Nagorno-Karabakh War
Nagorno-Karabakh War
Karabakhwar01.jpg
Clockwise from top: the remnants of Azeri transports, internally displaced Azerbaijanis from the Armenian-controlled areas, an Armenian T-72 tank memorial in Askeran, NKR troops climbing out of a trench during training exercises near Agdam.
Date 20 February 1988 – 16 May 1994
Location Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan
Result Decisive Armenian military victory

Ceasefire treaty (Bishkek Protocol, still in effect); ongoing peace talks to determine the future of the disputed territory

Territorial
changes
Establishment of the de facto independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, remaining a de jure part of Azerbaijan
Belligerents
 Nagorno-Karabakh
 Armenia

Supported by:
 CIS mercenaries

 Azerbaijan

Supported by:
Afghanistan Afghan mujahideen[1]
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Chechen fighters and mercenaries led by Shamil Basayev
 CIS mercenaries

Commanders and leaders
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Samvel Babayan
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Monte Melkonian  
Armenia Hamayak Haroyan
Armenia Vazgen Sargsyan
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Arkady Ter-Tatevosyan
Azerbaijan Isgandar Hamidov
Azerbaijan Surat Huseynov
Azerbaijan Rahim Gaziyev
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Shamil Basayev[2]
Afghanistan Gulbuddin Hekmatyar[1]
Strength
20,000 (NKR forces) 20,000 (Armenian forces)[3] 74,000[3]

2,000–3,000 Afghan and Chechen fighters[4]

Casualties and losses
Dead:
4,592[5]
Wounded: 25,000[citation needed]
Missing
196 [5]
Dead:
25,000[6][7]-30,000[5]
Wounded:
60,000[3][7]
Missing:
4,210[8]
Civilian deaths:
  • 1264 Armenian civilians (including citizens of Armenia)[5]
  • The exact number of the Azerbaijani civilian deaths is unknown as it has never been made official and is, probably, included in the overall death-toll and/or the number of missing civilians

Civilians missing:

  • 400 according to Karabakh State Commission[8]
  • 749 according to Azerbaijani State Commission[8]
Nagorno-Karabakh is currently a de facto independent republic in the South Caucasus, but is officially recognized as part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The Nagorno-Karabakh War was an armed conflict that took place from February 1988 to May 1994, in the small enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh[9] in southwestern Azerbaijan, between the majority ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh backed by the Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. As the war progressed, Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet Republics, entangled themselves in a protracted, undeclared war in the mountainous heights of Karabakh as Azerbaijan attempted to curb the secessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh. The enclave's parliament had voted in favor of uniting itself with Armenia and a referendum, boycotted by the Azerbaijani population of Nagorno-Karabakh, was held, whereby the vast majority of the voters voted in favor of independence. The demand to unify with Armenia, which proliferated in the late 1980s, began in a relatively peaceful manner; however, in the following months, as the Soviet Union's disintegration neared, it gradually grew into an increasingly violent conflict between ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis, resulting in claims of ethnic cleansing by both sides.[10][11]

Inter-ethnic fighting between the two broke out shortly after the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) in Azerbaijan, voted to unify the region with Armenia on 20 February 1988. The circumstances of the dissolution of the Soviet Union facilitated an Armenian separatist movement in Azerbaijan. The declaration of secession from Azerbaijan was the final result of a territorial conflict regarding the land.[12] As Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and removed the powers held by the enclave's government, the Armenian majority voted to secede from Azerbaijan and in the process proclaimed the unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.[13]

Full-scale fighting erupted in the late winter of 1992. International mediation by several groups including Europe's OSCE failed to bring an end resolution that both sides could work with. In the spring of 1993, Armenian forces captured regions outside the enclave itself, threatening the involvement of other countries in the region.[14] By the end of the war in 1994, the Armenians were in full control of most of the enclave and also held and currently control approximately 9% of Azerbaijan's territory outside the enclave.[15] As many as 230,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 800,000 Azeris from Armenia and Karabakh have been displaced as a result of the conflict.[16] A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994 and peace talks, mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group, have been held ever since by Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Contents

Background

The territorial ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh today is still heavily contested between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Called Artsakh by Armenians, its history spans over two millennia, during which it came under the control of several empires. The current conflict, however, has its roots in events following World War I. Shortly before the Ottoman Empire's capitulation in the war, the Russian Empire collapsed in November 1917 and fell under the control of the Bolsheviks. The three nations of the Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, previously under the rule of the Russians, declared their independence to form the Transcaucasian Federation which dissolved after only three months of existence.[7]

Armenian-Azerbaijani war

History of Nagorno-Karabakh
Dadivank fresco.JPG
This article is part of a series
Ancient History
Artsakh
Middle Ages
Principality of Khachen
Kingdom of Artsakh
Melikdoms of Karabakh
Modern Era
Karabakh Khanate
Russian Karabakh
Early 20th Century
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
Nagorno-Karabakh War
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh

  v · d · e

Fighting soon broke out between the Democratic Republic of Armenia and the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in three specific regions: Nakhchevan, Zangezur (today the Armenian province of Syunik) and Karabakh itself. Armenia and Azerbaijan quarreled as to where the boundaries would fall in accordance to the three provinces. The Karabakh Armenians attempted to declare their independence but failed to make contact with the Republic of Armenia.[7] Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, British troops occupied the South Caucasus in 1919. The British command provisionally affirmed Azerbaijani statesman Khosrov bey Sultanov as the governor-general of Karabakh and Zangezur, pending a final decision by the Paris Peace Conference.[17]

Soviet division

Two months later however, the Soviet 11th Army invaded the Caucasus and within three years, the Caucasian republics were formed into the Transcaucasian SFSR of the Soviet Union. The Bolsheviks thereafter created a seven-member committee, the Caucasus Bureau (often shortened to Kavburo). Under the supervision of the People's Commissar for Nationalities, the future Soviet ruler Joseph Stalin, the Kavburo was tasked to head up matters in the Caucasus.[18] On 4 July 1921 the committee voted 4–3 in favor of allocating Karabakh to the newly created Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia but a day later Kavburo reversed its decision and voted to leave the region within Azerbaijan SSR. The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was created in 1923,[7] leaving it with a population that was 94% Armenian.[19][20] The capital was moved from Shusha to Khankendi, which was later renamed as Stepanakert.

Armenian and Azeri scholars have speculated that the decision was an application by Russia of the principle of "divide and rule".[7] This can be seen, for example, by the odd placement of the Nakhichevan exclave, which is separated by Armenia but is a part of Azerbaijan. Others have also postulated that the decision was a goodwill gesture by the Soviet government to help maintain "good relations with Atatürk's Turkey."[21] Over the following decades of Soviet rule the Armenians retained a strong desire for unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, an aim that some members of the Armenian Communist Party, such as Aghasi Khanjian, attempted to accomplish.[12] The Armenians insisted that their national rights had been suppressed and their cultural and economic freedoms were being curtailed.[22]

Revival of the Karabakh issue

As the new general secretary of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, came to power in 1985, he began implementing his plans to reform the Soviet Union. These were encapsulated in two policies, perestroika and glasnost. While perestroika had more to do with economic reform, glasnost or "openness" granted limited freedom to Soviet citizens to express grievances about the Soviet system itself and its leaders. Capitalizing on this new policy of Moscow, the leaders of the Regional Soviet of Karabakh decided to vote in favor of unifying the autonomous region with Armenia on 20 February 1988.[23] Karabakh Armenian leaders complained that the region had neither Armenian language textbooks in schools nor in television broadcasting,[24] and that Azerbaijan's Communist Party General Secretary Heydar Aliyev had extensively attempted to "Azerify" the region and increase the influence and the number of Azeris living in Nagorno-Karabakh, while at the same time reducing its Armenian population (in 1987, Aliyev would step down as General Secretary of Azerbaijan's Politburo).[25] By 1988, the Armenian population of Karabakh had dwindled to nearly three-quarters of the total population.[26]

The movement was spearheaded by popular Armenian figures and found support among intellectuals in Russia as well. According to journalist Thomas De Waal members of the Russian intelligentsia, such as the dissident Andrei Sakharov expressed "rather simplistic support" for Armenians protesting on the streets of Yerevan due to the close relationships between Russian and Armenian intellectuals. However, Sakharov's opinion on Karabakh issue was controversial: at the beginning he took a pro-Armenian stance shaped by his Armenian wife but later he proposed more complex ways for the solution of the conflict.[7] More prominent support for the movement among the Moscow elite was interpreted by some in the public: in November 1987 L'Humanité published the personal comments made by Abel Aganbegyan, an economic adviser to Gorbachev, to Armenians living in France, in which he suggested that Nagorno-Karabakh could be ceded to Armenia. Prior to the declaration, Armenians had begun to protest and stage workers' strikes in Yerevan, demanding a unification with the enclave. This prompted Azeri counter-protests in Baku.

After the demonstrations in Yerevan, to demand unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, began, Gorbachev met with two leaders of the Karabakh movement, Zori Balayan and Silvia Kaputikyan on 26 February 1988. Gorbachev asked them for a one-month moratorium on demonstrations. When Kaputikyan returned to Armenia the same evening, she told the crowds the "Armenians [had] triumphed" although Gorbachev hadn't made any concrete promises. According to Svante Cornell, this was an attempt to pressure Moscow.[27] On 10 March Gorbachev stated that the borders between the republics would not change, in accordance with Article 78 of the Soviet constitution.[28] Gorbachev also stated that several other regions in the Soviet Union were yearning for territorial changes and redrawing the boundaries in Karabakh would thus set a dangerous precedent. But the Armenians viewed the 1921 Kavburo decision with disdain and felt that in their efforts they were correcting a historical error under the principle of self-determination, a right also granted in the constitution.[28] Azeris, on the other hand, found such calls for relinquishing their territory by the Armenians unfathomable and aligned themselves with Gorbachev's position.[29]

Askeran and Sumgait

Images showing burnt automobiles and marauding rioters on the streets of the industrial city of Sumgait during the pogrom there in February 1988.

