Human wave attack

"Human wave" redirects here. For the crowd act associated with sporting events, see Audience wave.

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Human wave attack, also known as human sea attack,^[1] is an offensive infantry tactic, in which an attacker conducts an unprotected frontal assault with densely concentrated infantry formations against the enemy line, intended to overrun the defenders by engaging in melee combat.

Definition

According to US Army analyst Edward C. O'Dowd, the technical definition of a human wave attack tactic is a frontal assault by densely concentrated infantry formations against an enemy line, without any attempts to shield or to mask the attacker's movement.^[2] The goal of the human wave attack is to maneuver as many men as possible into melee range, hoping that the shock from a large mass of attackers engaged in melee combat would force the enemy to disintegrate or fall back.^[2]

The human wave attack's reliance on melee combat usually made the skills of individual soldiers irrelevant, but it requires either great physical courage, coercion, or esprit de corps for the attackers to advance into enemy fire.^[3] However, when matched against modern weaponry such as automatic firearms, artillery and aircraft, human wave attack is an extremely dangerous and costly tactic in the face of devastating firepower.^[2] Thus for the human wave attack to succeed on the modern battlefield, it is imperative for the attackers to charge into the enemy line in the shortest time and in the greatest number possible, so that a sufficient mass can be preserved when the attackers reached melee range.^[2] But this solution usually meant that the attackers must sacrifice concealment and covers for numbers and speed.^[2] Because of this trade off, human wave attack tactic is normally used by an attacker with a lack of tactical training, or one who lacks firepower and the ability to maneuver, but whose main advantage is in motivating and controlling their men.^[4]

Usage

The term "human wave attack" has been used to describe the infantry assault tactics used by several armed forces around the world. These included European armies during World War I,^[5] Imperial Japanese Army and Soviet Red Army during World War II,^[6][7] Chinese People's Liberation Army during the Korean War,^[8] Vietnamese insurgents during the Indochina Wars,^[9] and Iranian Basij during the Iran–Iraq War.^[10]

People's Liberation Army

The term "human wave attack" was often misused^[11] to describe the Chinese short attack — a combination of infiltration and the shock tactics employed by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the Korean War.^[12] A typical Chinese short attack was carried out at night by small fireteams on a narrow front against the weakest point in enemy defenses.^[12] The Chinese assault team would crawl undetected within grenade range, then launch surprise attacks against the defenders in order to breach the defenses by relying on maximum shock and confusion.^[12]

If the initial shock failed to breach the defenses, additional fireteams would press on behind them and attack the same point until a breach was created.^[12] Once a penetration was achieved, the bulk of the Chinese forces would move into the enemy rear and attack from behind.^[13] During the attacks, the Chinese assault teams would disperse while masking themselves using the terrain, and this made it difficult for UN defenders to target large number of Chinese troops.^[7] The attacks by the successive Chinese fireteams were also carefully timed to minimize casualties.^[14] Due to the primitive communication systems and the tight political controls within the Chinese army, short attacks were often repeated indefinitely until either the defenses were penetrated or the attacker's ammunition supply were exhausted, regardless of the chances of success or the human cost.^[12]

This persistent attack pattern left a strong impression on UN forces that fought in Korea, thus the description of "human wave" was born.^[8] US Army historian Roy Edgar Appleman observed that the term "human wave" was later used by journalists and military officials to convey the image that the American soldiers were assaulted by overwhelming numbers of Chinese on a broad front, which is inaccurate when compared with the normal Chinese practice of sending successive series of five men teams against a single narrow portion of the line.^[1] S.L.A. Marshall also commented that the word "mass" was indiscriminately used by the media to describe Chinese infantry tactics, and it is rare for the Chinese to actually use densely concentrated infantry formations to absorb enemy firepower.^[15] In response to the media's coining of the term, a joke circulated among the US servicemen was "How many hordes are there in a Chinese platoon?"^[8][12][16]

Although abandoned by the PLA by 1953,^[17] the human wave attack tactic was adapted by the Viet Minh, and later by the Viet Cong and the Vietnam People's Army during the Indochina Wars.^[9] Due to the stagnation of the Chinese military modernization programs during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese army re-adopted this tactic during the Sino-Vietnamese War.^[18] Their use in the Sino-Vietnamese War is a rare example of an army with superior firepower, in this case the PLA, throwing away its advantage.^[19]

See also

• Attrition warfare
• Banzai charge
• Cannon fodder
• Highland charge
• Force concentration
• Swarming (Military)

Notes

1. ^ ^{a b} Appleman 1990, p. 362.
2. ^ ^{a b c d e} O'Dowd 2007, p. 145.
3. ^ O'Dowd 2007, pp. 145–146.
4. ^ O'Dowd 2007, p. 144.
5. ^ O'Dowd 2007, p. 143.
6. ^ Davis 2001, p. 408.
7. ^ ^{a b} Marshall 1988, pp. 5–6
8. ^ ^{a b c} Appleman 1989, p. 353.
9. ^ ^{a b} O'Dowd 2007, p. 149.
10. ^ Anderson, Jon Lee (2009-06-19), Understanding The Basij, New York, NY: The New Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/06/jon-lee-anderson-understanding-the-basij.html, retrieved 2010-11-22 
11. ^ Appleman 1990, p. 363.
12. ^ ^{a b c d e f} Roe 2000, p. 435.
13. ^ Alexander 1986, p. 311.
14. ^ Mahoney 2001, p. 73.
15. ^ Marshall 1988, p. 5.
16. ^ George 1967, pp. 4–5.
17. ^ O'Dowd 2007, p. 148.
18. ^ O'Dowd 2007, pp. 150, 165.
19. ^ O'Dowd 2007, pp. 144, 164.

References

• Alexander, Bevin R. (1986), Korea: The First War We Lost, New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, Inc, ISBN 9780870521355 
• Appleman, Roy (1989), Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur, College Station, TX: Texas A and M University Military History Series, 11, ISBN 9781603441285 
• Appleman, Roy (1990), Escaping the Trap: The US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950, College Station, TX: Texas A and M University Military History Series, 14, ISBN 0-89096-395-9 
• Davis, Paul K. (2001), 100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present, New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA, ISBN 9780195143669 
• George, Alexander L. (1967), The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The War and its Aftermath, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, OCLC 284111 
• Mahoney, Kevin (2001), Formidable Enemies: The North Korean and Chinese Soldier in the Korean War, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, ISBN 9780891417385 
• Marshall, S.L.A. (1988), Infantry Operations and Weapon Usage in Korea, London, UK: Greenhill Books, ISBN 0947898883 
• O'Dowd, Edward C. (2007), Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War, New York, NY: Routledge, ISBN 9780415414272 
• Roe, Patrick C. (2000), The Dragon Strikes, Novato, CA: Presidio, ISBN 0891417036