishment of a parliamentary oversight committee, the
* provide, train with, and use weapons and self-defence techniques in certain circumstances (ie: where the overseeing minister deems suitable).
* Oversight bodies
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*Relevant legislation
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