Ethnic infighting soon broke out between Armenians and Azerbaijanis living in Karabakh. As early as the end of 1987 Azerbaijani refugees from the villages of Ghapan and Meghri in Armenia complained that they were forced to leave their homes as a result of tensions between their Armenian neighbors. In November 1987 two freight cars full of Azerbaijanis are alleged to have arrived at the train station in Baku. In later interviews, the mayors of the two villages denied that any such tension existed at the time and no such documentation has been adduced to support the notion of forced expulsions.[30]

On 20 February 1988 two Azerbaijani trainee student girls in Stepanakert hospital were allegedly raped by Armenians.[7] On 22 February 1988, a direct confrontation between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, near the town of Askeran (located on the road between Stepanakert and Agdam) in Nagorno-Karabakh, degenerated into a skirmish. During the clashes two Azerbaijani youths were killed. One of them was probably shot by a local policeman, possibly an Azerbaijani, either by accident or as a result of a quarrel.[7][31] On 27 February 1988, while speaking on Baku's central television, the Soviet Deputy Procurator Alexander Katusev reported that "two inhabitants of the Agdam district fell victim to murder" and gave their Muslim names.[27]

The clash in Askeran was the prelude to the pogroms in Sumgait, where emotions, already heightened by news about the Karabakh crisis, turned even uglier in a series of protests starting on 27 February 1988. Speaking at the rallies, Azerbaijani refugees from the Armenian town of Ghapan accused Armenians of "murder and atrocities including raping women and cutting their breasts off."[29] According to the Soviet media, these allegations were disproved and many of the speakers were revealed to be agents provocateurs.[32] Within hours, a pogrom against Armenian residents began in Sumgait, a city some 25 kilometers north of Baku. The pogroms resulted in the deaths of 32 people (26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis), according to official Soviet statistics, although many Armenians felt that the true figure was not reported.[33] Nearly all of Sumgait's Armenian population left the city after the pogrom. Armenians were beaten, raped, and killed both on the streets of Sumgait and inside their apartments in three days of violence that only subsided when Soviet armed forces entered the city and quelled much of the rioting on 1 March.[34] The manner in which they were killed reverberated among Armenians, recalling memories of the Armenian Genocide.[35]

On 23 March the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union rejected the demands of Armenians to cede Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Troops were sent to Yerevan to prevent protests against the decision. Gorbachev's attempts to stabilize the region were to no avail, as both sides remained equally intransigent. In Armenia, there was a firm belief that what had taken place in the region of Nakhichevan would be repeated in Nagorno-Karabakh: prior to its absorption by Soviet Russia, it had a population which was 40% Armenian;[36] by the late 1980s, its Armenian population was virtually non-existent.[37]

Interethnic violence

Armenians refused to allow the issue to subside despite a compromise made by Gorbachev, which included a promise of a 400 million-ruble package to introduce Armenian language textbooks and television programming in Karabakh. At the same time, Azerbaijan was unwilling to cede any territory to Armenia. Calls to transfer Karabakh to Armenia briefly subsided when a devastating earthquake which hit Armenia on 7 December 1988, leveling the towns of Leninakan (now Gyumri) and Spitak and killing an estimated 25,000 people.[37] But conflict brewed up once more when the eleven members of the newly formed Karabakh Committee, including the future president of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan, were jailed by Moscow officials in the ensuing chaos of the earthquake. Such actions polarized relations between Armenia and the Kremlin; Armenians lost faith in Gorbachev, despising him even more because of his handling of the earthquake relief effort and his uncompromising stance on Nagorno-Karabakh.[38]

In the months following the Sumgait pogroms, a forced population exchange took place as Armenians living in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis living in Armenia were compelled to abandon their homes.[39] According to the Azerbaijani government, between 27 and 29 November 1988 thirty three Azerbaijanis were killed in Spitak, Gugark and Stepanavan and a total of 215 in the 1987–1989 period.[40] Azerbaijani sources claim that a column of Azerbaijani refugees, banished from their homes under the threat of death, was massacred in Spitak on 28 November.[citation needed] According to Azerbaijani MP Arif Yunusov in November of the same year twenty Azerbaijanis from the Armenian village of Vartan were reportedly burned to death.[7] However, according to Armenian sources, the number of Azerbaijanis killed in the 1988–1989 period was 25.[41]

Interethnic fighting also spread throughout cities in Azerbaijan, including, in December 1988, in Kirovabad and Nakhichevan, where seven people (including four soldiers) were killed and hundreds injured when Soviet army units attempted once more to stop attacks directed at Armenians.[42] Estimates differ on how many people were killed during the first two years of the conflict. The Azerbaijani government alleges that 216 Azerbaijanis were killed in Armenia, while the researcher Arif Yunusov gives 127 to those killed in 1988 alone. An October 1989 piece by Time, however, stated that over 100 people were estimated to have been killed since February 1988, in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.[43]

Black January

Inter-ethnic strife began to take a toll on both countries' populations, forcing most of the Armenians in Azerbaijan to flee to Armenia and most of the Azeris in Armenia to Azerbaijan.[12] The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh had grown so out of hand that in January 1989 the central government in Moscow temporarily took control of the region, a move welcomed by many Armenians.[7] In September 1989, Popular Front leaders and their ever-increasing supporters managed to coordinate a railway blockade against Armenia and the NKAO, effectively crippling Armenia's economy, as 85% of the cargo and goods arrived through rail traffic,[12] although some claim this was a response to Armenia's embargo against Nakhichevan ASSR that had started earlier that summer.[39] The disruption of rail service to Armenia was, accordingly, in part due to the attacks of Armenian militants on Azerbaijani train crews entering Armenia, who then began refusing to do so.[29]

In January 1990, another pogrom directed at Armenians in Baku forced Gorbachev to declare a state of emergency and send MVD troops to restore order. Amid the rising independence movement in Azerbaijan, Gorbachev dispatched the military to dragoon the events, as the Soviet regime inched closer to collapse. Soviet troops received orders to occupy Baku at midnight on 20 January 1990. City residents, who saw tanks coming at about 5 AM, said the troops were the first to open fire.[44] The Shield Report, an independent commission from the USSR military procurator's office, rejected the military claims of returning fire, finding no evidence that those manning the barricades on the roads to Baku were armed.[44] A curfew was established and violent clashes between the soldiers and the surging Azerbaijan Popular Front were common, in one instance over 120 Azeris and eight MVD soldiers were killed in Baku.[45] During this time, however, Azerbaijan's Communist Party had fallen and the belated order to send the MVD forces had more to do with keeping the Party in power than with protecting the city's Armenian population.[46] The events, referred to as "Black January", also strained the relations between Azerbaijan and the central government.

Fighting in Qazakh

Azerbaijan has several enclaves within the territory of Armenia: Yukhari Askipara, Barkhudarli and Sofulu in the northwest and an exclave of Karki in the Nakhchivan exclave of Azerbaijan Republic. In early 1990, the road alongside the border village of Baganis came under routine attack by militia members from Azerbaijan.[47] At the same time, Armenian forces attacked both these Azerbaijani enclaves within the Armenian territory and border villages of Qazakh and Sadarak rayon in Azerbaijan proper. On 26 March 1990 several cars with Armenian paramilitaries arrived in the Armenian border village of Baganis. At dusk, they crossed the border storming the Azerbaijani village Bağanis Ayrum. About 20 houses were burned and 8 to 11 Azerbaijani villagers killed.[48] The bodies of members of one family, including infants, were found in the charred ruins of their burned homes. By the time the Soviet Interior Ministry troops arrived in Bağanis Ayrum, the attackers already fled.[47]

On 18 August, a significant accumulation of Armenian militants near the border was observed. The following day, department of the Armenian national army bombarded Azeri villages Yuxarı Əskipara, Bağanis Ayrum, Aşağı Əskipara and Quşçu Ayrım, and according to eyewitnesses used rocket-propelled grenades and mortars.[48] The first attack was repulsed with additional reinforcements arriving from Yerevan,[48] Armenian forces were able to seize Yuxarı Əskipara and Bağanis Ayrum. On 20 August, tanks, anti-aircraft guns and helicopter gunships of the Soviet army under the command of Major General Yuri Shatalin were brought in and by the end of the day all positions of Armenians were driven off.[48] According to the Soviet Ministry of Interior, one internal ministry officer and two police officers were killed, nine soldiers and thirteen residents were injured. According to Armenian media reports, five militants were killed and 25 were wounded; according to Azerbaijani media, about 30 were killed and 100 wounded.[48]

Operation Ring

In the spring of 1991, President Gorbachev held a special countrywide referendum called the Union Treaty which would decide if the Soviet republics would remain together. Newly elected, non-communist leaders had come to power in the Soviet republics, including Boris Yeltsin in Russia (Gorbachev remained the President of the Soviet Union), Levon Ter-Petrosyan in Armenia and Ayaz Mutalibov in Azerbaijan. Armenia and five other republics boycotted the referendum (Armenia would hold its own referendum and declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 21 September 1991), whereas Azerbaijan voted in compliance to the Treaty.[12]

As many Armenians and Azeris in Karabakh began an arms build up (by acquiring weaponry located in caches throughout Karabakh) in order to defend themselves, Mutalibov turned to Gorbachev for support in launching a joint military operation in order to disarm Armenian militants in the region. Termed Operation Ring, the operation forcibly deported Armenians living in the villages of the region of Shahumyan. It was perceived by both Soviet and Armenian government officials as a method of intimidating the Armenian populace to giving up their demands for unification.[12]

Operation Ring proved counter-productive to what it had originally sought to accomplish. Its violent character only reinforced the belief among Armenians that the only solution to the Karabakh conflict was through outright armed resistance. The initial Armenian resistance inspired volunteers to start forming irregular volunteer detachments.[7]

First attempt to mediate peace

First peace mediation efforts were started by the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin and Kazakhstan President, Nursultan Nazarbayev in September 1991. After peace talks in Baku, Ganja, Stepanakert (Khankendi) and Yerevan on 20–23 September, the sides agreed to sign the Zheleznovodsk Communiqué in the Russian city of Zheleznovodsk taking the principles of territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign states, observance of civil rights as a base of the agreement. The agreement was signed by Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, Mutalibov and Ter-Petrosian.[49] The peace efforts, however, came to a halt after an Azerbaijani MI-8 helicopter was shot down near the village of Karakend in the Khojavend district with peace mediating team consisting of Russian, Kazakh observers and Azerbaijani high-ranking officials on-board.[50]

Conflict in the last days of the USSR

In late 1991, Armenian militias launched offensives to capture Armenian populated villages seized by Azerbaijani OMON in May–July 1991. Leaving these villages, the Azerbaijani units in some cases burned them.[51] According to the Moscow-based Human Rights organization Memorial, at the same time, as a result of attacks by Armenian armed forces several thousand residents of Azerbaijani villages in the former Shahumian, Hadrut, Martakert, Askeran, Martuni rayons of Azerbaijan had to leave their homes too. Some villages (e.g., Imereti, Gerevent) were burned by the militants. There were instances of serious violence against the civilian population (in particular, in the village Meshali).[51]

Starting in late autumn of 1991, when the Azerbaijani side started its counter-offensive, the Armenian side began targeting Azerbaijani villages. According to Memorial, the villages Malibeyli and Gushchular, from which Azeri forces regularly bombarded Stepanakert,[52][53][54] were attacked by Armenians where the houses were burned and dozens of civilians were killed. Both sides accused the other that the villages were being used as strategic gathering points, covering the artillery positions.[51] On 19 December, Internal Ministry troops began to withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh, which was completed by 27 December.[55] With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of internal troops from Nagorno-Karabakh, the situation in the conflict zone became uncontrollable.

