Fall of Sassanids

The Sassanid era is one of the most influential periods in Iran's (Persia) history. It also marks the second rise of a great Persian empire, a dynasty that rivaled its predecessor, the Achaemenids who too, like the Sassanids were native to the province of Pars, and in some instances the Parthians, in glory and power. Although it was at war with the Roman Empire for centuries during the Roman-Persian Wars, the Sassanid Empire met its demise this time not by the Byzantine Empire, but by Arab Muslims from its southern borders.

ocial problems

Sassanid society was divided into four classes: priests, warriors, secretaries, and commoners. The latter formed the bulk of the population, served as its sole tax base, and remained its poorest class.

Khosrau I's military and taxation reforms had no effect on social status and may have actually worsened life for the commoners. This contributed to people's discontent in later years.

At the climax of Khosrau II's ambitious Byzantine territory conquests in the Levant, taxes rose dramatically, and most people could not pay. Years of Sassanid-Byzantine wars had ruined trade routes and industry, the population's main income sources. Rapid turnover of rulers and increasing provincial landholder power further diminished the Sassanids. Over a period of fourteen years and twelve successive kings, the Sassanid Empire weakened considerably, and the power of the central authority passed into the hands of its generals. Even when a strong king emerged following a series of coups, the Sassanids never completely recovered.

Religion

Zoroastrianism lost its unifying effect as the state religion. The introduction of Mazdakism shattered people's faith in Zoroastrism, and its priests lost their influence on the people. Buddhism in the east and Christianity in the west also played an important role in religious unrest. However, their call wasn't as significant as before.

Military

Years of warfare between Sassanids and Byzantines, as well as the strain of the Khazar invasion of Transcaucasia, exhausted both armies. With no effective ruler following Khosrau II, societal chaos, and problems in provincial administration (until Yazdegerd III), the Persian army lost potency. Yazdegerd III lacked experience and didn't try to rebuild the army.

When Arab squadrons made their first raids into Sassanid territory, Yazdegerd III didn't consider them a threat, and he refused to send an army to encounter the invaders. When the main Arab army reached the Persian borders, Yazdegerd III procrastinated in dispatching an army against the Arabs. Even Rostam-e Farokhzad, who was both Eran Spahbod and Viceroy, didn't see the Arabs as a threat. Without opposition, the Arabs had time to consolidate and fortify their positions.

When the main battle began, the Persian army faced fundamental problems. While heavy cavalry had proved efficient against Roman armies, it was too slow and regimented to act with full force against the agile and unpredictable lightly-armed Arab cavalry and foot archers.

The Persian army did meet with a few initial successes. War-elephants temporarily stopped the Arab army, but when Arab veterans returned from the Syrian fronts where they had been fighting against Byzantine armies, they taught the Arab army how to deal with these beasts. Thus, war-elephants lost their effectiveness.

These factors contributed to the decisive Sassanid defeat at the Battle of al-Qādisiyyah. The Persians, who had only the generation before conquered Egypt and Asia Minor, lost decisive battles when nimble, lightly-armed Arabs accustomed to skirmishes and desert warfare attacked them. The Arab squadrons defeated the Persian army in several more battles culminating in the Battle of Nihawānd, the last major battle of the Sassanids. The Sassanid dynasty came to an end the following year with the death of Yazdegerd III.

ee also

* Islamic conquest of Persia
* Samanid dynasty
* History of Arabs in Afghanistan

References

* Dr. Abd al-Husayn Zarrin’kub "Ruzgaran:tarikh-i Iran az aghz ta saqut saltnat Pahlvi" Sukhan, 1999. ISBN 964-6961-11-8