Parrondo's paradox

Parrondo's paradox is a paradox in game theory and is often described as: "A losing strategy that wins". It is named after its creator Juan Parrondo, a Spanish physicist. Mathematically a more involved statement is given as:

:"Given two games, each with a higher probability of losing than winning, it is possible to construct a winning strategy by playing the games alternately."

The paradox is inspired by the mechanical properties of ratchets, the familiar saw-tooth tools used in automobile jacks and in self-winding watches. However, there is less to this paradox than meets the eye. It hinges on an incorrect probabilistic analysis - dependent random variables are treated as independent, and the paradox resolves itself as soon as the dependence is accounted for. For this reason, the initial burst of interest in the paradox rapidly faded.

However, Derek Abbott, a leading Parrondo's paradox researcher provides the following answer regarding the 'paradox:' Is Parrondo's paradox really a "paradox"? This question is sometimes asked by mathematicians, whereas physicists usually don't worry about such things. The first thing to point out is that "Parrondo's paradox" is just a name, just like the "Braess paradox" or "Simpson's paradox." Secondly, as is the case with most of these named paradoxes they are all really apparent paradoxes. People drop the word "apparent" in these cases as it is a mouthful, and it is obvious anyway. So no one claims these are paradoxes in the strict sense. In the wide sense, a paradox is simply something that is counterintuitive. Parrondo's games certainly are countertuitive—at least until you have intensively studied them for a few months. The truth is we still keep finding new surprising things to delight us, as we research these games. I have had one mathematician complain that the games always were obvious to him and hence we should not use the word "paradox." He is either a genius or never really understood it in the first place. In either case, it is not worth arguing with people like that.

Could it perhaps be suggested that a resolution is to rename the thing Parrondo's Conundrum?

Illustrative examples

The saw-tooth example

Consider an example in which there are two points A and B having the same altitude, as shown in Figure 1. In the first case, we have a flat profile connecting them. Here if we leave some round marbles in the middle that move back and forth in a random fashion, they will roll around randomly but towards both ends with an equal probability. Now consider the second case where we have a saw-tooth like region between them. Here also, the marbles will roll towards either ends with equal probability. Now if we tilt the whole profile towards the right, as shown in Figure 2, it is quite clear that both these cases will become biased towards B.

Now consider the game in which we alternate the two profiles while judiciously choosing the time between altering from one profile to the other in the following way.

When we leave a few marbles on the first profile at point E, they distribute themselves on the plane showing preferential movements towards point B. However, if we apply the second profile when some of the marbles have crossed the point C, but none have crossed point D, we will end up having most marbles back at point E (where we started from initially) but some also in the valley towards point A given sufficient time for the marbles to roll to the valley. Then again we apply the first profile and repeat the steps. If no marbles cross point C before the first marble crosses point D, we must apply the second profile shortly "before" the first marble crosses point D, to start over.

It easily follows that eventually we will have marbles at point A, but none at point B. Hence for a problem defined with having marbles at point A being a win and having marbles at point B a loss, we clearly win by playing two losing games.

The coin-tossing example

A second example of Parrondo's Paradox is drawn from the field of gambling. Consider playing two games, Game A and Game B with following rules. For convenience, define $C\_t$ to be our capital at time "t", immediately before we play a game.
# Winning a game earns us $1 and losing requires us to surrender $1. It follows that $C\_\{t+1\}\; =\; C\_t\; +1$ if we win at step "t" and $C\_\{t+1\}\; =\; C\_t\; -1$ if we lose at step "t".
# In Game A, we toss a biased coin, Coin 1, with probability of winning $P\_1=(1/2)-epsilon$. If $epsilon\; >\; 0$, this is clearly a losing game in the long run.
# In Game B, we first determine if our capital is a multiple of some integer $M$. If it is, we tossed a biased coin, Coin 2, with probability of winning $P\_2=(1/10)-epsilon$. If it is not, we toss another biased coin, Coin 3, with probability of winning $P\_3=(3/4)-epsilon,$. The role of $M$ is murky, and is not discussed in most articles about Parrondo's Paradox.