Weapons vacuum

As the disintegration of the Soviet Union became a reality for Soviet citizens in the autumn of 1991, both sides sought to acquire weaponry from military caches located throughout Karabakh. The initial advantage tilted in Azerbaijan's favor. During the Cold War, the Soviet military doctrine for defending the Caucasus had outlined a strategy where Armenia would be a combat zone in the case NATO member Turkey invaded from the west. Thus, in the Armenian SSR only three divisions and no airfields had been established while Azerbaijan had a total of five divisions and five military airfields. Furthermore, Armenia had approximately 500 railroad cars of ammunition in comparison to Azerbaijan's 10,000.[56]

As MVD forces began pulling out, they bequeathed the Armenians and Azerbaijanis a vast arsenal of ammunition and stored armored vehicles. The government forces initially sent by Gorbachev three years earlier were from other republics of the Soviet Union and many had no wish to remain any longer. Most were poor, young conscripts and many simply sold their weapons for cash or even vodka to either side, some even trying to sell tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs). The unsecured weapons caches led both sides to blame and mock Gorbachev's policies as the ultimate cause of the conflict.[57] The Azeris purchased a large quantity of these vehicles, as reported by the Azeri Foreign Ministry in November 1993, which said it had acquired 286 tanks, 842 armored vehicles and 386 artillery pieces from the power vacuum.[7] Several black markets also sprang up which brought in weaponry from the West.[58]

Further evidence also showed that Azerbaijan received substantial military aid and provisions from Turkey, Israel, Iran and numerous Arab countries.[37] Most weaponry was Russian-made or came from the former Eastern bloc countries; however, some improvisation was made by both sides. The Armenian Diaspora managed to donate a significant amount of money to be sent to Armenia and even managed to push for legislation in the United States Congress to pass a bill entitled Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in response to Azerbaijan's blockade against Armenia, restricting a complete ban on military aid from the United States to Azerbaijan in 1992.[59] While Azerbaijan charged that the Russians were initially helping the Armenians, it was said that "the Azeri fighters in the region [were] far better equipped with Soviet military weaponry than their opponents."[57]

With Gorbachev resigning as Soviet General-Secretary on 26 December 1991, the remaining republics including Ukraine, Belarus and Russia declared their independence and the Soviet Union ceased to exist on 31 December 1991. This dissolution gave way to any barriers that were keeping Armenia and Azerbaijan from waging a full scale war. One month prior, on 21 November, the Azerbaijani Parliament rescinded Karabakh's status as an autonomous region and renamed its capital "Xankandi." In response, on 10 December, a referendum was held in Karabakh by parliamentary leaders (with the local Azeri community boycotting it) where the Armenians voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence. On 6 January 1992, the region declared its independence from Azerbaijan.[12]

The withdrawal of the Soviet interior forces from Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus region was only temporary. By February 1992, the former Soviet states were consolidated as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). While Azerbaijan abstained from joining, Armenia, fearing a possible invasion by Turkey in the escalating conflict, entered the CIS which would have protected it under a "collective security umbrella". In January 1992, the CIS forces then moved in and established a headquarters at Stepanakert and took up a slightly more active role in peacekeeping, incorporating old units including the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 4th Army.[18]

Building armies

The sporadic battles between Armenians and Azeris had intensified after Operation Ring recruited thousands of volunteers into improvised armies from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Armenia, a recurrent and popular theme at the time compared and idolized the separatist fighters to historical Armenian guerrilla groups and revered individuals such as Andranik Ozanian and Garegin Nzhdeh, who fought against the Ottoman Empire during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[7] In addition to the government's conscription of males aged 18–45, many Armenians volunteered to fight and formed tchokats, or detachments, of about forty men, which combined with several others were under the command of a Lieutenant Colonel. Initially, many of these men chose when and where to serve and acted on their own behalf, rarely with any oversight, when attacking or defending areas.[37] Direct insubordination was common as many of the men simply did not show up, looted the bodies of dead soldiers and commodities such as diesel oil for armored vehicles disappeared only to be sold in black markets.[37]

Many women enlisted in the Nagorno-Karabakh military, taking part in the fighting as well as serving in auxiliary roles such as providing first-aid and evacuating wounded men from the battlefield.

Azerbaijan's military functioned in much the same manner; however, it was better organized during the first years of the war. The Azeri government also carried out conscription and many Azeris enthusiastically enlisted for combat in the first months after the Soviet Union collapsed. Azerbaijan's National Army consisted of roughly 30,000 men, in addition to nearly 10,000 in its OMON paramilitary force and several thousand volunteers from the Popular Front. Suret Huseynov, a wealthy Azeri, also improvised by creating his own military brigade, the 709th of the Azerbaijani Army and purchasing many weapons and vehicles from the 23rd Motor Rifle Division's arsenal.[7] İsgandar Hamidov's bozqurt or Grey Wolves brigade also mobilized for action. The government of Azerbaijan also poured a great deal of money into hiring mercenaries from other countries through the revenue it was making from its oil field assets on and near the Caspian Sea.[60]

Former troops of the Soviet Union also offered their services to either side. For example, one of the most prominent officers to serve on the Armenian side was former Soviet General Anatoly Zinevich, who remained in Nagorno-Karabakh for five years (1992–1997) and was involved in planning and implementation of many operations of the Armenian forces. By the end of war he held the position of Chief of Staff of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) armed forces. The estimated amount of manpower and military vehicles each entity involved in the conflict had in the 1993–1994 time period was:[61]

Entity Military Personnel Artillery Tanks Armored personnel carriers Armored fighting vehicles Fighter aircraft Helicopters
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh 20,000 16 13 120 N/A N/A N/A
Republic of Armenia 20,000 160[62]-170 77[62]-160 150[62]-240 39[62]-200 3[62] 13[62]
Republic of Azerbaijan 42,000 388[62]-395[63] 436[62]-458[63] 558[62]-1264[63] 389[62]-480 63[62]-170 45–51

Because at the time Armenia did not have the kind of far reaching treaties with Russia (signed later in 1997 and 2010), and because CSTO did not exist then, Armenia had to protect its border with Turkey by itself. Alexander Khranchikhin notes that for the duration of the war most of the military personnel and equipment of the Republic of Armenia stayed in Armenia proper guarding the Armenian-Turkish border against possible aggression.[62]

In an overall military comparison, the number of men eligible for military service in Armenia, in the age group of 17–32, totalled 550,000, while in Azerbaijan it was 1.3 million. Most men from both sides had served in the Soviet Army and so had some form of military experience prior to the conflict, including tours of duty in Afghanistan. Among Karabakh Armenians, about 60% had served in the Soviet Army.[61] Most Azeris, however, were often subject to discrimination during their service in the Soviet military and relegated to work in construction battalions rather than fighting corps.[64] Despite the establishment of two officer academies including a naval school in Azerbaijan, the lack of such military experience was one factor that rendered Azerbaijan unprepared for the war.[64]

Early Armenian victories

2 January 1992 Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov introduced presidential rule in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas.[65] From early February onwards, the Azeri villages of Malıbəyli, Karadagly and Agdaban were conquered and their population evicted, leading to at least 99 civilian deaths and 140 wounded.[39]

Khojaly

Memorial to the victims of Khojaly Massacre in Baku

Officially, the newly created Republic of Armenia publicly denied any involvement in providing any weapons, fuel, food, or other logistics to the secessionists in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Ter-Petrosyan later did admit to supplying them with logistical supplies and paying the salaries of the separatists but denied sending any of its own men to combat. Armenia faced a debilitating blockade by the now Republic of Azerbaijan as well as pressure from neighboring Turkey, which decided to side with Azerbaijan and build a closer relationship with it.[66] The only land connection Armenia had with Karabakh was through the narrow mountainous Lachin corridor which could only be reached by helicopters. The region's only airport was in the small town of Khojaly, which was seven kilometers north of Stepanakert with an estimated population of 6,000–10,000 people. Additionally, Khojaly had been serving as an artillery base and since 23 February, was shelling Armenian and Russian units in the capital.[29] By late February, Khojaly had largely been cut off. On 26 February, Armenian forces, with the aid of some of armored vehicles from the 366th, mounted an offensive to capture Khojaly.

According to the Azerbaijani side and the affirmation of other sources including Human Rights Watch, the Moscow based human rights organization Memorial and the biography of a leading Armenian commander, Monte Melkonian, documented and published by his brother,[67] after Armenian forces captured Khojaly, they proceeded to kill several hundred civilians evacuating from the town. Armenian forces had previously stated they would attack the city and leave a land corridor for them to escape through. However, when the attack began, the attacking Armenian force easily outnumbered and overwhelmed the defenders who along with the civilians attempted to retreat north to the Azeri held city of Agdam. The airport's runway was found to have been intentionally destroyed, rendering it temporarily useless. The attacking forces then went on to pursue those fleeing through the corridor and opened fire upon them, killing scores of civilians.[67] Facing charges of an intentional massacre of civilians by international groups, Armenian government officials denied the occurrence of a massacre and asserted an objective of silencing the artillery coming from Khojaly.[68]

An exact body count was never ascertained but conservative estimates have placed the number to 485.[7] The official death toll according to Azerbaijani authorities for casualties suffered during the events of 25–26 February is 613 civilians, of them 106 women and 83 children.[69] On 3 March 1992, the Boston Globe reported over 1,000 people had been slain over four years of conflict. It quoted the mayor of Khojaly, Elmar Mamedov, as also saying 200 more were missing, 300 were held hostage and 200 injured in the fighting.[70] A report published in 1992 by the human rights organization Helsinki Watch however stated that their inquiry found that the Azerbaijani OMON and "the militia, still in uniform and some still carrying their guns, were interspersed with the masses of civilians" which may have been the reason why Armenian troops fired upon them.[71]

Capture of Shusha

The road leading up to Shusha was the scene of a famous fighting engagement between Armenian and Azerbaijani armored vehicles.

When Armenians launched one of the first offensives, at Stepanakert on 13 February 1988, many Azerbaijanis fled to the stronghold of Shusha. On 28 March Azerbaijani side by deploying attack on Stepanakert, from the village Dzhangasan attacked enemy positions above the village Kirkidzhan, and in the afternoon the next day took up positions in close proximity to the city, but were quickly repulsed by the Armenians.[72]

In the ensuing months after the capture of Khojaly, Azeri commanders holding out in the region's last bastion of Shusha began a large scale artillery bombardment with GRAD rocket launchers against Stepanakert. By April, the shelling had forced many of the 50,000 people living in Stepanakert to seek refuge in underground bunkers and basements.[57] Facing ground incursions near the city's outlying areas, military leaders in Nagorno-Karabakh organized an offensive to take the town.

On 8 May, a force of several hundred Armenian troops accompanied by tanks and helicopters attacked the Azeri citadel of Shusha. Fierce fighting took place in the town's streets and several hundred men were killed on both sides. Overwhelmed by the numerically superior fighting force, the Azeri commander in Shusha ordered a retreat and fighting ended on 9 May.[37]

The capture of Shusha resonated loudly in neighboring Turkey. Its relations with Armenia had grown better after it had declared its independence from the Soviet Union; however, they gradually worsened as a result of Armenia's gains in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Turkey's prime minister, Suleyman Demirel said that he was under intense pressure by his people to have his country intervene and aid Azerbaijan. Demirel, however, was opposed to such an intervention, saying that Turkey's entrance into the war would trigger an even greater Muslim-Christian conflict (Turks are overwhelmingly Muslims).[73]

Turkey never did send troops to Azerbaijan but did provide substantial military aid and advisers. In May 1992, the military commander of the CIS forces, Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, issued a warning to Western nations, especially the United States, to not interfere with the conflict in the Caucasus, stating it would "place us [the Commonwealth] on the verge of a third world war and that cannot be allowed."[12]

A Chechen contingent, led by Shamil Basayev, was one of the units to participate in the conflict. According to Azeri Colonel Azer Rustamov, in 1992, "hundreds of Chechen volunteers rendered us invaluable help in these battles led by Shamil Basayev and Salman Raduev."[74] Basayev was said to be one of the last fighters to leave Shusha. According to Russian news reports Basayev later said during his career, he and his battalion had only lost once and that defeat came in Karabakh in fighting against the "Dashnak battalion."[74] He later said he pulled his forces out of the conflict because the war seemed to be more for nationalism than for religion.[74] Basayev received direct military training from the Russian GRU during the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993) since the Abkhaz were backed by Russia. Other Chechens also were trained by the GRU in warfare, many of these Chechens who fought for the Russians in Abkhazia against Georgia had fought for Azerbaijan against Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh war.[75]

Sealing Lachin

The loss of Shusha led the Azeri parliament to lay the blame on Mamedov, which removed him from power and cleared Mutalibov of any responsibility after the loss of Khojaly, reinstating him as President on 15 May 1992. Many Azeris saw this act as a coup in addition to the cancellation of the parliamentary elections slated in June of that year. The Azeri parliament at that time was made up of former leaders from the country's communist regime and the losses of Khojaly and Shusha only aggrandized their desires for free elections.[12]

To contribute to the turmoil, an offensive was launched by Armenian forces on 18 May to take the city of Lachin in the narrow corridor separating Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The city itself was poorly guarded and, within the next day, Armenian forces took control of the town and cleared any remaining Azeris to open the road that linked the region to Armenia. The taking of the city then allowed an overland route to be connected with Armenia itself with supply convoys beginning to trek up the mountainous region of Lachin to Karabakh.[76]

The loss of Lachin was the final blow to Mutalibov's regime. Demonstrations were held despite Mutalibov's ban and an armed coup was staged by Popular Front activists. Fighting between government forces and Popular Front supporters escalated as the political opposition seized the parliament building in Baku as well as the airport and presidential office. On 16 June 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey was elected leader of Azerbaijan with many political leaders from the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party were elected into the parliament. The instigators characterized Mutalibov as an undedicated and weak leader in the war in Karabakh. Elchibey was staunchly against receiving any help from the Russians, instead favoring closer ties to Turkey.[77]

The fighting also spilled into nearby Nakhchivan, which was shelled by Armenian troops in May 1992.[78]

Escalation

Operation Goranboy

Operation Goranboy was a large scale Azerbaijani offensive in the summer of 1992 aimed at taking control over the entire Nagorno-Karabakh and putting a decisive end to the resistance. This offensive is regarded as the only successful breakthrough by the Azeri Army and marks the peak of Azerbaraijani success in the entirety of the six-year long conflict. It also marks the beginning of a new, more intense, phase of the war. Over 8,000 Azeri troops and four additional battalions, at least 90 tanks and 70 Infantry fighting vehicles, as well as Mi-24 attack-helicopters were used in this operation.

On 12 June 1992, the Azeri military first launched a large scale diversionary attack in the direction of the Askeran region at the center of Nagorno-Karabakh. Two groups of Azeris totaling 4,000 troops attacked the positions to the north and south of Askeran. As a result of fierce fighting Azeris managed to establish control over some settlements in Askeran region: Nakhichevanik, Arachadzor, Pirdzhamal, Dahraz and Agbulak. On 4 July 1992, Azeris captured the largest town in the region, Mardakert.

The scale of the Azeri offensive prompted the Armenian government to openly threaten Azerbaijan that it would overtly intervene and assist the separatists fighting in Karabakh.[79] The assault forced Armenian forces to retreat south towards Stepanakert where Karabakh commanders contemplated destroying a vital hydroelectric dam in the Martakert region if the offensive was not halted. An estimated 30,000 Armenian refugees were also forced to flee to the capital as the assaulting forces had taken back nearly half of Nagorno-Karabakh.

However, the thrust made by the Azeris ground to a halt when their armor was driven off by helicopter gunships.[7] It was claimed that many of the crew members of the armored units in the Azeri launched assault were Russians from the 104th Guards Airborne Division based out of Ganja and, ironically enough, so were the units who eventually stopped them. According to an Armenian government official, they were able to persuade Russian military units to bombard and effectively halt the advance within a few days. This allowed the Armenian government to recuperate for the losses and reorganize a counteroffensive to restore the original lines of the front.[7] Given the reorganization of the NKR Defense Army, the tide of Azeri advances was finally stopped. By the autumn of 1992, the Azerbaijani army was exhausted and suffered heavy loses, and in February–March of the following year, the NKR Defense Army helped turn the tide into an unprecedented wave of advances.

Subsequent attempts to mediate peace

New peace mediation efforts were initiated by the Iranian President, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in the first half of 1992. First attempts by Iran to mediate a ceasefire were previously disrupted by massacre of Khojaly. However, after conducting shuttle diplomacy in Armenia and Azerbaijan for several weeks, Iranian authorities were able to bring President of Azerbaijan, Yaqub Mammadov and President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosian to Tehran for bilateral talks on 7 May 1992.[80][81] The Tehran Communiqué was signed by Mammadov, Ter-Petrosian and Rafsanjani following the agreement of the parties to international legal norms, stability of borders and to deal with refugee crisis. However, the peace efforts were disrupted on the next day when Armenian troops captured the town of Shusha and completely failed following the capture of the town Lachin on 18 May.[82]

In the summer of 1992, the CSCE (later to become the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), created the Minsk Group in Helsinki which comprised eleven nations and was co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States with the purpose of mediating a peace deal with Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, in their annual summit in 1992, the organization failed to address and solve the many new problems that had arisen since the Soviet Union collapsed, much less the Karabakh conflict. The war in Yugoslavia, Moldova's war with the breakaway republic of Transnistria, the growing desire for independence from Russia by Chechen separatists and Georgia's renewed disputes with Russia, Abkhazia and Ossetia were all top agenda issues that involved various ethnic groups fighting each other.[83]

The CSCE proposed the use of NATO and CIS peacekeepers to monitor ceasefires and protect shipments of humanitarian aid being sent to displaced refugees. Several ceasefires were put into effect after the June offensive but the implementation of a European peacekeeping force, endorsed by Armenia, never came to fruition. The idea of sending 100 international observers to Karabakh was once raised but talks broke down completely between Armenian and Azeri leaders in July. Russia was especially opposed to allowing a multinational peacekeeping force from NATO to entering the Caucasus, seeing it as a move that encroached on its "backyard".[12]

Mardakert and Martuni Offensives

In late June, a new, smaller Azeri offensive was planned, this time against the town of Martuni in the southeastern half of Karabakh. The attack force consisted of several dozen tanks and armored fighting vehicles along with a complement of several infantry companies massing along the Machkalashen and Jardar fronts near Martuni and Krasnyy Bazar. Martuni's regimental commander, Monte Melkonian, referred now by his men as "Avo", although lacking heavy armor, managed to stave off repeated attempts by the Azeri forces.[37]

In late August 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh's government found itself in a disorderly state and its members resigned on 17 August. Power was subsequently assumed by a council called the State Defense Committee which was chaired by Robert Kocharyan, stating it would temporarily govern the enclave until the conflict ended.[7] At the same time, Azerbaijan also launched attacks by fixed-wing aircraft, often bombing civilian targets. Kocharyan condemned what he believed were intentional attempts to kill civilians by the Azeris and also Russia's alleged passive and unconcerned attitude towards allowing its army's weapons stockpiles to be sold or transferred to Azerbaijan.[84]

Winter thaw

Azerbaijani female soldiers

As the winter of 1992 approached, both sides largely abstained from launching full scale offensives so as to reserve resources, such as gas and electricity, for domestic use. Despite the opening of an economic highway to the residents living in Karabakh, both Armenia and the enclave suffered a great deal due to the economic blockades imposed by Azerbaijan. While not completely shut off, material aid sent through Turkey arrived sporadically.[12]

Experiencing both food shortages and power shortages, after the close down of the Metsamor nuclear power plant, Armenia's economic outlook appeared bleak: in Georgia, a new bout of civil wars against separatists in Abkhazia and Ossetia began, who raided supply convoys and repeatedly destroyed the only oil pipeline leading from Russia to Armenia. Similar to the winter of 1991–1992, the 1992–1993 winter was especially cold, as many families throughout Armenia and Karabakh were left without heating and hot water.[85]

Other goods such as grain were more difficult to procure. The international Armenian Diaspora raised money and donated supplies for Armenia. In December, two shipments of 33,000 tons of grain and 150 tons of infant formula arrived from the United States via the Black Sea port of Batumi, Georgia.[85] In February 1993, the European Community sent 4.5 million ECUs to Armenia.[85] Armenia's southern neighbor Iran, also helped Armenia economically by providing power and electricity. Elchibey's oppositional stance against Iran and his remarks to unify with Iran's Azeri minority alienated relations between the two.

Azeris displaced as internal and international refugees were forced to live in makeshift camps provided by both the Azerbaijan government and Iran. The International Red Cross also distributed blankets to the Azeris and noted that by December, enough food was being allocated for the refugees.[86] Azerbaijan also struggled to rehabilitate its petroleum industry, the country's chief export. Its oil refineries were not generating at full capacity and production quotas fell well short of estimates. In 1965, the oil fields in Baku were producing 21.5 million tons of oil annually; by 1988, that number had dropped down to almost 3.3 million. Outdated Soviet refinery equipment and a reluctance by Western oil companies to invest in a war region where pipelines would routinely be destroyed prevented Azerbaijan from fully exploiting its oil wealth.[12]

Summer 1993

Conflicts

Despite the grueling winter both countries had suffered, the new year was viewed enthusiastically by both sides. Azerbaijan's President Elchibey expressed optimism towards bringing an agreeable solution to the conflict with Armenia's Ter-Petrosyan. Glimmers of such hope, however, quickly began to fade in January 1993, despite the calls for a new ceasefire by Boris Yeltsin and George H. W. Bush, as hostilities in the region brewed up once more.[87] Armenian forces began a new bout of offensives that overran villages in northern Karabakh that had been held by the Azeris since the previous autumn.

Frustration over these military defeats took a toll in the domestic front in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's military had grown more desperate and defense minister Gaziev and Huseynov's brigade turned to Russian help, a move which ran against Elchibey's policies construable as insubordination. Political infighting and arguments on where to shift military units between the country's ministry of the interior İsgandar Hamidov and Gaziev led to the latter's resignation on 20 February. A political shakeup also occurred in Armenia when Ter-Petrosyan dismissed the country's prime minister, Khosrov Arutyunyan and his cabinet for failing to implement a viable economic plan for the country. Protests by Armenians against Ter-Petrosyan's leadership were also suppressed and put down.[88]

Kelbajar

An Armenian engineer repairing a captured Azeri tank. Note the crescent emblem on the turret of the tank.

Situated west of northern Karabakh, out of the boundaries of the region, was the rayon of Kelbajar which bordered alongside Armenia. With a population of about 60,000, the several dozen villages were made up of Azeris and Kurds.[89] In March 1993, the Armenian-held areas near the Sarsang reservoir in Mardakert were reported to have been coming under attack by the Azeris. After successfully defending the Martuni region, Melkonian's fighters were tasked to move to capture the region of Kelbajar, where the incursions and purported artillery shelling were said to have been coming from.[37]

Scant military opposition by the Azeris allowed Melkonian's fighters to quickly gain a foothold in the region and also captured several abandoned armored vehicles and tanks. At 2:45 pm, on 2 April, Armenian forces from two directions advanced towards Kelbajar in an attack that quickly struck against Azeri armor and troops entrenched near the Ganje-Kelbjar intersection. Azeri forces were unable to halt advances made by Armenian armor units and nearly all died defending the area. The second attack towards Kelbajar also quickly overran the defenders. By 3 April, Armenian forces had captured Kelbajar.[37] President Elchibey imposed a state of emergency for a period of two months and introduced universal conscription.