It is clear that by playing Game A, we will almost surely lose in the long run. Harmer and Abbott [G. P. Harmer and D. Abbott, "Losing strategies can win by Parrondo's paradox", Nature 402 (1999), 864] show via simulation that if $M=3$ and $epsilon\; =\; 0.005,$ Game B is an almost surely losing game as well. In fact, Game B is a Markov chain, and an analysis of its state transition matrix shows that the steady state probability of using coin 2 is 0.3836, and that of using coin 3 is 0.6164. As coin 2 is selected nearly 40% of the time, it has a disproportionate influence on the payoff from Game B, and results in it being a losing game.

However, when these two losing games are played in some alternating sequences - e.g. two games of A followed by two games of B (AABBAABB....), the combination of the two games is, paradoxically, a "winning" game. Not all alternating sequences of A and B result in winning games. For example, one game of A followed by one game of B (ABABAB...) is a losing game, while one game of A followed by two games of B (ABBABB....) is a winning game. This coin-tossing example has become the canonical illustration of Parrondo's Paradox – two games, both losing when played indvidually, become a winning game when played in a particular alternating sequence. The paradox has been resolved using a number of sophisticated approaches, including Markov Chains, [Harmer, G. P. and D. Abbott, , "Parrondo's Paradox", Statistical Science 14 (1999) 206-213] Flashing Ratchets, [Harmer, G. P., D. Abbott, P. G. Taylor and J. M. R. Parrondo, in "Proc. 2nd Int. Conf. Unsolved Problems of Noise and Fluctuations", D. Abbott, and L. B. Kiss, eds, American Institute of Physics, 2000] Simulated Annealing [Harmer, G. P., D. Abbott, and P.G. Taylor, "The Paradox of Parrondo's Games", Proc. Royal Society of London A 456 (2000), 1-13] and Information Theory. [Harmer, G. P., D. Abbott, P. G. Taylor, C. E. M. Pearce and J. M. R. Parrondo, "Information Entropy and Parrondo's Discrete-Time Ratchet", in "Proc. Stochastic and Chaotic Dynamics in the Lakes", Ambleside, U.K., P. V. E. McClintock, ed, American Institute of Physics, 2000] However, there is less to this paradox than meets the eye. Observe that:
* While Game B is a losing game under the probability distribution that results for $C\_t$ modulo $M$ when it is played individually ($C\_t$ modulo $M$ is the remainder when $C\_t$ is divided $M$), it can be a winning game under other distributions, as there is at least one state in which its expectation is positive.
* As the distribution of outcomes of Game B depend on the player's capital, the two games cannot be independent. If they were, playing them in any sequence would lose as well.

The role of $M$ now comes into sharp focus. It serves solely to induce a dependence between Games A and B, so that a player is more likely to enter states in which Game B has a positive expectation, allowing it to overcome the losses from Game A. With this understanding, the paradox resolves itself: The individual games are losing only under a distribution that differs from that which is actually encountered when playing the compound game. In summary, Parrondo's paradox is not a paradox, but a shining example of how dependence can wreak havoc with probabilistic computations made under an incorrect assumption of independence. A more detailed exposition of this point, along with several related examples, can be found in Philips and Feldman. [Philips, T. and Feldman, A. [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=581521 "Parrondo's Paradox is not Paradoxical"] ]

Application of Parrondo's paradox

Parrondo's paradox is used extensively in game theory, and its application in engineering, population dynamics, financial risk, etc. are also being looked into.

It is of little use in most practical situations e.g. investing in stock markets, as the paradox specifically requires the payoff from at least one of the interacting games to depend on the player's capital. This is unrealistic, and would constitute a free lunch for an observant gambler if it did indeed exist.

References

External links

* [http://seneca.fis.ucm.es/parr/GAMES/index.htm Parrondo's Paradox Game]
* [http://www.eleceng.adelaide.edu.au/Groups/parrondo/articles/sandiego.html Alternate game play ratchets up winnings: It's the law]
* [http://www.eleceng.adelaide.edu.au/Groups/parrondo Official Parrondo's paradox page]
* [http://www.cut-the-knot.org/ctk/Parrondo.shtml Parrondo's Paradox - A Simulation]
* [http://wizardofodds.com/askthewizard/149 The Wizard of Odds on Parrondo's Paradox]