The offensive provoked international rancor against the Armenian government, marking the first time Armenian forces had crossed the boundaries of the enclave itself and into Azerbaijan's territory. On 30 April, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 822, co-sponsored by Turkey and Pakistan, affirming Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and demanding that Armenian forces withdraw from Kelbajar.[90] Human Rights Watch findings concluded that during the Kelbajar offensive Armenian forces committed numerous violations of the rules of war, including forcible exodus of civilian population, indiscriminate fire and taking hostages.[89]

The political repercussions were also felt in Azerbaijan when Huseynov embarked on his "march to Baku" from Ganje. Frustrated with what he felt was Elchibey's incompetence in dealing with the conflict and demoted from his rank of colonel, his brigade advanced towards Baku to unseat the President in early June. Elchibey stepped down from office on 18 June and power was assumed by then parliamentary member Heydar Aliyev. On 1 July, Huseynov was appointed prime minister of Azerbaijan.[91] As acting president, Aliyev disbanded 33 voluntary battalions of the Popular Front, whom he deemed politically unreliable.[92]

Agdam, Fizuli, Jabrail and Zangilan

Ruins of Agdam (2009)

While the people of Azerbaijan were adjusting to the new political landscape, many Armenians were coping with the death of Melkonian who was killed earlier on 12 June in a skirmish near the town of Merzuli as his death was publicly mourned at a national level in Yerevan. The Armenian forces exploited the political crisis in Baku, which had left the Karabakh front almost undefended by the Azerbaijani forces.[7] The following four months of political instability in Azerbaijan led to the loss of control over five districts, as well as the north of Nagorno-Karabakh.[7] Azerbaijani military forces were unable to put up much resistance to Armenian advances and left most of the areas without any serious fighting.[7] In late June, they were driven out from Martakert, losing their final foothold of the enclave. By July, the Armenian forces were preparing to attack and capture the region of Agdam, another rayon nestled outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, claiming that they were attempting to bolster a greater barrier to keep Azeri artillery out of range.[93]

On 4 July, an artillery bombardment was commenced by Armenian forces against the region's capital of Agdam, destroying many parts of the town. Soldiers, along with the civilians began to evacuate Agdam. Facing a military collapse, Aliev attempted to mediate with the de-facto Karabakh government and Minsk Group officials. In mid-August, Armenians massed a force to take the Azeri regions of Fizuli and Jebrail, south of Nagorno-Karabakh proper.

In light of the Armenians' advance into Azerbaijan, Turkey's prime minister Tansu Çiller, warned the Armenian government not to attack Nakhichevan and demanded that Armenians pull out of Azerbaijan's territories. Thousands of Turkish troops were sent to the border between Turkey and Armenia in early September. Russian Federation forces in Armenia countered their movements and thus warded off any possibility that Turkey might play a military role in the conflict.[94]

By early September, Azeri forces were nearly in complete disarray. Many of the heavy weapons they had received and bought from the Russians were either taken out of action or abandoned during the battles. Since the June 1992 offensive, Armenian forces had captured dozens of tanks, light armor and artillery from the Azeri forces. For example, according to Monte Melkonian in a television interview in March 1993, his forces in Martuni alone had captured or destroyed a total of 55 T-72s, 24 BMP-2s, 15 APCs and 25 pieces of heavy artillery since the June 1992 Azeri offensive, stating that "most of our arms...[were] captured from Azerbaijan."[37] Serzh Sargsyan, the then military leader of the Karabakh armed forces claimed they had captured a total of 156 tanks throughout the war.[7] By the summer of 1993, Armenian forces had captured so much equipment that many of them were praising Elchibey's war policies since he was, in effect, arming both sides.[37]

Further signs of Azerbaijan's desperation included the recruitment by Aliev of 1,000–1,500 Afghan and Arab mujahadeen fighters from Afghanistan. Although the Azerbaijani government denied this claim, correspondence and photographs captured by Armenian forces indicated otherwise.[12] Other sources of foreign help arrived from Pakistan and also Chechnya including guerilla fighter Shamil Basayev.[95] The United States-based petroleum company, Mega Oil, also hired several American military trainers as a prerequisite for it to acquire drilling rights to Azerbaijan's oil fields.[60]

Aerial warfare

The aerial warfare in Karabakh involved primarily fighter jets and attack helicopters. The primary transport helicopters of the war were the Mi-8 and its cousin, the Mi-17 and were used extensively by both sides. Armenia's active air force consisted of only two Su-25 ground support bombers, one of which was lost due to friendly fire. There were also several Su-22s and Su-17s; however, these aging craft took a backseat for the duration of the war.[96]

Azerbaijan's air force was composed of forty-five combat aircraft which were often piloted by experienced Russian and Ukrainian mercenaries from the former Soviet military. They flew mission sorties over Karabakh with such sophisticated jets as the MiG-25 and Sukhoi Su-24 and with older-generation Soviet fighter bombers, such as the MiG-21. They were reported to have been paid a monthly salary of over 5,000 rubles and flew bombing campaigns from air force bases in Azerbaijan often targeting Stepanakert.[96]

These pilots, like the men from the Soviet interior forces in the onset of the conflict, were also poor and took the jobs as a means of supporting their families. Several were shot down over the city by Armenian forces and according to one of the pilots' commanders, with assistance provided by the Russians. Many of these pilots faced the threat of execution by Armenian forces if they were shot down. The setup of the defense system severely hampered Azerbaijan's ability to carry out and launch more air strikes.[96] The most widely used helicopter gunship by both the Armenians and Azeris was the Soviet-made Mil Mi-24 Krokodil.[97]

Armenian and Azerbaijani aircraft equipment during the war

Below is a table listing the number of aircraft that were used by Armenia and Azerbaijan during the war.[98]

1993–1994 attack waves

The final borders of the conflict after the 1994 ceasefire was signed. Armenian forces of Nagorno-Karabakh currently control almost 9% of Azerbaijan's territory outside the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.[7][16] Azerbaijani forces, on the other hand, control Shahumian and the eastern parts of Martakert and Martuni.

In October 1993, Aliev was formally elected as President and promised to bring social order to the country in addition to recapturing the lost regions. In October, Azerbaijan joined the CIS. The winter season was marked with similar conditions as in the previous year, both sides scavenging for wood and harvesting foodstuffs months in advance. Two subsequent UNSC resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were passed, (874 and 884), in October and November and, although reemphasizing the same points as the previous two, they acknowledged Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to the conflict.[90]

In early January, Azerbaijani forces and Afghan guerrillas recaptured part of the Fizuli district, including the railway junction of Horadiz on the Iranian border, but failed to recapture the town of Fizuli itself.[100] On 10 January 1994, an offensive was launched by Azerbaijan towards the region of Martakert in an attempt to recapture the northern section of the enclave. The offensive managed to advance and take back several parts of Karabakh in the north and to the south of but soon stalled. The Republic of Armenia began sending conscripts and regular Army and Interior Ministry troops to stop Azerbaijani advancements in Karabakh.[89] To bolster the ranks of its army, the Armenian government issued a decree, instituting a three-month call-up for men up to age forty-five and resorted to press-gang raids to enlist recruits. Several active-duty Armenian Army soldiers were captured by the Azerbaijani forces.[89]

Azerbaijan's offensives grew more dire as men as young as 16 with little to no training at all were recruited and sent to take part in ineffective human wave attacks, tactics once employed by Iran during the Iran–Iraq War. The two offensives that took place in the winter cost Azerbaijan as many as 5,000 men (at the loss of several hundred Armenians).[12] The main Azeri offensive was aimed at recapturing the Khelbajar district, thus threatening the Lachin corridor. The attack initially met little resistance and was successful in capturing the vital Omar Pass. However, as the Armenian forces reacted, the bloodiest clashes of the war ensued and the Azeri forces were soundly defeated. Several Azeri brigades were isolated when the Armenians recaptured the Omar Pass and were eventually surrounded and destroyed.

While the political foundations changed hands several times in Azerbaijan, most Armenian soldiers in Karabakh claimed that the youths and Azeris themselves, were demoralized and lacked a sense of purpose and commitment to fighting the war.[101] Russian professor Georgiy I. Mirsky also supported this viewpoint, stating that "Karabakh does not matter to Azerbaijanis as much as it does to Armenians. Probably, this is why young volunteers from Armenia proper have been much more eager to fight and die for Karabakh than the Azerbaijanis have."[102] This reality was reflected by a journalist who noted that "In Stepanakert, it is impossible to find an able-bodied man – whether volunteer from Armenia or local resident – out of uniform. [Whereas in] Azerbaijan, draft-age men hang out in cafes."[103] Andrei Sakharov also supported this view, stating, "For Azerbaijan the issue of Karabakh is a matter of ambition, for the Armenians of Karabakh, it is a matter of life or death."[38]

1994 ceasefire

The graves of Azerbaijani soldiers in the city of Baku.

After six years of intensive fighting, both sides were ready for a ceasefire. Azerbaijan, after exhausting nearly all its manpower, was relying on a ceasefire to be put forth by either the CSCE or by Russia as Armenian commanders stated their forces had an unimpeded path towards Baku. The borders, however, were confined to Karabakh and the immediate rayons surrounding it. Diplomatic channels increased between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the month of May.[12] The final battles of the conflict took place near Shahumyan in a series of brief engagements between Armenian and Azeri forces at Gulustan.

On 16 May, the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia met in Moscow to sign a truce that would effectively call for a cessation of hostilities. In Azerbaijan, many welcomed the end of hostilities, while others felt that a contingent of peacekeeping troops to remain temporarily in the area should not have come from Russia. Sporadic fighting continued in some parts of the region but all sides affirmed that they would stay committed to honoring the ceasefire.[104]

Media coverage

Valuable footage of the conflict was provided by a number of journalists from both sides, including Vardan Hovhannisyan, who won the 2007 Tribeca Film Festival's prize for best new documentary filmmaker for his A Story of People in War and Peace, and Chingiz Mustafayev, who was posthumously awarded the title of National Hero of Azerbaijan. Armenian-Russian journalist Dmitri Pisarenko who spent a year at the front line and filmed many of the battles later wrote that both Armenian and Azerbaijani journalists were preoccupied with echoing the official stands of their respective governments and that "objectiveness was being sacrificed for ideology." Armenian military commanders were eager to give interviews following Azerbaijani offensives when they were able to criticise the other side for launching heavy artillery attacks that the "small-numbered but proud Armenians" had to fight off. Yet they were reluctant to speak out when Armenian troops seized a village outside Nagorno-Karabakh in order to avoid justifying such acts. Therefore Armenian journalists felt the need to be creative enough to portray the event as "an Armenian counter-offensive" or as "a necessary military operation."[105]

Bulgarian journalist Tsvetana Paskaleva is noted for her coverage of Operation Ring. According to professor Karim H. Karim from Carleton University, foreign journalists previously concerned with emphasizing the Soviet conceding in the Cold War, gradually shifted towards presenting the USSR as a country swamped by a wave of ethnic conflicts, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict being one of them.[106] Due to lack of available information about the roots and causes of the conflict, foreign reporters filled the information vacuum with constant references to the religious factor, i.e. the fact that Armenians were predominantly Christian, whereas Azeris were predominantly Muslim; a factor which in fact was virtually irrelevant in the course of the entire conflict.[107] Readers already aware of rising military Islamism in the Middle East were considered a perfect audience to be informed of a case of "Muslim oppressors victimising a Christian minority," according to Karim.[106] Religion was unduly stressed more than political, territorial and ethnic factors, with very rare references to democratic and self-determination movements in both countries. It was not until the Khojaly Massacre in late February 1992, when hundreds of civilian Azeris were massacred by Armenian units, that references to religion largely disappeared, as being contrary to the neat journalistic scheme where "Christian Armenians" were shown as victims and "Muslim Azeris" as their victimisers. A study of four largest Canadian newspapers covering the event showed that the journalists tended to present the massacre of Azeris as a secondary issue, as well as to rely on Armenian sources, to give priority to Armenian denials over Azerbaijani "allegations" (which were described as "grossly exaggerated"), to downplay the scale of death, not to publish images of the bodies and mourners, and not to mention the event in editorials and opinion columns.[106]

Post-ceasefire violence and mediation

Today, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains one of several frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet states along with Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as Moldova's troubles with Transnistria. Karabakh remains under the jurisdiction of the government of the unrecognized but de facto independent Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and maintains its own uniformed military, the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army.[108]

Contrary to media reports which nearly always mentioned the religions of the Armenians and Azeris, religious aspects never gained significance as an additional casus belli, and it has remained primarily an issue of territory and the human rights of Armenians in Karabakh.[109] Since 1995, the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group has been mediating with the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan to settle for a new solution. Numerous proposals have been made which have primarily been based on both sides making several concessions. One such proposal stipulated that as Armenian forces withdrew from the seven regions surrounding Karabakh, Azerbaijan would share some of its economic assets including profits from an oil pipeline that would go from Baku through Armenia to Turkey.[110] Other proposals also included that Azerbaijan would provide the broadest form of autonomy to the enclave next to granting it full independence. Armenia has also been pressured by being excluded from major economic projects throughout the region, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway.[110]

According to Armenia's former president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, by giving certain Karabakh territories to Azerbaijan, the Karabakh conflict would have been resolved in 1997. A peace agreement could have been concluded and a status for Nagorno-Karabakh would have been determined. Ter-Petrossian noted that the Karabakh leadership approach was maximalist and “they thought they could get more.”[111][112][113] Most autonomy proposals have been rejected, however, by the Armenians, who consider it as a matter that is not negotiable. Likewise, Azerbaijan has also refused to let the matter subside and regularly threatens to resume hostilities.[114] On 30 March 1998, Robert Kocharyan was elected President and continued to reject calls for making a deal to resolve the conflict. In 2001, Kocharyan and Aliyev met at Key West, Florida for peace talks sponsored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. While several Western diplomats expressed optimism, failure to prepare the populations of either country for compromise reportedly thwarted hopes for a peaceful resolution.[115]

Refugees displaced from the fighting account to nearly one million people. An estimated 400,000 Armenians living in Azerbaijan fled to Armenia or Russia and a further 30,000 came from Karabakh.[116] Many of those who left Karabakh returned after the war ended.[117] An estimated 800,000 Azeris were displaced from the fighting including those from both Armenia and the enclave.[16] Various other ethnic groups living in Karabakh were also forced to live in refugee camps built by both the Azeri and Iranian governments.[118] Although the issue of amount of Azeri territory controlled by Armenians has often been claimed to be 20% and even as high 40%, the number is estimated, taking into account the exclave of Nakhichevan, 13.62% or 14% (the number comes down to 9% if the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is excluded).[7]

The ramifications of the war were said to have played a part in the February 2004 murder of Armenian Lieutenant Gurgen Markaryan who was hacked to death with an axe by his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ramil Safarov at a NATO training seminar in Budapest, Hungary.[119] Azerbaijani enmity against anything Armenian led to the destruction of thousands of medieval Armenian gravestones, known as khachkars, at a massive cemetery in Julfa, Nakhichevan. This destruction was temporarily halted when first revealed in 1998, but then continued on to completion in 2005.[120] Azerbaijan has likened Armenia's control of the region to the Nazi occupation of the Soviet Union during World War II.[7]

Current situation

Internally displaced Azerbaijanis from Nagorno-Karabakh.

In the years since the end of the war, a number of organizations have passed resolutions regarding the conflict. On 25 January 2005, for example, PACE adopted a controversial non-binding resolution, Resolution 1416, which criticized the "large-scale ethnic expulsion and the creation of mono-ethnic areas" and declared that Armenian forces were occupying Azerbaijan lands.[121][122] On 14 May 2008 thirty-nine countries from the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 62/243 which called for "the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan." Almost one hundred countries, however, abstained from voting while seven countries, including the three co-chairs of the Minsk Group, Russia, the United States and France, voted against it.[123]

During the summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the session of its Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, member states adopted OIC Resolution № 10/11 and OIC Council of Foreign Ministers Resolution № 10/37, on 14 March 2008 and 18–20 May 2010, respectively. Both resolutions condemned alleged aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan and called for immediate implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884.[124] As a response, Armenian leaders have stated Azerbaijan was "exploiting Islam to muster greater international support."[125]

In early 2008, tensions between Armenia, the NKR Karabakh and Azerbaijan grew. On the diplomatic front, President Ilham Aliyev once again repeated statements that Azerbaijan would resort to force, if necessary, to take the territories back;[126] concurrently, shooting incidents along the line of contact increased. The most significant breach of the ceasefire occurred on 5 March 2008, when up to sixteen soldiers were killed. Both sides accused the other of starting the battle.[127] Moreover, the use of artillery in the recent skirmishes marks a significant departure from previous clashes, which usually involved only sniper or machine gun fire.[128] Deadly skirmishes took place during the summer of 2010 as well.

In 2008, the Moscow Defense Brief opined that because of the rapid growth of Azeri defense expenditures  – which is driving the strong rearmament of the Azeri armed forces  – the military balance appeared to be now shifting in Azerbaijan's favor: "...The overall trend is clearly in Azerbaijan’s favor, and it seems that Armenia will not be able to sustain an arms race with Azerbaijan’s oil-fueled economy. And this could lead to the destabilization of the frozen conflict between these two states," the journal wrote.[129] Other analysts have made more cautious observations, noting that administrative and military deficiencies are obviously found in the Azerbaijani military and have noted that the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army attempts a "constant state of readiness..."[130]

Misconduct

Emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union as nascent states and due to the near-immediate fighting, it was not until mid-1993 that Armenia and Azerbaijan became signatories of international law agreements, including the Geneva Conventions. Allegations from all three governments (including Nagorno-Karabakh's) regularly accused the other side of committing atrocities which were at times confirmed by third party media sources or human rights organizations. Khojaly Massacre, for example, was confirmed by both Human Rights Watch and Memorial while what became known as the Maraghar Massacre was alleged by a group from the British-based organization Christian Solidarity International in 1992.[7][131] Azerbaijan was condemned by HRW for its use of aerial bombing in densely populated civilian areas and both sides were criticized for indiscriminate fire, hostage-taking and the forcible displacement of civilians.[89]

The lack of international laws for either side to abide by virtually sanctioned activity in the war to what would be considered war crimes. Looting and mutilation (body parts such as ears, brought back from the front as treasured war souvenirs) of dead soldiers were commonly reported and even boasted about among soldiers.[7] Another practice that took form, not by soldiers but by regular civilians during the war, was the bartering of prisoners between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Often, when contact was lost between family members and a soldier or a militiaman serving at the front, they took it upon themselves to organize an exchange by personally capturing a soldier from the battle lines and holding them in the confines of their own homes. New York Times journalist Yo'av Karny noted this practice was as "old as the people occupying [the] land."[132]

After the war ended, both sides accused their opponents of continuing to hold captives; Azerbaijan claimed Armenia was continuing to hold nearly 5,000 Azerbaijani prisoners while Armenians claimed Azerbaijan was holding 600 prisoners. The non-profit group, Helsinki Initiative 92, investigated two prisons in Shusha and Stepanakert after the war ended, but concluded there were no prisoners-of-war there. A similar investigation arrived at the same conclusion while searching for Armenians allegedly laboring in Azerbaijan's quarries.[8]

Notes

  1. ^ a b Taarnby, Michael. "The Mujaheddin in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case Study in the Evolution of Global Jihad." Real Institute Elcano. 5 September 2008.
  2. ^ Griffin, Nicholas (2004). Caucasus: A Journey to the Land Between Christianity and Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 185–186. ISBN 0-226-30859-6. 
  3. ^ a b c DeRouen, Karl and Uk Heo (eds.) Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2007, p. 148. ISBN 978-1-85109-919-1.
  4. ^ Наёмники!Нагорный Карабах, Абхазия, Чечня, Югославия http://smotri.com/video/view/?id=v10746247aec
  5. ^ a b c d (Russian) Melik-Shahnazarov, Arsen. Нагорный Карабах: факты против лжи.
  6. ^ "Winds of Change in Nagorno Karabakh ." Euronews. 28 November 2009.
  7. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab De Waal, Thomas (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. New York: New York University Press. pp. passim. ISBN 0-8147-1945-7. 
  8. ^ a b c d Ohanyan, Karine; Zarema Velikhanova (12 May 2004). "Investigation: Karabakh: Missing in Action – Alive or Dead?". Institute for War and Peace Reporting. http://iwpr.gn.apc.org/?s=f&o=160728&apc_state=henicrs2004. 
  9. ^ The region's names in various languages tend to have the same approximate meaning. The name first originated in Georgian and Persian sources in the 13th and 14th centuries. In Azerbaijani, the name of the region translates to "mountainous Karabakh [black garden]". Armenians also commonly refer to it as Artsakh, an allusion to the tenth province of the ancient Kingdom of Armenia; the name is often seen shortened to simply Karabakh in news sources and books. Other languages such as Russian, French and German refer to the region, respectively, as Nagorny Karabakh, Haut-Karabakh (Upper Karabakh) and Bergkarabach (Mountain-Karabach).
  10. ^ Rieff, David (June 1997). "Without Rules or Pity". Foreign Affairs (Council on Foreign Relations) 76 (2). http://www.cilicia.com/armo19e.html. Retrieved 13 February 2007. 
  11. ^ Lieberman, Benjamin (2006). Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. pp. 284–292. ISBN 1-56663-646-9. 
  12. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Croissant, Michael P. (1998). The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications. London: Praeger. ISBN 0-275-96241-5. 
  13. ^ It should be noted that at the time of the dissolution of the USSR, the United States government recognized as legitimate the pre-Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 1933 borders of the country (the Franklin D. Roosevelt government established diplomatic relations with the Kremlin at the end of that year). Because of this, the George H. Bush administration openly supported the secession of the Baltic SSRs, but regarded the questions related to the independence and territorial conflicts of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the rest of the Transcaucasus as internal Soviet affairs.
  14. ^ Four UN Security Council resolutions, passed in 1993, called on withdrawal of Armenian forces from the regions falling outside of the borders of the former NKAO.
  15. ^ Using numbers provided by journalist Thomas de Waal for the area of each rayon as well as the area of the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast and the total area of Azerbaijan are (in square kilometres): 1,936, Kelbajar; 1,835, Lachin; 802, Kubatly; 1,050, Jebrail; 707, Zangelan; 842, Aghdam; 462, Fizuli; 75, exclaves; totaling 7,709 km² or 8.9%: De Waal. Black Garden, p. 286.
  16. ^ a b c The Central Intelligence Agency. "The CIA World Factbook: Transnational Issues in Country Profile of Azerbaijan". https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html#Issues. Retrieved 14 February 2007.  Military involvement denied by the Armenian government.
  17. ^ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROA. Circular by colonel D. I. Shuttleworth of the British Command. Republic of Armenia Archives, File No. 9. Retrieved 2 March 2007.
  18. ^ a b Karagiannis, Emmanuel. (2002). Energy and Security in the Caucasus. London: RoutledgeCurzon. pp. 36, 40. ISBN 0-7007-1481-2. 
  19. ^ Bradshaw, Michael J; George W. White (2004). Contemporary World Regional Geography: Global Connections, Local Voices. New York: Mcgraw-Hill. p. 164. ISBN 0-07-254975-0. 
  20. ^ Yamskov, A. N. "Ethnic Conflict in the Transcausasus: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh." Theory and Society, Vol. 20, No. 5, Special Issue on Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union October 1991, p. 659. Retrieved on 13 February 2007.
  21. ^ Weisbrode, Kenneth (2001). Central Eurasia – Prize or Quicksand?: Contending Views of Instability in Karabakh, Ferghana and Afghanistan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 27. ISBN 0-19-851070-5. 
  22. ^ Nadein-Raevski, V. "The Azerbaijani Armenian Conflict" in Ethnicity and Conflict in a Post-Communist World. Rupesinghe, K., King, P., Vorkunova, O. (eds.) New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, p. 118.
  23. ^ Gilbert, Martin (2001). A History of the Twentieth Century: The Concise Edition of the Acclaimed World History. New York: Harper Collins. p. 594. ISBN 0-06-050594-X. 
  24. ^ Brown, Archie (1996). The Gorbachev Factor. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 262. ISBN 0-19-288052-7. 
  25. ^ (Russian) Anon. "Кто на стыке интересов? США, Россия и новая реальность на границе с Ираном" (Who is at the turn of interests? US, Russia and new reality on the border with Iran). Regnum. 4 April 2006.
  26. ^ Lobell, Steven E.; Philip Mauceri (2004). Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. p. 58. ISBN 1-4039-6356-8. 
  27. ^ a b Cornell, Svante E. Small nations and great powers: a study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus. London: Routledge, 2001. ISBN 0-7007-1162-7.
  28. ^ a b Rost, Yuri (1990). The Armenian Tragedy: An Eye-Witness Account of Human Conflict and Natural Disaster in Armenia and Azerbaijan. New York: St. Martin's Press. p. 17. ISBN 0-312-04611-1. 
  29. ^ a b c d Kaufman, Stuart (2001). Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. New York: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. pp. 49–66. ISBN 0-8014-8736-6. 
  30. ^ it has been argued that very little is known about the incidents because the authorities are alleged to have suppressed any information about it: see De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 18–19.
  31. ^ (Russian) Chronology of the conflict. Memorial.
  32. ^ (Russian) Kulish, O. and Melikov, D. Socialist Industry. 27 March 1988. Retrieved 30 March 2008.
  33. ^ Remnick, David. "Hate Runs High in Soviet Union's Most Explosive Ethnic Feud." The Washington Post. 6 September 1989.
  34. ^ See Shahmuratian, Samvel (ed.) (1990). The Sumgait Tragedy: Pogroms Against Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan. New York: Zoryan Institute. ISBN 0-89241-490-1. 
  35. ^ See Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller (2003), Armenia: Portraits of Survival and Hope. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0-5202-3492-5.
  36. ^ Hovannisian, Richard G. (1971). The Republic of Armenia: The First Year, 1918–1919, Vol. I. Berkeley: University of California Press. p. 91. ISBN 0-520-01984-9. 
  37. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Melkonian, Markar (2005). My Brother's Road, An American's Fateful Journey to Armenia. New York: I.B. Tauris. pp. passim. ISBN 1-85043-635-5. 
  38. ^ a b Chorbajian, Levon (2001). The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh: From Secession to Republic. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 1, 161, 213. ISBN 0-333-77340-3. 
  39. ^ a b c Svante E. Cornell. "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict." Report No 46, Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University, 1999.
  40. ^ "Letter dated December 23, 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General". United Nations. http://www.un.int/azerbaijan/pdf/Updates/24%20dec%202009%20letter.pdf. Retrieved 4 December 2010. 
  41. ^ (Russian) Pogroms in Armenia: Opinions, Conjecture and Facts. Interview with Head of the Armenian Committee for National Security Husik Harutyunyan. Ekspress-Khronika. No. 16. 16 April 1991. Retrieved 1 August 2008.
  42. ^ Hofheinz, Paul (5 December 1988). "Nationalities People Power, Soviet Style". Time. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,956447,00.html. Retrieved 2 May 2006. 
  43. ^ Hofheinz, Paul (23 October 1989). "On the Edge of Civil War". Time. http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,958833,00.html. Retrieved 13 March 2006. 
  44. ^ a b Altstadt, Audrey L. The Azerbaijani Turks: power and identity under Russian rule. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992, p. 215.
  45. ^ Smolowe, Jill (29 January 1990). "The Killing Zone". TIME Magazine. http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,969280,00.html. Retrieved 25 February 2006. 
  46. ^ Abu-Hamad, Aziz, et al. Playing the "Communal Card": Communal Violence and Human Rights Human Rights Watch.
  47. ^ a b Cullen, Robert. "A Reporter at Large, Roots." The New Yorker. 15 April 1991.
  48. ^ a b c d e (Russian) "АРМЕНИЯ – АЗЕРБАЙДЖАН: ЭТО УЖЕ ПРОСТО ВОЙНА". Vlasts. 20 August 1990. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc-rss.aspx?DocsID=266481. 
  49. ^ "Zheleznovodsk Declaration". 23 September 1991. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/keytexts6.php. Retrieved 22 April 2010. 
  50. ^ Eichensehr, Kristen; Reisman, W.Michael (1998). Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Studies in International Intervention. Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 54. ISBN 978-90-04-17855-7. http://books.google.com/?id=tjcSb5Yw2_UC&pg=PA55&dq=November+20+Azerbaijan+helicopter&q. Retrieved 22 April 2010. 
  51. ^ a b c (Russian) "Доклад правозащитного центра «Мемориал» о массовых нарушениях прав человека, связанных с занятием населенного пункта Ходжалы в ночь с 25 на 26 февраля 1992 г. вооружёнными формированиями." Memorial.
  52. ^ "14 KILLED AS AZERIS DISRUPT ELECTION". The Courier Mail/The Sunday Mail (Australia). 30 December 1991. 
  53. ^ "Shelling kills 14 people in Azerbaijan". The Advertiser/Sunday Mail (Adelaide, South Australia). 30 December 1991. 
  54. ^ "Untitled". The Mercury/Sunday Tasmanian (Australia). 30 December 1991. 
  55. ^ (Russian) Dmitrii Faydengold (30 December 1991). "Завершен вывод войск из Нагорного Карабаха". Kommersant. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?fromsearch=e9d62166-98ec-4359-8810-caf7d38148d9&docsid=2213. 
  56. ^ Petrosian, David. "What Are the Reasons for Armenians' Success in the Military Phase of the Karabakh Conflict?" Noyan Tapan Highlights. 1 June 2000.
  57. ^ a b c Carney, James (13 April 1992). "Former Soviet Union Carnage in Karabakh". TIME Magazine. http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,975278,00.html. Retrieved 13 April 2006. 
  58. ^ Smith, Hedrick (1991). The New Russians. New York: Harper Perennial. pp. 344–345. ISBN 0-380-71651-8. 
  59. ^ Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. Humanitarian aid was not explicitly banned but such supplies had to be routed through indirectly to aid organizations. On 25 January 2002, President George W. Bush signed a waiver that effectively repealed Section 907, thereby removing any restrictions that were barring the United States from sending military aid to Azerbaijan; however, military parity is maintained towards both sides. For more information, see here [1]. Azerbaijan continues to maintain their road and air blockade against Armenia.
  60. ^ a b Gurdelik, Rasit (30 January 1994). "Azerbaijanis Rebuild Army with Foreign Help". The Seattle Times: p. A3. http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19940130&slug=1892424. Retrieved 10 January 2011. 
  61. ^ a b Chorbajian, Levon; Patrick Donabedian, Claude Mutafian (1994). The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh. London: Zed Books. pp. 13–18. ISBN 1-85649-288-5.  Unless otherwise stated, the statistics cited by the authors is from data compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in London in a report entitled The Military Balance, 1993–1994 published in 1993. The 20,000 figure of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh included 8,000 volunteers from Armenia itself; Armenia's military in the report was exclusively made up of members in the army; Azerbaijan's statistics referred to 38,000 members in its army and 1,600 in its air force. Reference to these statistics can be found on pages 68–69 and 71–73 of the report.
  62. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l [Храмчихин, Александр Анатольевич "На кавказских фронтах – ситуация патовая. Пока...", Независимое военное обозрение 15 January 2010 | http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2010-01-15/1_kavkaz.html
  63. ^ a b c [Mikhail Barabanov "Nagorno-Karabakh: Shift in the Military Balance" | http://infoarm.blogspot.com/2008/09/nagorno-karabakh-shift-in-military.html]
  64. ^ a b Curtis, Glenn E. (1995). Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Country Studies. Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division Library of Congress. ISBN 0-8444-0848-4. 
  65. ^ (Russian) Faydengold, Dmitrii (06.01.1992). "Новый год в Карабахе: пахло не шампанским". Kommersant. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?fromsearch=376e2e47-9fba-471f-a8d7-db7dfcb8841c&docsid=2353. 
  66. ^ Gokay, Bulent (2003). The Politics of Caspian Oil. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 189–190. ISBN 0-333-73973-6. 
  67. ^ a b Melkonian. My Brother's Road, p. 213.
  68. ^ The Armenian government denies that a deliberate massacre took place in Khojaly and maintains most of the civilians were killed in a crossfire shooting between Armenian and Azeri troops.
  69. ^ Letter from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations Office
  70. ^ Quinn-Judge, Paul (3 March 1992). "Armenians killed 1000, Azeris charge.". Boston Globe. http://www.khojaly.net/press.html. Retrieved 2 March 2007. 
  71. ^ Denber Rachel. Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Escalation of the Armed Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. New York: Helsinki Watch, September 1992, pp. 19–21. ISBN 1-56432-081-2.
  72. ^ (Russian) "Весеннее оживление в Нагорном Карабахе". Kommersant. 06.04.1992. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?fromsearch=8ee300c2-1d04-4f51-b932-9a580cb38550&docsid=4073. 
  73. ^ Rubin, Barry; Kemal Kirisci (2001). Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner. p. 175. ISBN 1-55587-954-3. 
  74. ^ a b c Mouradian, Khatchig. "Terror in Karabakh: Chechen Warlord Shamil Basayev's Tenure in Azerbaijan." The Armenian Weekly.
  75. ^ Yossef Bodansky (2008). Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda's Training Ground and the Next Wave of Terror (reprint ed.). HarperCollins. p. 36. ISBN 0061429775. http://books.google.com/books?id=gQeZdtqC6EsC&pg=PA36&dq=basayev+gru+agent&hl=en&ei=rRhITsqdOYTb0QHJrO2TCA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=basayev%20gru%20agent&f=false. Retrieved 14 August 2011. 
  76. ^ Bertsch, Gary (1999). Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. London: Routledge. pp. 167–171, 172–173, 297. ISBN 0-415-92273-9. 
  77. ^ Brown, Michael E. (1996). The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Cambridge: MIT Press. p. 125. ISBN 0-262-52209-8. 
  78. ^ Notholt, Stuart (2008). Fields of Fire: An Atlas of Ethnic Conflict. Troubador Publishing Ltd. p. 7.17. ISBN 1-906510-47-4. 
  79. ^ Goldberg, Carey (14 June 1992). "Azerbaijan Troops Launch Karabakh Offensive Conflict". The Los Angeles Times. http://www.latimes.com/. Retrieved 17 February 2007. 
  80. ^ Dr. Mahmood Vaezi. Vice-President of the Center for Strategic Research and Head of Foreign Policy Research. "Mediation in the Karabakh Dispute". Center for Strategic Research. http://www.csr.ir/departments.aspx?lng=en&abtid=07&depid=74&semid=989. Retrieved 6 May 2010. 
  81. ^ Jean-Christophe Peuch (25 July 2001). "Caucasus: Iran Offers To Mediate In Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute". RFE/RL. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1097022.html. Retrieved 6 May 2010. 
  82. ^ (Russian) "Важный документ по Карабаху или ничего особенного? [An important document on Karabakh or one of no significance?]". Vremya Novostei. 11 June 2008. http://www.portugal.mid.ru/rus/news_10.html. Retrieved May 2010. 
  83. ^ Freire, Maria Raquel (2003). Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union: The Role of the OSCE. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. ISBN 0-7546-3526-0. 
  84. ^ Dahlburg, John-Thor (24 August 1992). "Azerbaijan Accused of Bombing Civilians". Chicago Sun-Times.  Kocharyan's assertion in regards to the former allegation was confirmed by the testimonies given by Russian and Ukrainian pilots, hired to fly in the Azerbaijani air force, after being shot down by Armenian forces near Stepanakert. The pilots claimed that their Azerbaijani commanders outlined the air strikes to explicitly target civilian rather than military targets, thereby instowing panic upon the city's populace: (Russian) Русские наемники воевавшие в Карабахе. Documentary produced and broadcast by REN TV.
  85. ^ a b c Chrysanthopolous, Leonidas T. (2002). Caucasus Chronicles: Nation-building and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993–1994. Princeton: Gomidas Institute Books. ISBN 1-884630-05-7. 
  86. ^ Sammakia, Nejla (23 December 1992). "Winter Brings Misery to Azerbaijani Refugees". San Francisco Chronicle. http://sfgate.com/chronicle/. Retrieved 8 August 2006. 
  87. ^ Bourdreaux, Richard (5 January 1993). "Despite Appeals, Karabakh Battles Rage". The Los Angeles Times. http://www.latimes.com/. Retrieved 8 February 2007. 
  88. ^ "Armenians Rally to Protest Leader". The Los Angeles Times. 6 February 1993. http://www.latimes.com/. Retrieved 17 February 2007. 
  89. ^ a b c d e See Human Rights Watch/Helsinki. Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994.
  90. ^ a b United Nations Security Council Resolution 822 passed on 30 April 1993. A total of four UNSC resolutions were passed in regards to the conflict.
  91. ^ "Rebel troops push toward Azeri capital." Toronto Star. 21 June 1993, p. A12.
  92. ^ (Russian) Laura Baghdasaryan and Arif Yunusov. "Война, социальные изменения и синдромы 'ни войны, ни мира' в азербайджанском и армянском обществах". Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/russian/russian15.php.  "в 1993 году президент Гейдар Алиев расформировал 33 добровольческих батальона, состоявших в основном из сторонников оппозиции. Это стало во многом причиной кризиса на фронте и последовавшего захвата армянами семи районов вокруг Нагорного Карабаха."
  93. ^ The genuineness of the NKR's claims during the 1993 summer offensives were widely questioned in the international forum on whether or not Karabakh forces were wantonly seizing the territories surrounding the enclave. While many doubted that they were true, periodic fighting between the two sides in the regions was reported to have been occurring months before the offensives took place.
  94. ^ During the Russian constitutional crisis of 1993, one of the coup's leaders against Russian President Yeltsin, Chechen Ruslan Khasbulatov, was reported by the US and French intelligence agencies to preparing Russian troop withdrawals from Armenia if the coup succeeded. An estimated 23,000 Russian soldiers were stationed in Armenia on the border of Turkey. Çiller was reported by the agencies to be collaborating with Khasbulatov for him to give her tacit support in allowing possible military incursions by Turkey into Armenia under the pretext of pursuing PKK guerrillas, an act it had once followed up on earlier the same year in northern Iraq. Russian armed forces, however, crushed the coup.
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  97. ^ Under the protocols of the Tashkent Agreement signed in Uzbekistan in May 1992, the former Soviet republics were allocated a certain number of tanks, armored vehicles and combat aircraft. The agreement allowed Armenia and Azerbaijan to have a total of 100 aircraft. The Armenian Air Force currently possesses a fleet of 12 Mil Mi-24s gunships, 9 Mil Mi-2s and 13 Mil Mi-8s transport helicopters. Azerbaijan's air force has a near-similar fleet of 15 Mil Mi-24s, 7 Mil Mi-2, 15 Mil Mi-6 and 13 Mil Mi-8 utility helicopters.
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  100. ^ Cooley, John K. (2002). Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism. London: Pluto Press. pp. 150–151. ISBN 0-7453-1917-3. 
  101. ^ As one Armenian fighter commented: "The difference is in what you do and what you do it for. You know a few miles back is your family, children, women and old people and therefore you're duty-bound to fight to the death so that those behind you will live."
  102. ^ Mirsky, Georgiy I. (1997). On Ruins of Empire: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Former Soviet Union. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. p. 63. ISBN 0-313-30044-5. 
  103. ^ Specter, Michael (15 July 1994). "Armenians Suffer Painfully in War, But With Pride and Determination". New York Times. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9907E1D8103FF936A25754C0A962958260. Retrieved 7 January 2007. 
  104. ^ Bell, Christine (2005). Peace Agreements and Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 326. ISBN 0-19-927096-1. 
  105. ^ (Russian) "Журналисты на войне в Карабахе: Писаренко Дмитрий (Journalists in the Karabakh War: Dmitri Pisarenko)." Biblioteka Centra Ekstremalnoy Zhurnalistiki.
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  112. ^ "Ter-Petrosyan on the BBC: Karabakh conflict could have been resolved by giving certain territories to Azerbaijan". ArmeniaNow. ArmeniaNow. 19 April 2011. http://www.armenianow.com/news/29088/terpetrosyan_bbc_interview. 
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  119. ^ Grigorian, Mariana; Rauf Orujev (20 April 2006). "Murder Case Judgement Reverberates Around Caucasus". Institute for War and Peace Reporting. http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=261218&apc_state=henicrs200604. 
  120. ^ Pickman, Sarah. "Tragedy on the Araxes." Archaeology, 30 June 2006.
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  125. ^ Organization of the Islamic Conference Again Condemns Armenia." Asbarez. 27 September 2010.
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  128. ^ "4 killed in Nagorno-Karabakh region in skirmishes between Azerbaijanis, ethnic Armenians", International Herald Tribune. 10 March 2008. Retrieved 10 March 2008.
  129. ^ Barabanov, Mikhail. "Nagorno-Karabakh: Shift in the Military Balance". Moscow Defense Brief (Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies) (2/2008). http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2008/item2/article2/. Retrieved 27 May 2009. 
  130. ^ Giragosian, Richard. "Armenia and Karabakh: One Nation, Two States." AGBU Magazine. № 1, Vol. 19, May 2009, pp. 12–13.
  131. ^ Speech given by Baroness Caroline Cox in April 1998. "Survivors of Maraghar massacre: It was truly like a contemporary Golgotha many times over." Accessed 10 February 2007.
  132. ^ Karny, Yo'av (2000). Highlanders: A Journey to the Caucasus in Quest of Memory. New York: Douglas & McIntyre. pp. 405–406. ISBN 0-374-52812-8. 

Further reading

Historical overviews

  • Cheterian, Vicken. (2008). War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia's Troubled Frontier. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Cox, Caroline and John Eibner (1993). Ethnic Cleansing in Progress: War in Nagorno Karabakh. Zürich; Washington: Institute for Religious Minorities in the Islamic World.
  • Croissant, Michael P (1998). Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications. London: Praeger.
  • Curtis, Glenn E (1995). Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Country Studies. Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division Library of Congress.
  • De Waal, Thomas (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. New York: New York University Press.
  • Freire, Maria Raquel (2003). Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union: The Role of the OSCE. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
  • Griffin, Nicholas (2004). Caucasus: A Journey to the Land Between Christianity and Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Karny, Yo'av (2000). Highlanders: A Journey to the Caucasus in Quest of Memory. New York: Douglas & McIntyre.
  • Libaridian, Gerard (1988). The Karabagh file: Documents and facts on the region of Mountainous Karabagh, 1918–1988. Cambridge, Mass: Zoryan Institute for Contemporary Armenian Research & Documentation; 1st ed.
  • Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (1994). Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Specific issues and time periods

  • Chrysanthopolous, Leonidas T (2002). Caucasus Chronicles: Nation-building and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993–1994. Princeton: Gomidas Institute.
  • Goltz, Thomas (1998). Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic. New York: M.E. Sharpe ISBN 0-7656-0244-X
  • Kaufman, Stuart (2001.). Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. New York: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.
  • Hovannisian, Richard G. "The Armeno-Azerbaijani Conflict Over Mountainous Karabagh." Armenian Review, XXIV, Summer 1971.
  • ___________________. "Mountainous Karabagh in 1920: An Unresolved Contest." Armenian Review, XLVI, 1993, 1996.
  • Malkasian, Mark (1996). Gha-Ra-Bagh!: The Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia. Wayne State University Press.
  • Rost, Yuri (1990). The Armenian Tragedy: An Eye-Witness Account of Human Conflict and Natural Disaster in Armenia and Azerbaijan. New York: St. Martin's Press
  • Shahmuratian, Samvel (ed.) (1990). The Sumgait Tragedy: Pogroms Against Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan. New York: Zoryan Institute.

Biographies

  • Melkonian, Markar (2005). My Brother's Road, An American's Fateful Journey to Armenia. New York: I.B. Tauris.

External links


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